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Changing Homeland Security: What Should 




Homeland security has spiraled into Stage Five of the Issue Attention Cycle.1 
Stage Five – the post-problem stage – means homeland security again operates 
principally behind the public apron. Stakeholders sedulously sift through the 
grist of homeland security’s congressional, industrial, academic, and bureaucratic 
complex. The professionals who populate that complex spend their days 
calibrating the strategies, programs, and institutions disjunctively formed in the 
earlier stages of the Cycle.  
Except for an occasional fifteen minutes of public attention to dead terrorists, 
disrupted plots, and grant cuts, homeland security is not an issue high on the 
public’s agenda.2 It could leap back on top in an instant.3 But for now most 
conversations about homeland security take place within a comparatively small 
community. 
The issues are largely the same ones talked about for the last five years: 
funding, threats, hazards, borders, interoperability, intelligence, response, 
transportation, equipment, and – recently – pandemics.4 Unarguable progress 
has been made in all these domains. We clearly are better prepared – for some 
things – than we were in the autumn of 2001. Equally as certain, there are miles 
to go before most of the nation’s jurisdictions get a “Sufficient” rating in future 
national preparedness assessments.5 
Stage Five in the Issue Attention Cycle means there is little political will to 
substantially alter the hodgepodge federalism that characterizes U.S. homeland 
security. The system we have is the one we have to work with, at least until 
something significant happens: another attack, a catastrophic natural disaster, a 
national public health emergency, or a new political administration. 6  
Until the system is shocked, much homeland security work will be 
incremental. It will continue to focus on the mundane but institutionally 
important work of answering “how prepared are we, how prepared do we need to 
be, and how do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”7 The operational agenda 
will funnel attention toward measuring outputs and outcomes, and stutter fitfully 
around peripatetic priorities, like “creating a culture of preparedness” or 
modernizing “our planning processes, products, tools, and the training, 
education, and development of homeland security planners who are expected to 
use them.”8   
If the country is never attacked again, if there are no more national traumas, 
then incrementalism is a cautious, stable and appropriate way to continue to 
improve homeland security. But if something calamitous does happen, 
incrementalism does not stand a chance. 
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Ammunition and Weapons 
Management attends to the realism of what is. Leadership looks toward what 
could be, what should be. What should the future be like in homeland security? 
And how can we get there? 
Future-thinking homeland security leaders are like ammunition, particularly 
during Stage Five. They are seeking weapons – looking for opportunities to be 
used. Elected and other political officials are the weapons, especially primed to do 
battle during times of national crisis, when the Attention Cycle coils around to 
“alarmed discovery.”   
Immediately after the next national trauma, elected officials will be looking for 
answers, for ideas about what to do to respond to the “discovery” that we remain 
exposed to a cluster of vulnerabilities already familiar to homeland security 
specialists. Elementary schools – critical infrastructure to the parents of every 
student – are unprotected targets. Chemical plants – patiently waiting to be 
weaponized – sit in the midst of high-density populations. The medical care 
system has about ten percent of the ventilators needed during a pandemic. Foot 
and Mouth disease, caused by a virus that can easily be brought into the country, 
can infect livestock in an entire region and significantly affect food related 
businesses, employment, and economies. The list of how vulnerable the nation is 
to harm is practically endless.9 
The next significant national event will create an environment that supports, if 
not demands, substantial change. What should those changes be? More of the 
same, but with added discipline and control? A rededication to the principles of 
authentic federalism? A re-imagining of our core civil liberties? Something 
completely different? 
What will homeland security leaders recommend after the next tragedy? Less 
dramatically, what ideas will they champion when city, state, or national political 
administrations change?   
The questions should be discussed now, before answers are needed, before 
emotion drowns deliberation.   
Responses to these open-ended questions will emerge from conversations 
among people who care about homeland security when it is not on top of the 
nation’s policy agenda. The discussions will be based on a mix of research, 
experience, opinion, ideology, and bias. Participants in the conversation will be 
political officials, interest group representatives, public administrators, 
academics, professional commentators, the occasional unattached citizen, and 
others who form the amoebic body of homeland security leaders. These are 
people who could be called Stage Five leaders. 
 
You Might Be A Homeland Security Leader If . . .  
Anyone who has read this far can probably name at least half a dozen people they 
look to for thoughtful homeland security ideas and perspectives. You can find 
familiar names on books and articles, in the appendices of Department of 
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Homeland Security (DHS) and think tank reports, and at congressional 
hearings.10 Stage Five leaders routinely appear at homeland security conferences, 
on workshop panels, and in subject matter expert groups. Recently some of them 
have been featured in media tales about former government officials who moved 
to private industry.11   
The leaders come from many arenas. Their ideas can help shape the future of 
homeland security. What should they be talking about? 
 “What is past is prologue” is inscribed on a statue outside of the National 
Archives, home of the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and other 
foundational America charters.12 The phrase implies those who are interested in 
the future have an obligation to know 
something about the past. 
Homeland security is old enough to 
have a past. Part of that past is 
encapsulated in the strategies, policies, 
programs, and processes that shape the 
work of the homeland security 
professional. How much of this past do 
you know?  
 Try your hand at answering the 
following questions. Suggestively, they 
outline what could be called basic 
homeland security literacy – at least in 
the cognitive domain.  
1. What is the official definition of 
Homeland Security? Absent an official 
definition, what is a defensible 
definition? How does that compare with 
the official definition? 
2.  Identify the basic elements of the nation’s homeland security policy. 
3. Describe the objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. If you have a state or local perspective, also identify the 
objectives of your jurisdiction’s homeland security strategy. Extra 
points if you can highlight the prevention elements in any of the 
strategies. 
4. How many of the eight principles that shaped the National Strategy 
can you name? 
5. How many homeland security presidential directives have been 
issued? Extra leadership points given for each one you can describe 
(and saying “HSPD 1, HSPD 2, …” doesn’t count). 
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6. What is the National Preparedness Goal? What is the “vision” for the 
national preparedness goal? What is the difference between the two? 
How much of either can you recite?   
7. Identify the seven priorities for national preparedness. Add extra 
points for being able to separate them into “overarching priorities” and 
“priorities to build specific capabilities.” Double your point score for 
this question if you can repeat the rumor about an eighth priority, 
supposedly added after Katrina. 
8. What are the National Planning Scenarios? How are they intended to 
help preparedness? On what basis have they been criticized?  Without 
looking, how many can you describe? 
9. What is the difference between the TCL and the UTL? How many 
items are in each group (plus or minus ten percent)? Where do they fit 
within the “culture of preparedness?” 
10. Explain the difference between, and relationships among, NIMS, 
ICS, NRP, ESF, unity of command, and unified command. Subtract 
points from your final score if you have to look up the acronyms. 
11. Define “risk.” How is risk determined? How do you distinguish risk 
from threat and vulnerability? How many definitions of risk can you 
cite? You get one extra point for each definition, up to a maximum of 
22. 
12. Provide convincing distinctions among the terms prevention, 
protection, readiness, and preparedness. Three extra points for 
identifying the national policy document that defines prevention as 
activities undertaken “during the early stages of an incident.” 
13. Draw your jurisdiction’s homeland security organizational or 
network structure. Which agency or people are the critical nodes in 
that system, and why? Extra points if the structure extends beyond 
your jurisdiction’s political boundaries. 
14. Explain the process used to decide the 2006 DHS grant awards. 
Identify how much it costs your jurisdiction – direct and indirect costs 
– for each dollar of homeland security funding it receives. 
15. Describe how you have, or plan to, or should, measure the impact of 
homeland security programs and spending in your jurisdiction. 
16. Have you seen and understood your jurisdiction’s most recent 
threat assessment? If no, why not? If yes, what did you do with the 
information? Who do you tell what your requirements are for 
intelligence? 
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17.  Have you initiated or responded to a DHS data call? Have you seen 
or used the results of that call? How? 
18. Can you identify the most significant critical infrastructure in your 
jurisdiction? To whom is it significant? What proportion of your critical 
infrastructure is outside your ability to control or influence? 
19. Describe your jurisdiction’s crisis communication strategy. 
Additional points awarded for identifying the core message that will be 
communicated for specific catastrophic incidents. 
20. How important is homeland security to the public officials and 
citizens in your jurisdiction? How do you know? Additional points if 
homeland security is important enough to you to have at least one 
emergency preparedness kit and a family crisis plan. 
 
 Extra Credit – Multiple choice (select all that apply).  
You don’t know the answer to some or all of the above questions, but you:  
 a) Know where to find the answers;  
 b) Know someone who can tell you the answers if and when you ever 
need them;  
 c) Know better questions to ask; or  
 d) Know more effective ways to figure out who the Stage Five homeland 
security leaders are. 
 
What Should Stage Five Leaders Be Talking About? 
How did you do? In my experience, very few homeland security leaders are able 
to correctly answer more than half of those somewhat pedantic questions. (In the 
past year, I have found only one person who can say what the vision is for the 
National Preparedness Goal.)   
The questions have superficial face validity about one’s level of homeland 
security literacy. However, one could argue (perhaps convincingly) that knowing 
details is not what leadership ought to be about. Leadership should be about big-
picture issues; the forest rather than the trees; the 30,000-foot view of homeland 
security – pick your own metaphor. Details – although important – are for the 
people who manage what leaders create.13 
 
Three Big Homeland Security Pictures 
There are at least three big-picture perspectives that can frame conversations 
about the future of homeland security: strict constructionism, middle-of-the-road 
moderation, and radical reconstructionism.14 
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The traditional view – if one can use the word “traditional” with anything 
related to homeland security – is that homeland security initially was about 
preventing and responding to terrorism.15 The post-Katrina and the pre-
pandemic political environment has expanded the scope of what constitutes 
homeland security. Should that expansion be resisted, embraced, ignored?   
Strict constructionists embrace the traditional perspective. They maintain 
homeland security is about terrorism, pure and simple, just as it says in the 
National Strategy. Other agencies deal with other policy issues. Homeland 
Security can collaborate with them. Let FEMA, state, and local emergency 
management agencies have natural disasters. Public health can take the lead for 
pandemics. The terrorism portfolio belongs unambiguously to homeland 
security.  
Middle-of-the-road moderates are in a second group. They agree homeland 
security is about terrorism. But they say it should and could be about more than 
that. Concentrating too much on terrorism reduces overall readiness. They offer 
the Katrina response as evidence. 
“9/11 was a distraction for us,” said one western state emergency management 
official. “Our threats are wildfires and tornados. Since homeland security showed 
up, we’ve gotten away from planning, training and doing exercises about our 
actual threats. Now people are too busy writing homeland security grants and 
reports to work on our real issues. If anything, we’ve fallen behind.”16  
“When are we going to be finished with this preparedness business so we can 
get back to our regular work?” asked an eastern state administrator.17  
Middle-of-the-road moderates draw attention to the dual-use value of 
emergency preparedness structures and processes. 
One state emergency management leader said, in response to criticisms that 
terrorism displaces effort, “What we do to get prepared for an all hazards 
response can help us respond to other threats, like terrorism and pandemics.” 18   
Radical reconstructionists advocate a third perspective. They assert that 
homeland security is about much more than stopping the next terrorist attack, 
responding to natural disasters, or getting ready for pandemics. The public safety 
disciplines struggling to find unifying themes can help the nation by paying more 
attention to the social and economic conditions that give rise to and support 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience.”19  
A lexicographer cautions not to “confuse sécurité, the feeling of having nothing 
to fear, and sûreté, the state of having nothing to fear.”20 Radical 
reconstructionists focus on the state of having nothing (or at least less) to fear. 
They contrast the comparatively few Americans who have been killed by 
terrorists with the substantial number of people killed each year by traffic 
accidents, tobacco, seasonal flu, and other preventable events. They ask why 
homeland security is not more concerned with gang violence, illegal drugs, 
inadequate public health and medical care, second-rate educational systems, and 
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other domestic policy problems that ultimately have as much to do with 
homeland sûrete as countering terrorism.21  
Many of our national homeland security and defense-related strategies have 
short-term and long-term elements.22 Short-term strategic work is directed at 
immediate problems. Long-term activities aim to address underlying causes of 
those problems.23 Self-starter Islamic fundamentalist terrorists are a growing 
domestic threat.24 Left and right wing domestic terrorists are still active.25 
Homeland security needs both short- and long-term perspectives. From a social 
perspective, its current operational point of view is too short, too narrow. 
Radical reconstructionists argue the behemoth that is the Department of 
Homeland Security – and eventually its state and local functional counterparts – 
could usefully collaborate with other agencies to dampen the social conditions 
that contribute to domestic unrest, including terrorism. How many years without 
attacks have to pass before politicians stop providing forty billion dollar budgets? 
How many uninsured or underemployed or uneducated does it take to create a 
homeland security problem? As those who focus on social capital and the 
community development dimensions of homeland security suggest, “It’s tough to 
be a terrorist in a caring community.”26  
 
AN INVITATION 
The conversational terrain shaping the future of homeland security sits 
somewhere between being able to recite the National Preparedness Goal and 
advocating that DHS evolve into a social services agency.   
Regardless of how you did on the basic literacy test, or what big picture you 
may subscribe to, you are invited to participate in a thought experiment to 
answer the question: What should homeland security leaders be talking about?   
Envision a strategic conversation among Stage Five leaders.  The conversation 
is strategic in the sense that it concentrates on the large purposes and activities of 
homeland security as a policy area within the wider social, economic, and 
political environment.27 It is oriented more toward the possibilities of the future 
than the pressing concerns of today. It is a conversation in the sense of civil 
communication among participants. It is characterized by cognitive and affective 
maturity, listening, risking, and learning. That is the premise for the experiment. 
Now, what are the participants in this conversation talking about? 
If you are interested in sharing your thoughts, please send an email to 
cbellavi@nps.edu describing what you think Stage Five homeland security 
leaders ought to be talking about and why.   
We will publish creative, provocative, and thoughtful responses in the next 
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On Killing al-Zarqawi – Does United States Policy 
Know Its Tools in the War on Terror? 
 
Donald J. Reed 
 
 
"Do not rejoice that you killed (al-Zarqawi), he has left behind 
lions that ... trained under him.” 
Statement attributed to al-Zarqawi’s reported successor Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.1 
 
 
TERRORISM PROCESSES VERSUS TERRORIST ENTITIES 
The air attack that killed al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – the successful 
synchronization of actionable intelligence and tactical military operations that 
eliminated a key terrorist network node – was a good thing. Much of the media- 
pundit and popular analysis that followed has focused on the potential impact of 
al-Zarqawi’s death on the outcome of the war in Iraq. The demand of the 
American public for information and results notwithstanding, the emphasis on 
outcome is not the right approach. Al-Zarqawi’s death serves greater strategic 
purpose both in the war in Iraq, and in the larger war on terror, when viewed as 
process rather than as outcome or end-state. 
The diffusion of threat specificity when viewing terrorism as a methodology, 
exemplified by the terror network known as al Qaeda, makes strategic thought 
difficult. Conventional wartime strategy has traditionally concerned itself with 
identifying enemy weaknesses or centers of gravity and using military force to 
strike at them. The issue becomes how to craft a strategy to exploit an 
asymmetrical enemy’s weaknesses without always knowing who the enemy is, or 
even what means of war he will employ. A war that encompasses literally any 
group using terrorist tactics becomes impossibly broad, engulfing a wide range of 
groups that includes those posing no meaningful threat to the United States.   
In the war on terror it becomes necessary therefore to distinguish between 
terrorism as a process and terrorist networks as entities. Terrorism, as a process, 
includes sub-processes that can be disrupted through the networking of political 
information security (i.e. military or law enforcement), economic, and social 
means. Those sub-processes vulnerable to disruption include:  leadership 
development; alliance building; public and ideological outreach; acquisition of 
funding, materiel, shelter and support; recruitment; organization of efforts; 
indoctrination and training of personnel; planning and targeting; movement and 
operations; communications; and exploitation of results.2 When viewed as 
entities, different targeted strategies are required to defeat individual terrorist 
networks depending on whether their ideologies are rooted in political, economic, 
cultural, or special-interest origins. Strategies focused against specific terrorist 
networks can be resource-intensive and there is no guarantee of success.  It is not 
likely that terrorism can be eliminated by targeting terrorist networks, but by 
disrupting their processes terrorist networks can be contained or rolled back. 
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While it constitutes a tactical success and a great moral victory for the United 
States, it is likely that the death of al-Zarqawi will have little effect on either al 
Qaeda or the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. With a structure that has been 
described as “horizontal as opposed to hierarchical, and ad hoc as opposed to 
unified” the Iraqi insurgency has achieved the resiliency of a network.3 Removal 
of key nodes in the network leaves the remaining key nodes and links, and the 
white space between them intact and functioning. According to Bruce Hoffman of 
the RAND Corporation, "There is no center of gravity, no leadership, no hierarchy 
[to the Iraqi insurgency]; they are more a constellation than an organization.  
They have adopted a structure that assures their longevity."4   
If al-Zarqawi’s death leaves the Iraqi insurgency and al Qaeda intact and 
capable of continuing to fight, the questions for the United States become: Does 
his death advance United States policy in the war in Iraq, and the overall war on 
terror? How successful is the United States in disrupting the processes of the 
Iraqi Insurgency and of al Qaeda? As a corollary, what are the domestic 
implications? The answer perhaps can be found in the tools of policy that are 
available to the United States although its track record in using them has not 
always been good.     
 
UNITED STATES POLICY AND ITS TOOLS IN IRAQ 
In On War, in his discussion of war as an instrument of policy and the 
relationship between political and military interests, Carl von Clausewitz speaks 
of the “assumption that policy knows the instrument it means to use.”5 United 
States policy for Iraq, as established by the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
is a nation that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure [italics 
added].”6 The tools by which the United States means to achieve its policy, as laid 
out in the Strategy, are political, security (i.e. military) and economic. Noticeably 
missing from the Strategy are effective applications of the information tool, 
which includes strategic communications, and the social tool, which includes 
culture and religion.  
If we accept Clausewitz’s supposition as true, then it is not self-evident that 
United States policy knows the instrument it means to use in Iraq, despite the 
occasional military success in removing terrorist nodes such as al-Zarqawi. It 
appears the United States has elected to use military means as its primary tool to 
establish the necessary political, security and economic pre-conditions and 
processes for democracy in Iraq. It does not seem to focus at all on the social pre-
conditions for democracy.  This is a problematic approach. 
Much of United States’ effort in Iraq from 2003-2005 has relied heavily on 
military occupation and counter-insurgency efforts to establish democratic 
processes. Thus far, they have produced very mixed results and it is not certain  
the means being used – military – are the correct means at all. Anthony 
Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has touched 
upon this issue. In Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Working Notes, he writes, “Democracy is the last, not the first, priority [when 
fighting an insurgency]. Security, effective governance and services, rule of law 
and limits to corruption, education, health, and employment all have a much 
higher priority.” 7 It is here, in the processes for achieving the priorities laid out 
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by Cordesman, that the death of al-Zarqawi has the potential to serve its greatest 
purpose. 
The proof of this assertion is in the lack of progressive results thus far. From 
2004-2005 the nature of the insurgency in Iraq – an insurgency the Bush 
Administration was reluctant to recognize – changed. During this period the 
number of American troop deaths in Iraq declined by six percent and the number 
of American troops wounded declined by thirty-three percent. This is not, 
however, an indicator of progress in achieving the stated goal of a democratic 
Iraq. As reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at the 
same time American casualties were declining the Iraqi populace experienced a 
different and much starker reality: an increase in insurgent attacks and in 
casualties, as shown in the table below.  
 
 

































































Notes:       1.   The average success rate (attacks that cause damage or casualties) = 24% 
2.   Insurgent attacks focused more on Iraqis and less on U.S. forces in 2005. 
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Reliable figures are difficult to obtain but the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies indicates that, by one media estimate, for every United 
States soldier killed in Iraq at least thirteen Iraqi civilians are killed. Its 
conclusion is that the trends indicate “cycles in an evolving struggle, but not signs 
that the struggle is being lost or won…There have, as yet, been [no] decisive 
trends or no tipping points: simply surges and declines.”8 The increase in Iraqi 
casualties reflects a shift in the focus of the al-Zarqawi-led insurgency away from 
attacking United States and Coalition forces and toward igniting a sectarian civil 
war between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. These conditions hardly seem conducive 
to convincing the Iraqi people that democracy is working for them.  
 
The United States’ Track Record in Fostering Democracy 
If the military and security conditions for achieving democracy in Iraq remain 
uncertain, the political, economic, and social conditions are even more so. In a 
2003 article entitled “Democracy? In Iraq?,” Chappell Lawson and Strom 
Thacker of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford 
University, concluded that while United States efforts are not completely 
hopeless, “Iraq is unlikely to sustain democratic institutions, even given 
protracted U.S. occupation.” They base their conclusion on empirical studies that 
indicate “Iraq has few of the success factors associated with democracy, such as a 
high degree of economic development and a Western cultural tradition.”9 
Lawson and Thacker measured levels of democracy on a numerical scale 
during 1996-2000. Not surprisingly, Iraq under Saddam Hussein scored lowest 
on the scale along with other countries such as Afghanistan (under the Taliban), 
Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 
and Vietnam. From their data they concluded that richer, more literate, more 
egalitarian, and more homogenous societies do better at establishing and 
sustaining democracy. Petro-states, countries with high Muslim populations, and 
societies with little cultural affinity for the West tend to be less democratic. 
Lawson and Thacker conclude that Iraq would likely not become a free society on 
its own. 
Lawson and Thacker also looked at the impact of American occupation on the 
likelihood of a country establishing and sustaining democracy.  In the last century 
the United States has occupied nineteen countries with the goal of reshaping 
their political systems. They found that in about half the cases democratic 
institutions lasted, but in the other half they did not. At best, American 
occupation seems to be only a modest and indirect influence on the future long-
term development of other countries. Those countries that became democratic 
following American occupation already had the necessary social, economic, and 
political pre-conditions that made them more likely to do so, and those that did 
not have those indicators were unlikely to make the transition. 
 
Domestic Implications 
As the terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated, no longer can the United States rely 
on the conventional protections of time and distance as a result of being 
surrounded by vast oceans and air space. Instead, unconventional attacks may 
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come with little or no warning, and they may occur against United States citizens 
and interests at home as well as abroad. In the war on terror future attacks on the 
United States may originate from within as well as from outside the nation’s 
borders. The question of whether policy knows its tools is equally applicable on 
the domestic front. 
United States policy for domestic counterterrorism is established by the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, which calls for preventing terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, 
and minimizing the damage from attacks that do occur.10 Unlike the war in Iraq 
where the primary United States policy tool is military, the primary policy tool for 
domestic counterterrorism is law enforcement. The National Vision for domestic 
counterterrorism established by the National Strategy for Homeland Security is 
to “redefine our law enforcement mission to focus on the prevention of all 
terrorist acts within the United States, whether international or domestic in 
origin.”11 Effective application of the information tool is prescribed within the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, but it does not mention the use of the 
political, economic, or social tools for domestic counterterrorism.  
Similar to the insurgency in Iraq the greatest domestic terrorist threat comes 
from resilient terror networks, whether transnational or domestic. Realizing that 
not all potential threats can be prevented, a network-centric response that 
incorporates all the tools of policy – political, information, security (military or 
law enforcement), economic and social – is required.  Network-centric operations 
refers to the linking of people and systems into a common shared awareness 
network at all levels – international, federal, state, local, tribal, private – to 
obtain information superiority and enhanced decision-making and response. The 
working theory of network-centric operations is that organizations and agencies 
that are networked will outperform organizations and agencies that are not 
networked. Within such a concept, the transit of threats from their source to their 
targets at the local level presents a series of processes that can be disrupted in 
order to defeat, deter, preempt, prevent, protect and respond to them.  
The concept of network-centric operations, however, is not simply about 
technology, per se; it is also about behavior. The idea is to feed information as 
quickly as possible to leaders and operators so they can make better-informed 
decisions about what, when and how to respond to threats. In contrast to 
traditional operations that are agency-specific, network-centric operations 
focus on passing information and intelligence among different agencies and 
entities to increase their ability as a whole to respond to threats.   
 
THE WAY AHEAD 
If United States policy is to be successful in the war on terror, if democratic 
processes are to have a chance to take root in Iraq and if terrorist attacks within 
the United States are to be prevented, it will be necessary for United States policy 
makers to adhere to Clausewitz’s assumption that “policy knows the instrument it 
means to use.” In doing so, they must use all the tools available – diplomatic, 
information, military/law enforcement, economic and social – to disrupt the 
processes of terrorism while simultaneously fostering the processes by which 
democracy can flourish. Of these tools, the security – military and law 
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enforcement – option offers the lowest probability of long-term success, 
particularly if wielded in isolation from the other tools. Unless the processes that 
breed them are addressed there will always be another al-Zarqawi to confront. 
Unfortunately, there are signs that the administration does not understand 
Clausewitz’s assumption, as it is scaling back funding for the main organizations 
trying to build democratic institutions in Iraq such as political parties and civil 
society groups. According to the Washington Post, agencies such as the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican 
Institute will see their grants from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development dry up in 2006, leaving them only special funds earmarked by 
Congress last year. Similarly, the U.S. Institute of Peace has had its funding for 
Iraq democracy promotion cut by sixty percent, and the National Endowment for 
Democracy expects to run out of money for Iraqi programs by September 2006.12  
Writing in the New York Times, Retired Marine Corps Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century, 
outlines what he calls a laundry list of United States inaction in Iraq.13 Among the 
actions that Hammes says greatly increase the likelihood of civil war are  
diversion of nearly half the money allocated to reconstruction in Iraq to other 
needs, including security; cuts in financing for democratization efforts, many of 
them undertaken by nongovernmental groups; proposals for cutting overall Army 
and Marine forces for fighting the “long war” in Iraq; inauguration of only four of 
the proposed sixteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and continuous 
undermanning of Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training Iraqi security 
forces. The result, according to Hammes, is,  
 
The [Iraqi] militias are already looking ahead: some are carving out safe 
areas they will use as bases in the coming [civil] war by driving Iraqis of 
other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and 
villages. Iraqi government officials estimated that more than 100,000 
families have already fled their homes. This falling back on militias and 
preparing for internecine conflict is not a new phenomenon. It is exactly 
what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago. Once the Afghans 
believed the Soviet troops were finally pulling out, the various insurgent 
groups stopped fighting the invaders and began positioning for a 
multisided civil war. That conflict, of course, lasted until the United States 
invaded Afghanistan in 2001.14   
 
On the domestic front, the United States faces the risk of complacency in the war 
on terror and much more needs to be done to build networks for confronting the 
terrorist threat. Nearly five years after the attacks of 9/11 and the pronouncement 
of a Global War on Terror, metrics for performance related to clear and 
obtainable national objectives are largely lacking. Measurements are inextricably 
linked to strategies. While the goals of terrorist groups may be diametrically 
opposed to those of the United States, however, they may also be tangential in 
nature with each side achieving objectives and making progress according to 
their different measurement systems.   
REED, ON KILLING AL-ZARQAWI   7 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
 
It remains an open question as to why al Qaeda has not followed its attacks of 
9/11 with additional attacks on the United States. The absence of attacks could be 
taken as an indicator of successful Homeland Security countermeasures 
implemented by the United States. Another alternative could be that the 9/11 
attacks allowed al Qaeda to accomplish its strategic objectives and it sees no need 
for further attacks on the United States at this time. Uncertainty with respect to 
wartime strategies and measurements makes it difficult to determine or to 
demonstrate progress.15 
Writing nearly four years after the 9/11 attacks, John Arquilla, co-editor of 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy,16 describes 
the way ahead on building counterterrorism networks: 
 
If we … see ourselves as just part of a network fighting for civil society 
worldwide, good things are going to happen. And good things will keep 
happening as long as our police, military and intelligence agencies come to 
realize that their strength grows from networked information-sharing with 
each other. This is a lesson not yet learned at the top, despite the examples 
provided by real successes of networking achieved by our allies. Failure to 
learn this lesson would leave us ill prepared to defend the U.S. against 
either Al Qaeda or other networks likely to rise in the coming years, in 
emulation of Bin Laden, the dark pioneer of netwar.17 
 
Given the current outlook, until the United States begins to use effectively all its 
tools of policy both in Iraq and on the domestic front, and focuses on processes 
rather than tactical outcomes, the conclusion to be drawn is that there will be an 
endless line of al-Zarqawi, or even Bin Laden, successors and the future will 
remain uncertain. The terrorist threat will remain unabated and the lessons 
learned, or not learned, will carry over to the larger war on terror overall. 
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Right-Wing Group Characteristics and Ideology 
 




Following the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack, our national 
attention was focused on Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and other radical Islamic 
extremists. On April 19, 1995 the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was bombed 
by a native-born white male United States citizen who harbored right-wing 
extremist beliefs. While our collective consciousness prioritizes radical Islamists 
as the preeminent threat, should individuals and groups that encompass the 
radical right be viewed as having a reduced capacity to perform acts of terrorism?  
What future trends will be adopted by the radical right? How could these trends 
lead to an escalation of the threat posed by right-wing extremists? What can be 
done to reduce the threat of terrorism perpetrated by right-wing adherents? 
Before offering an answer to these questions, we should establish a knowledge 
baseline to understand the history, key figures, and beliefs of right-wing 
extremist groups in the United States.   
The specific ideology of right-wing extremism is frequently difficult to define 
because adherents have multiple and frequently simultaneous memberships in 
the array of right-wing groups. Many people involved in right-wing groups have 
come from other right-wing organizations and will likely move on to other groups 
as their beliefs change.1 
 
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY MOVEMENT 
To understand Christian Identity is to understand a core feature of right-wing 
extremism. While some right-wing groups and individuals do not embrace the 
ideas of the Christian Identity movement,2 it has become a prominent religious 
belief for many right-wing extremists.  
 
Theology 
According to David Brannan in “Left- and Right-wing Political Terrorism,” a 
chapter in The Politics of Terrorism, Christian Identity is comprised of two 
separate theological ideas. The first and most prevalent form of Christian Identity 
is referred to as “seed-line” theology. In “seed-line” theology, Jews are depicted as 
the actual offspring of the Devil (Lucifer) and Eve. All non-whites, according to 
‘seed-line’ theology, are considered to be the “beasts in the field,” a reference to the 
biblical passage contained in Genesis 1:24. Right-wing extremists who embrace 
“seed-line” Christian Identity theology possess core beliefs to justify death, 
enslavement, or expulsion of all non-whites from the country.3 
The British-Israel version of Christian Identity is the second theological belief 
embraced by right-wing extremists. According to Brannan, British-Israel 
followers believe Aryans, rather than the Jews, are God’s chosen people.  True 
Israel is actually comprised of the Anglo-Saxon, British, Scandinavian, and 
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Germanic peoples, not Semitic or Ashkenazi Jews.4  Pete Peters, the pastor of the 
LaPorte Church of Christ in Colorado preaches British-Israel Christian Identity 
theology. Part of Peters’ message is that Jews are not God’s chosen people and 
true Israelites are the Celtic, Anglo Saxon, Scandinavian, Germanic, and kindred 
people. Peters claims these true Israelites “can be identified Biblically, 
historically, and archeologically.”5 Bertrand Comparet, an earlier figure 
associated with the formative years of Christian Identity, in his essay Christian 
Identity: What is It? provides an account of Adam’s people. Comparet notes the 
name Adam, in Hebrew, refers to being able to “show blood in the face; to be fair; 
rosy cheeked; to be ruddy; and to be able to blush or flush.”6 This description fits 
the true Israelites of British-Israel theology.   
Both “seed-line” and British-Israel Christian Identity adherents refer to 
information contained in The Thirteenth Tribe by Arthur Koestler to support 
their views of modern day Jews. Koestler claims the majority of Jews surviving 
the holocaust were of eastern European descent, primarily the Khazar Empire.7  
The Khazar Empire was a Jewish state comprised mostly of Turks, prominent 
between the seventh and tenth centuries. It was located in eastern Europe and 
controlled a vital area between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.8 After the 
destruction of their empire, Khazar tribes and communities were believed to have 
migrated to Russia and Poland, where the largest populations of Jews were 
located during the beginning of the Modern Age. According to Koestler, this 
migration has led many historians to speculate that a majority of the Jews in the 
world today may not be of Semitic origin; they may actually be of Khazar 
ancestry.9   
 
Christian Identity History 
During the middle part of the nineteenth century, the idea of British-Israelism 
became a movement as a result of the works of John Wilson. His book, Lectures 
of Our Israelitish Origin, his speeches, and other writings appealed to the British 
middle class.10   
According to James Aho in The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian 
Patriotism, British-Israelism was imported to Canada and then passed on to the 
United States through two points of entry. First, in 1928, Howard Rand of Maine 
started spreading the British-Israel message through his newsletter, the Kingdom 
Message. In 1930, Rand met William J. Cameron, the editor of Henry Ford’s 
Dearborn Independent, and eventually they formed the Anglo-Saxon Federation 
of America.11 The Dearborn Independent was a very anti-Jewish publication and 
was later used as the basis of Henry Ford’s book The International Jew: The 
World’s Foremost Problem.12  
The other location for the export of the British-Israel movement to the United 
States was Vancouver, British Columbia, which influenced followers in 
Washington and Oregon. A British-Israel group in Vancouver influenced the 
emergence of Christian Identity through its participation in a series of 
conferences held in the western United States from 1937 through 1947. The 
Vancouver group spread and supported information that fostered the adoption of 
apocalyptic, conspiratorial, and anti-Semitic beliefs.13 
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According to Aho, the connection between Christian Identity and blatant 
racism could be partly attributed to fundamentalist Protestants from the Midwest 
Bible Belt and southern states who were fervent vocal proponents of the 
movement that would eventually become Christian Identity. These individuals 
included James Lovell, a Texas Baptist; Wesley Swift, an Alabama Methodist; Joe 
Jeffers, an Alabama Baptist; and Herbert Armstrong, an Iowa Adventist. 14 While 
Cameron is given credit for being a primary influence in the early development of 
Christian Identity, Californians Wesley Swift, Bertrand Comparet, and William 
Porter Gale were also key figures in the early development of Christian Identity in 
the United States.15  
Gerald L. K. Smith was a notable national figure in the development of Identity 
doctrine. Smith was a Church of Christ minister who was an associate of 
Louisiana political kingpin Huey Long. Characterized as a bombastic and 
charismatic orator, his extreme ego and political naiveté became apparent (and 
detrimental) during the unsuccessful presidential campaign of William Lemke.  
Smith became a friend of Henry Ford’s in the late 1930s and received funding 
from the automobile industry icon for a radio broadcast series. Smith credits 
Ford for showing him the connection between Judaism and Communism. This 
focus on the denunciation of both Jews and communism was a prevalent theme 
during speaking engagements and in his mail order ministry, two businesses that  
made Smith a millionaire.16 After World War II, Smith moved to Los Angeles 
where he became affiliated with anti-Semitic and white supremacists in Southern 
California. Smith’s high profile public appearances included anti-Semitic and 
racist rhetoric that resulted in the mobilization of opposition minority and Jewish 
communities in the Los Angeles area.17 
Wesley Swift, who had been affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the early 
1940s,18 may have been at least one early source of the Identity hermeneutic that 
furthered “seed-line” Identity theology. Kaplan provides the following quote in 
Radical Religion in America to indicate how Smith’s Identity beliefs were 
influence by Swift: “He opened the Bible and demonstrated to me with proper 
text that Christ’s worst enemies were not God’s chosen people. He identified the 
‘true Israel’ which gave us the Messiah...He demonstrated that the crucifiers of 
Christ were apostates, sons of Satan, and the seed of Cain.”19  
In addition to Gerald L. K. Smith, Wesley Swift was affiliated with several 
notable figures influential in the rise of Christian Identity after World War II.  
Included in this group were Bertrand Comparet, William Gale, and Richard Butler.  
Comparet was a Stanford educated lawyer and had held the position of deputy 
district attorney in San Diego. He was an active Christian Identity preacher and 
was a close associate of Smith. Comparet successfully defended Smith during a 
1955 libel suit.20  
Gale was a former Army lieutenant colonel during World War II who 
frequently embellished his war record.21 He was the founder of the Posse 
Comitatus, a movement he outlined in a 1971 article published in the Identity 
Newsletter. Posse Comitatus was founded on the belief that, constitutionally, no 
governmental body higher than the county level is legitimate.22 Gale and his 
fellow Posse Comitatus followers’ refusal to acknowledge state and federal 
governmental authority resulted in legal complications with the Internal Revenue 
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Service on tax-related criminal charges. At the time of his death in April 1988, 
Gale was appealing a 1987 conviction for conspiracy to threaten a judge and an 
IRS agent. While he preached his anti-Semitic and racial bigotry, Gale kept an 
enormous secret from his Christian Identity associates: his father was a Jew. The 
central premise of his Christian Identity beliefs and ministry were based on a 
complete denial of his heritage.23 
Posse Comitatus members were responsible for several acts of violence in the 
Northwest and Midwest during the 1980s. An example of this violence was the 
1983 shootout between Gordon Kahl and federal marshals. Kahl, an icon of the 
radical right and a member of the North Dakota Posse Comitatus, was killed 
during the incident. Many of the people who later participated in the militia 
movement were believed to have been involved in the Posse Comitatus groups of 
this time period.24 Posse Comitatus members seized an opportunity to spread 
their message to distressed farmers during the 1980s farm crisis. 
Right-wing religious rhetoric may appeal to many people for reasons other 
than religion. American Terrorist by Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck mentions 
Timothy McVeigh’s interest a church near Yellowstone National Park that was 
involved in stockpiling food and munitions, but their “New Age religious ways 
failed to trip his trigger.” McVeigh was not a believer in organized religion.  
Instead, he thought natural law guided the universe through a higher power using 
an internalized method to instill right and wrong in a person.25 Yet McVeigh 
attempted to contact Andreas Strassmeir, a German national believed to be 
staying at the Christian Identity community in Elohim City, Oklahoma, seeking a 
safe haven after the bombing. McVeigh had met Strassmeir at a gun show. He 
also attempted to call a representative of the National Alliance to arrange refuge.  
Neo-Nazi William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries, was the head of the 
National Alliance.26 Although he contacted these two groups to seek assistance 
with escape and sanctuary, McVeigh should not be characterized as a Christian 
Identity follower or a neo-Nazi. 
Richard Butler, a former engineer for Lockheed, had been a member of Swift’s 
California church. Butler moved to Idaho in 1973 and started the Church of Jesus 
Christ Christian in Coeur d’ Alene. His most notable political right-wing activity 
paralleling the Christian Identity movement was the establishment of the Aryan 
Nations.27 Aryan Nations served as a consolidator of right-wing groups, including 
those who followed Christian Identity doctrine and those who did not follow the 
movement. Bruce Hoffmann in Inside Terrorism describes the Aryan Nations as 
being “an extremist, anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi group of white supremacists, 
survivalist and militant tax resisters...”28 Aryan Nations members were involved 
in a series of violent acts beginning in the 1980s. These acts included the killing 
of a Denver, Colorado, Jewish radio talk show host by an Aryan Nations splinter 
group known as The Order. Members of The Order also committed several armed 
robberies and bombings during its reign of terror. Butler died in 2004, but not 
before he saw his Aryan Nations organization financially decimated by a civil 
judgment.29 Although Richard Butler’s demise appears to have resulted in further 
fragmentation of the national leadership of the Christian Identity movement, the 
danger posed by the overall goal of its followers – to establish a racially pure 
white Aryan country – continues to be a matter of concern. 
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According to a CNN.com article by Henry Schuster, Butler’s Aryan Nations 
successor, August Kries, has offered to form an alliance with al Qaeda. The 
motive behind the offer is based on common enemies shared by the two extremist 
groups – the United States government and the Jews. Christian Identity 
adherents might view involvement with extremist Muslims of Middle Eastern 
origins as contrary to their core beliefs; Kries dismisses the viewing of al Qaeda 
members as “mud people” as being “old school racism.” He provided the 
following reassurance to al Qaeda should they become interested in forming an 
alliance:  “the cells are out here and they are already in place.  They might not be 
cells of Islamic people, but they are here and they are ready to fight.”30 
Phineas, a priest mentioned in the Old Testament, has inspired the use of 
violence in the name of God by a very secretive group of right-wing activists who 
are Christian Identity followers. According to Hoffman, punishing such violators 
of divine edicts as homosexuals, inter-racial married couples, and abortionists is 
the mission of the Phineas Priests. Ending the federal banking system is another 
divine duty accepted by the Phineas Priests.31 With the decline of the Aryan 
Nations, the Phineas Priests have become more prevalent. Phineas Priests are not 
believed to be an organized group; rather, they appear to be a collection of several 
individual right-wing extremists who have committed violent crimes in the name 
of God.32 In an August 4, 2005 posting on the Aryan Nations website, Pastor Jay 
Foster described two entities that form the Aryan Nations organization. First is 
the Aryan Nations proper, which accepts people who may not be religious, but are 
still attracted to the group because of their “views and systems.” The second 
entity is the biblical wing of the organization, known as the Tabernacles of the 
Phineas Priesthood.33 Will the Tabernacles of the Phineas Priesthood actually 
commit acts of violence in the name of God, as their name implies? The Christian 
Identity beliefs of its members make potential terrorist acts a constant possibility.   
Christian Identity offers devotees explanations for their present deficiencies and 
reassuring interpretations of the past. The past is described as glorious prior to the 
theft of their God-given birthright by the evil Jews. As for the future, Christian 
Identity provides assurances of happiness and global supremacy. Survival in the 
future is accomplished by the grace of God, through the use of Christian Identity 
followers’ intellect and – alternatively – through the availability of stockpiled food 
and weaponry.34    
 
MILITIAS 
The militia movement has evolved during the past three decades, redefining its 
purposes, ideology, and appeal to future members. Consistent themes include a 
distrust of the federal government and a belief that citizens will be disarmed by 
the government. The attraction of the militia movement to prospective members 
has varied as militias adapt their ideology to address emerging issues.   
Militias are part of the informal patriot movement that, according to Matthew 
Zook, emerged from the challenges (created by the civil rights and feminist 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s) to the “dominant social and economic 
systems for regulating race and gender relations.”35 Chip Berlet in Militia Nation 
expands this view of militias when he suggests that militias are a social byproduct 
of “economic hardship and the partial erosion of traditional structures of white 
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male heterosexual privilege.” He mentions two stresses associated with the 
“right-wing populist revolt” for which militia members are concerned: first is the 
stress of the genuine economic suffering that resulted from global restructuring; 
the second type of stress stemmed from outrage regarding the societal gains 
achieved by oppressed groups in the United States.36   
According to a study of threats and reactive mobilizations by Van Dyke and 
Soule, the increase in the organization of patriot and militia groups is related to 
economic downturns. These economic hard times resulted in the loss of 
agricultural and manufacturing jobs.37     
The loss of land and the heritage of many farmers and ranchers resulted in 
what rural counselor Glen Wallace referred to in his congressional committee 
testimony as “community depression.” The symptoms of the community 
depression observed by Wallace are similar to an individual with chronic long-
term depression.38 One of the escape mechanisms for the chronic stress 
experienced by farmers exhibiting manifestations of depression or psychosis is an 
outward projection of anger. These individuals want to make those whom they 
hold responsible feel the pain of the farmers. In the rural crisis of the 1980s, 
these outward expressions of anger resulted in the murders of bankers and 
federal lending agents.39 Wallace acknowledged the violent reaction to the 
economic crisis in rural America when he stated:  “You can’t treat human beings 
in a society the way rural people have been treated without them organizing and 
fighting back.” Involvement in antigovernment right-wing groups became 
another means for rural Americans to outwardly fight back. 40 
Societal gains by historically oppressed groups, the second area of stress 
mentioned by Beret, result in the displeasure expressed by many in the patriot 
movement with regard to unjust advantages extended to minorities and women, 
specifically nonwhites. Affirmative action programs have become a contentious 
subject of discourse. Conspiracy theories fueled the anger generated by the 
societal and economic issues. One tenet of conspiracy theories, mentioned by 
Beret, is the description of two types of people: parasites and producers.  
Parasites are viewed by the conspiracy theorist as being at the top and bottom 
levels of society. The top level contains the corrupt governmental officials and 
wealthy manipulators of the banks and currency. At the bottom are the aimless, 
“slacker” parasites who sponge off the hard-working middle class by accepting 
public assistance. In the middle are the producers, a reflection of the person who 
typically embraces conspiracy theories. A belief that those at the bottom are 
mostly blacks and Hispanics injects a racial element into these theories, though 
in reality welfare and other government relief programs are mostly utilized by 
whites.41 
Mark Pitcavage in Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement from 
Ruby Ridge to Y2K, attributes the rise of participation in militia groups to a 
variety of incidents that occurred during the 1990s.  Included in these events 
were the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Brady Bill, the assault rifle ban, the riots in the Los Angeles area after the Rodney 
King verdict, the presidential election of Bill Clinton, the 1992 Ruby Ridge 
shootout, and the 1993 Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas.42 According to 
the 1999 congressional testimony of former FBI Director Louis Freeh, “most of 
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the militia movement has no racial overtones and does not espouse bigotry; there 
are some black and Jewish militia members.” While many militia members are 
not law violators, the presence of Christian Identity followers and individuals 
who embrace other hate beliefs is an emerging problem.43  
Militia groups vary in some of their beliefs and priorities, but the preservation of 
their right to possess and own firearms is universally regarded as the most important 
issue. Militias view firearms ownership as a means to safeguard against government 
totalitarianism. Many militia members view, as fact, conspiracy theories based on 
scenarios where the federal government increases its power gradually and 
confiscates firearms. Some members believe New World Order conspiracy theories 
that foreign troops are secretly stationed in the country or staged for an eminent 
invasion sanctioned by the United Nations.44 
Timothy McVeigh was not raised on a farm, but his anti-government sentiments 
could have been partially formed by the disappearance of industrial jobs commonly 
available to his father’s generation. Many of these jobs were lost due to international 
trade agreements and global economics.45 His right-wing beliefs were something 
McVeigh had in common with militia members and other patriot groups. A 
significant belief opposed the government regulation of the right to own firearms.  
According to Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck in American Terrorist: Timothy 
McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing, McVeigh belonged to the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) for one year while serving in the U.S. Army. McVeigh determined the Klan’s 
main emphasis was on racism, while his concern was gun ownership rights and 
patriotism.46 McVeigh believed politicians had the power to set their own salaries 
and were able to lavishly reward themselves in violation of the trust the public placed 
in them. Following his failure to gain employment as a New York toll road collector, 
despite a high score on the entrance examination, McVeigh surmised he was not 
hired because he was white and blamed affirmative action programs.47 The Ruby 
Ridge incident further inflamed his anger with the federal government to the point 
where he believed the United States was “becoming an overtaxed police state.”  
Concluding that the National Rifle Association was too weak to protect his second 
amendment rights, McVeigh canceled his membership.48 In an interview conducted 
by a student reporter during the Waco siege, McVeigh claimed the local sheriff was 
the only person with the legal authority to serve the warrant; federal agents had no 
authority or legitimate reason to be on Branch Davidian property. McVeigh 
ultimately found acceptance and understanding among the individuals he associated 
with while participating in the gun show circuit. He further solidified his belief in a 
New World Order – a single ruling government in the form of the United Nations – 
taking over the United States and restricting individual freedom.49 
Militias, according to Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism, come in two 
varieties. The “talking militias” do not advocate the overthrow of the government 
and are primarily concerned with preserving the right to bear arms. “Marching 
militias” or “up-front militias” use force to accomplish their goals. They embrace 
the more radical anti-Semitic, racist, and subversive principles of the radical 
right.50 The Viper militia group in Phoenix, Arizona, is an example of a marching 
militia: Their members amassed a sizeable stockpile of illegal weapons and 
practiced the use of explosives. During the investigation following their arrest, 
the group’s plan to bomb buildings in Phoenix was discovered.51 Closed-cell 
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militias are mentioned in an article by Martin Lindstedt in the initial issue of the 
Modern Militiaman. Persons wishing to become involved in a militia are only 
invited to the open militia meetings, never to a closed-cell group. Closed-cell 
groups are reserved for relatives and trusted friends.52 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing, reporters portrayed McVeigh as  an active 
militia member.53 He was not an actual militia member, although he had made an 
unsuccessful attempt to organize a militia group in Arizona, with his friend Michael 
Fortier, and publicity after the bombing resulted in an increase in militia activity.  
Due to the arrests of several militia members in the late 1990s and unfulfilled 
conspiracy theories related to Y2K, many people left militia organizations. Other 
individuals left militias because they believed the organizations did not 
sufficiently address the issues important to them;54 these were more radical 
members who probably became affiliated with other right-wing extremist groups 
that fulfilled their expectations. Others become loners, such as accused Olympic 
Park bomber Eric Rudolph, and committed violent acts to satisfy their desire for 
action.55 Many other members grew bored and lost interest in militias.56 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, militias adopted new conspiracy theories 
to fit their fear of a new world order. Conspiracy theories often provide simplistic 
analysis, defying explanations of conflict or perceived problems. Militia members 
who embrace these theories affix blame to individuals or groups, instead of 
analyzing the complexities of real world issues and power structures.57 John 
Trochmann of the Militia of Montana voiced an outlandish conspiracy theory 
when he claimed Bin Laden was a CIA operative when he masterminded the 9-11 
attacks.58  
Post 9-11 interest in survivalist training and equipment has also been used to 
increase militia membership and activities. Militia members at a fair in Yakima, 
Washington actively sought individuals to enroll in classes on terrorism survival.  
The Militia of Montana sold biological warfare suits, gas masks, and potassium 
iodide to individuals in various parts of the United States.59 
Membership in militia organizations has increased and decreased over the past 
twenty years. Events such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9-11 attacks have 
impacted militia organizations by refocusing their interests. While many militia 
members are not law violators, the presence of members who have more radical 
beliefs, such as Christian Identity, is a matter of concern. 
  
SOVEREIGN CITIZENS, FREEMEN, AND COMMON LAW COURTS  
People involved in groups referring to themselves as “sovereign citizens,” 
“freemen,” and “common law court members” are categorized as “separatist” by 
Leonard Weinberg, Elizabeth Francis, and Randall Lloyd in their article “Courts 
Under Threat.”  In addition to a formative relationship with Christian Identity, a 
manuscript known as the Nehemiah Township Document and Common Law 
Contract provides the foundation for separatist organizations. In 1982, twenty-
eight people signed the document that was subsequently notarized and filed by 
the county clerk in Kootenai County, Idaho. Notable extremist signatories 
included Richard Butler and KKK Imperial Wizard Thom Robb.60 A religiously-
based Republican government, in which only Aryan freemen would have rights, 
was the ultimate goal of the Nehemiah Township Charter. It referred to God’s 
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divine laws as the only laws applicable to Aryans. National Courts consisting of 
seventy judges would be established to hand down verdicts according to God’s 
law.  The National Courts and lesser-affiliated judicial bodies would have 
overriding authority over other political entities, including state and federal court 
systems.  Those persons who were not Aryan freemen would have no rights to 
participate in government or in the legal system. As in the Posse Comitatus 
movement, county government provides the structure for posses to function, 
though charters would be created as a new entity in government. Township 
citizens would have the power not to abide by any ordinance, regulation, or law 
enacted by municipal, state, or federal governmental bodies. This power also 
includes the right to ignore the federal tax code. The Charter contains references 
to the United States Constitution and English common law. One of the final 
passages in the Charter makes reference to an attack on one member being the 
equivalent to an attack on the whole group. This reference reveals that the signers 
realized the rebellious nature of their actions and beliefs – an indicator of future 
actions by some of the signers, who were subsequently convicted and 
incarcerated for their violent activities.61 
In addition to the information contained in the Nehemiah Township Charter, 
Richard Abanes’ book, American Militias, describes characteristics of separatists’ 
beliefs. Included in these beliefs are two types of citizenship. State citizenship is 
considered natural and is believed to have been present before the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The other form of citizenship is conferred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights; in this form, citizens are obligated 
to comply with federal statutes, regulations, codes, judgments and rulings.  
Separatists believe the blood relatives of state citizens may reclaim inherited 
sovereign citizenship by breaking implicit contracts binding them to the federal 
government and its inferior form of citizenship. Birth certificates, marriage 
licenses, Social Security cards, and driver and vehicle licenses are examples of 
unlawful contracts to be broken to regain sovereignty. Sovereign citizens are not 
required to follow federal law, but are required to adhere to common law court 
judgments.62 
Two other idiosyncratic separatist beliefs worthy of mention are claims that 
the United States Constitution was suspended in 1933 by the War and Emergency 
Powers Act and the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified, thereby 
nullifying the legality of the federal income tax system. In the late 1990s, several 
common law courts were formed, predominantly in West and Midwest states.  
Common law activities included bogus liens filed against the property of judges, 
law enforcement officers, and other public officials. Illegitimate common law 
arrest warrants were issued for public officials who made decisions or rulings 
against the edict of separatists.63 A decline in occurrences of separatist activities 
in the early twenty-first century is partly attributed to new laws that addressed 
the common law court activities.64 
During the summer of 1997, Weinberg, Francis, and Lloyd conducted a 
random survey of 3,000 judges who had experience with separatists. Survey 
results revealed most judges viewed the separatists as being “angry individuals 
who are bright enough to have absorbed some abstract interpretation to explain 
their circumstances but who still lack the capacity, often provided by education, 
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to place the interpretation in a broader or comparative framework of 
understanding.” Of the judges who had encountered separatist challengers, over 
half indicated traffic cases were the most frequently disputed. A prevalence of 
cases involving weapons offenses was not surprising due to the Second 
Amendment issues embraced by militia members. Additionally, frequently 
disputed episodes involving domestic abuse, child custody, and alimony issues 
were viewed by Weinberg, et al. as indicative of the high stress associated with 
extremist political behavior.65 The emotional vehemence of separatists is revealed 
in the survey results: Twenty-seven percent of the judges who reported 
challenges indicated they had received threats of violence. Four judges reported 
being victims of physical assaults.66 
 
KU KLUX KLAN 
The KKK is the domestic ‘granddaddy’ of the right-wing extremist movement. It 
was founded in Pulaski, Tennessee, between late December 1865 and June of 
1866, at the beginning of the Reconstruction era following the Civil War. The 
name of the organization is derived from the Greek word kuklos, which translates 
to English as “circle.”  The group changed the Greek word slightly to kuklux and 
added the word klan to the ending to note the Scottish heritage of the group’s 
organizers. Six former confederate soldiers created the organization as a non-
political social club for the amusement of themselves and other community 
members. In the beginning, the white sheets and elaborate costumes worn by the 
Klansmen were referred to as costumes of mystique and amusement. The 
amusement eventually transformed into intimidation. Klansmen also believed 
their white, hooded costumes represented the ghosts of dead confederate soldiers 
coming back to cast retribution upon the inferior Negro race.67 This activity 
eventually led to freed blacks and white carpetbaggers from the North becoming 
the targets of degrading and frequently vicious nocturnal raids, often resulting in 
acts of violence and murder.68 The Klan dens spread throughout Tennessee and 
eventually to Mississippi and Alabama. The Klan’s first national convention was 
held in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1867, where Confederate General Nathan Forrest 
became the first elected grand wizard. Forrest officially dissolved the Klan in 
1869, but the activities of the various dens throughout the South continued.69  
The first legislation designed to fight the intimidation and violence inflicted by 
members of the Klan was passed in 1870. The new law was designed to enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by outlawing interference with 
voting rights through intimidation, bribery, or use of force. Passage of this act 
resulted in an increased rate of Klan violence in the south during the 1870 
elections.70 In 1871, continued Klan violence resulted in President Ulysses S. 
Grant pushing Congress to pass the Ku-Klux Klan Bill: This law allowed any 
citizen of the United States to seek a federal judicial remedy for the violation of 
constitutional rights. Persons with foreknowledge of Klan violence were held 
liable for victims’ suffering. A provision of the bill made conspiring by two or 
more persons to violate another person’s rights a crime. The boldest parts of the 
Ku-Klux Klan Bill allowed the president to suspend temporarily the writ of 
habeas corpus and use federal troops to quell civil unrest aimed at depriving 
anyone from exercising their constitutional rights.71 As racist, southern, white 
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conservatives regained legitimate power from the Reconstruction governments 
established at the end of the Civil War, the Klan faded from prominence.72 
The Klan was reinvigorated in 1915, by the D. W. Griffith motion picture Birth of 
a Nation, which was based on Thomas Dixon’s novel The Clansmen.73 The movie 
glorified the Klan of the Reconstruction Era as saviors and portrayed a black man 
as the rapist of a frail innocent white girl.74 The ceremonial burning of crosses was 
first depicted in the novel and was portrayed in the movie. Interest in the KKK 
intensified as Klansmen used movie showings to promote the organization.75 The 
born-again Klan was less violent than the original Klan, but added the hatred of 
Jews and Catholics to the traditional hatred of blacks. Klan membership 
throughout the country was estimated to have been in the millions during the 
1920s and 1930s. Prior to and during World War II, Klan membership continued 
to dwindle, only to rebound again during the turbulent civil rights movement of the 
1960s. The Klan does not currently have a nationwide central governing 
organization; it consists of several, unconnected groups using variations of the 
Klan moniker. In keeping with the multiple affiliation characteristics of right-wing 




Neo-Nazis, as the name implies, are the new followers of Nazi ideology.  
Members of this movement embrace many of the World War II Nazi symbols, 
including the swastika, which is considered the icon of the movement. Neo-Nazis 
refer to themselves as National Socialists and hold Adolph Hitler in high regard,77 
but they do not follow completely the ideas of Hitler’s Nazi party. The modern 
rendition of these groups can be divided into three categories: followers of 
Odinism, Christian Identity believers, and groups embracing other spiritual or 
religious notions.78 Christian Identity believers associated with the neo-Nazi 
movement have been discussed earlier and included Richard Butler’s Aryan Nations 
groups, now lead by August Kries.   
Believers of Odinism and Ásatrú reject Christianity,79 but adopt the reconstructed 
beliefs of the pre-Christian mythical Norse gods of the Vikings. To attract followers 
who may already have multiple systems of religious or philosophical beliefs, Odinists 
use ritual magic, fraternal camaraderie, and a flexible ideology. Through the 
influences of Rud Mills (1930s) and Else Christensen (1960s), marked differences 
have emerged between Odinism and Ásatrú. First, individuals who embrace 
Odinism are more in touch with right-wing white supremacy adherents. Most Ásatrú 
followers reject such associations. Next, Odinists accept the validity of conspiracies 
when viewing the events of history, while most Ásatrú followers do not embrace 
these theories. A third difference is the warrior principle that drives Odinists to 
consider forceful retaliation for perceived past injustices by the dominant culture. A 
fourth difference is that Odinists hold racist feelings and opinions, which frequently 
merge with racial mysticism. Last, Odinism places an emphasis on the 
oversimplification of complex information associated with the revitalized tribal ideas 
of the Vikings. Ásatrú followers do not accept efforts to simplify their reconstruction 
of the communal, magical, and religious practices as they apply to modern society. 
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Many individuals who were involved in the rise of Hitler’s Third Reich were known 
to have been Odinists. 80     
George Lincoln Rockwell started the American Nazi Party (ANP) in 1958; the 
organization was later called the National Socialist White People’s Party. The 
need for white people to take back the country from the minorities, aliens, and 
terrorists was one of Rockwell’s beliefs. Betty Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-
Meile, in their book White Power, White Pride!, mention Rockwell’s advocacy of 
worldwide white power as a means to stop the mongrelization of the white race.  
A recently-expelled group member killed Rockwell in 1967.81 William Pierce, a 
former Oregon State University physics instructor and member of Rockwell’s 
ANP, later established and directed the National Alliance.82   
Pierce is also the creator of Cosmotheism, a religious belief described by Brad 
Whitsel in Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains as  
centered upon the “deterministic ideas reflecting the ‘unlimited destiny’ of the 
white race.” The Cosmotheist believes an evolutionary force, still guiding us 
today, created the races. According to Pierce’s view, the white race maintains a 
special status due to its past historical achievements, which far surpass the 
accomplishments of other races.83 Placing man on a course to achieve godhood 
was what Pierce described as the divine mission of Cosmotheism. Some elements 
of Odinism have been incorporated into Cosmotheism, such as Norse legends and 
the use of mysterious runes, ancient characters used in Anglo-Saxon, 
Scandinavian, or Teutonic writings.84 
Pierce wrote The Turner Diaries under the pseudonym Andrew McDonald in 
1978. The novel described the revolution against an evil federal government with 
established race-mixing, gun control, and other detestable actions. The Turner 
Diaries was believed to have inspired Robert Mathews to establish the violent 
white supremacist group known as The Order.85 Timothy McVeigh also was 
inspired by The Turner Diaries: In an envelope found in the car driven from 
Oklahoma City after the bombing, McVeigh had placed articles he wanted to be 
discovered upon his capture. Among the items was a paper with the following 
quotes from Earl Turner, the central character of The Turner Diaries:  
The real value of our attacks today lies in the psychological impact, not in 
the immediate casualties. More important though, is what we taught the 
politicians and the bureaucrats. They learned this afternoon that not one 
of them is beyond our reach. They can huddle behind barbed wire and 
tanks in the city, and they can hide behind the concrete walls of their 
country estates, but we can still find them and kill them.86  
After Pierce’s July 2002 death, Erich Gliebe, the former boxer known as The 
Aryan Barbarian, assumed the National Alliance leadership position. As is 
frequently the case in right-wing groups, disagreement among the other potential 
leaders of the group resulted in resignations or expulsions from the National 
Alliance. This disarray in the American neo-Nazi movement has resulted in one 
of Pierce’s intellectual protégés, Kevin Strom, forming the National Vanguard and 
another Pierce follower, Billy Roper, starting the group known as White 
Revolution.87 
Rex (Gerhard) Lauck, known as the Farm Belt Fuhrer,88 is described by Ingo 
Hasselbach in Fuhrer-Ex as being an international neo-Nazi leader. Based in 
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Lincoln, Nebraska, Lauck is the leader of the NSDAP/AO, the “National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party/Aufbau (“building up” in German) and Auslands 
(“abroad”) Organization. Lauck’s NSDAP/AO was patterned after the 
organization of the same name formerly operated by the Third Reich. Lauck had 
a significant influence on the activities and advancement of neo-Nazi activities in 
Germany and other European countries. His connections with old Nazis in South 
America helped to finance neo-Nazi activities.89 Lauck’s publishing business in 
Lincoln produced and distributed a variety of Nazi paraphernalia, such as 
bumper stickers, books, videos, and computer games.90 Lauck’s power was 
sufficient to order acts of terrorism against various officials associated with the 
attempt to host the Olympics in Berlin. His rationale for ordering the acts of 
terrorism was to deny the Federal Republic of Germany the chance to eclipse the 
Olympics hosted by the Third Reich prior to World War II.  Acts of terrorism by 
neo-Nazis and left-wing elements resulted in Germany abandoning efforts to host 
the Olympics.91 Eventually, Lauck was arrested in Denmark and charged with 
distributing terrorist materials and Nazi propaganda.92 
 
SKINHEADS 
The terrorist youth subculture label has been used to describe the groups 
popularly known as the skinheads.93 Skinheads first materialized in London 
during the 1960s as a working-class youth response to the hippie trend.94 These 
early skinheads, according to Mark Hamm in American Skinheads: The 
Criminology and Control of Hate Crime, combined the cultures of the working-
class white and the Jamaican black immigrant. Their shaved heads symbolized 
their visibly defiant self-determination and served as a practical advantage by 
preventing opponents from grabbing their hair during street fights. These early 
skinheads targeted for their acts of violence Pakistanis, hippies, homosexuals, 
and students from upper-class families who attended Cambridge and the London 
School of Economics. In 1972, Scotland Yard successfully cracked down on 
skinheads perpetrating violent acts against innocent victims, thereby curtailing 
skinhead activities.95 
Second-generation skinheads in Britain reemerged as a problem in 1981 as Ian 
Stuart, leader of the band Skrewdriver, formed a political action group called White 
Noise. The combination of politics and music led to an affiliation with the British 
National Front, a right-wing, neo-fascist organization. Resurgence of skinhead 
racial violence was encouraged further by anti-immigrant and nationalistic views 
expressed by officials in the Thatcher administration.96 Skrewdriver’s popularity as 
the premier British white power band eventually led to a record contract with West 
German record company Rock-O-Rama Records. This contract resulted in their 
white hate, neo-Nazi, skinhead message being distributed throughout Europe, the 
United States, and Canada. The popularity of white power rock music was a factor 
in the development of the skinhead movement into an international youth 
subculture.97 
According to J. Cotter, in Sounds of Hate: White Power Rock and Roll and the 
Neo-Nazi Skinhead Subculture, the propagation, persistence, and viability of the 
skinhead culture can be attributed to the messages communicated in the lyrics of 
white power rock and roll. This music validates the use of violence against non-
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white immigrants perceived as a threat to the white race and the skinhead 
culture. In addition to being a source of entertainment for skinheads, white 
power rock and roll music has been a vehicle for the distribution of racist 
propaganda to a wide group of listeners. White power bands travel to various 
countries to give concerts and spread the skinhead way of life and ideology. The 
worldwide skinhead publication and music distribution network provides 
support to the bands and facilitates the flow of information to any interested 
persons.98 A significant segment of the white power music and publication 
network is represented by Resistance Records and Resistance Magazine. George 
Eric Hawthorne, alias George Burdi, the lead singer of the band RAHOWA 
(Racial Holy War), founded Resistance Records in 1993. The publication side of 
the business doubled as a fan magazine for white power bands and a propaganda 
tool for white supremacy. Following Hawthorne’s arrest for violating the 
Canadian law prohibiting the distribution of hate material, and his difficulties in 
the United States related to tax irregularities, Resistance Records fell on hard 
times. Eventually, it was purchased by Willis Carto and Todd Blodgett and later 
sold to William Pierce of the National Alliance. Pierce also acquired a competing 
Swedish white power music distributor to further bolster his business.99 Prior to 
his death in 2002, Pierce had capitalized upon his investment through Internet 
sales and distribution of hate music, computer games, and literature.100 
Clark Martell, a Skrewdriver follower and American Nazi Party member from 
Blue Island, Illinois, formed the first American skinhead group. A crime spree in 
the Chicago area was attributed to Martell and his skinhead group. Their violence 
resulted in the assault of six Hispanic women, swastikas painted on the walls of 
three synagogues, and other damage to Jewish-owned businesses. Martell’s 
incarceration for the crime spree neutralized the skinhead movement in the 
Chicago area. Robert Heick formed a second group of skinheads in the Haight-
Ashbury district of San Francisco. They adopted the typical appearance of the 
skinhead movement: Levi jeans, red suspenders, Fred Perry shirts, and Doc 
Martens steel-toed boots. Heick also adorned his body with sixteen tattoos of 
Vikings, swastikas, and eagles. Following a brief crime spree, Haight-Ashbury 
business owners persuaded police to crack down on the skinheads. Heick’s group 
was neutralized, but many other skinheads would later emerge in the Bay area.101 
Skinheads are considered the foot soldiers of the right-wing movement and are 
the target of recruitment efforts by other right-wing organizations, such as the 
Aryan Nations, KKK groups, and Church of the Creator (COC).102 Thomas 
Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance (WAR), an organization known for using 
television for recruitment, successfully enlisted skinheads into his organization.  
Skinhead WAR members were linked to the 1988 murder in Portland, Oregon of 
an immigrant from Ethiopia and the assault of three other immigrants. A civil 
case related to the wrongful death of the immigrant resulted in a $12.5 million 
judgment against WAR.103 
According to a 2006 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) press release, skinhead 
activity has increased along with a rise in hate crimes against African-Americans, 
Hispanics, immigrants, and homosexuals. The ADL attributes four factors to the 
increase in skinhead activity. First, alienated or disaffected youth are cordially 
invited to join the skinhead social network of hate on the Internet. Second, white 
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power music glorifying the skinhead movement is thriving. Third, the global 
expansion of the Hammerskin Nation and other skinhead groups through the 
Internet has resulted in the expansion of other white supremacist sites and has 
enhanced the ability of skinheads to communicate with each other. Finally, the 
level of competition from other white supremacist groups has been reduced by the 
deaths or arrests of their leaders and a resulting leadership vacuum characterized 
by group infighting.104 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE TRENDS OF THE RADICAL RIGHT  
Miki Vohryzek-Bolden lists future trends of the radical right in Right-Wing 
Terrorists and the Threats They Pose for Americans in the 21st Century. The 
first trend is the right-wing shift from group affiliations to individual actors.105  
Louis Beam, a former Texas KKK grand dragon and participant in the Aryan 
Nations, is associated with promoting the concept of leaderless resistance. In his 
essay “Leaderless Resistance,” Beam advocates the use of individuals or 
autonomous small groups, also known as cells, to perform acts of violence.  
Leaderless resistance is a means of avoiding the perceived pitfalls of the military 
model of organization. The unlinked cells and individuals make detection, 
information gathering, and informant development difficult.106 One example of 
leaderless resistance was the involvement of Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, 
Michael Fortier, and Lori Fortier in the Oklahoma City bombing. Use of 
leaderless resistance increases the need for effective long-term undercover 
officers to gather intelligence and be vigilant for signs of radical cells or lone wolf 
terrorists. Undercover officers must gain sufficient trust to be included in the 
more secure and exclusive gatherings where terrorist actions are likely to be 
discussed and planned or more radicalized individuals identified. 
Other future trends of right-wing groups mentioned by Vohryzek-Bolden are 
attempts to have right-wing ideas and images assimilated into mainstream 
politics, and a rise in Odinism, white power rock music, and the influence of neo-
Nazi groups. The desire of some group members to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction is mentioned as another future trend.107 The confiscation in 2004 of a 
cyanide compound belonging to William Krar and his common-law wife Judith 
Bruey is an example of this potentiality becoming reality.108 An additional trend 
involves the continued refinement of communications networks on the Internet, 
resulting in a potential ability to connect extremist and terrorists groups 
throughout the world. Related to this trend is the globalization of terrorist and 
extremist groups, including their symbols, religions, and music. Two final trends 
described by Vohryzek-Bolden include the formation of a more hard-core group 
of “true believers” and the recruitment of college-educated individuals who are 
more articulate and capable of handling the duties of group spokespersons.109 
To safeguard our nation from future acts of terrorism, a constant awareness of 
right-wing extremist beliefs, activities, and adherents must be maintained. Public 
safety officials must be aware of the heroes and martyrs of the radical right and the 
catalytic events that may result in future acts of terrorism. Individuals committing 
criminal activities associated with the proliferation of right-wing extremist 
activities must be investigated and, if sufficient evidence is present, effectively 
adjudicated. The threat posed by the radical right may seem dormant, but the ideas 
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that promote violence against the government and other perceived enemies remain 
a constant danger. Developing sufficient and timely intelligence will be important 
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Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can 
Learn Them 
 
Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy 
 
On February 23, 2006, in a press conference to release the White House report on 
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend said “[The president] demanded that 
we find out the lessons, that we learn them and that we fix the problems, that we take 
every action to make sure America is safer, stronger and better prepared.” The lessons 
Townsend called out in her briefing concerned planning, resource management, 
evacuation, situational awareness, communications, and coordination. No one in the 
emergency response community was surprised. We know these are the problem areas. 
We knew they would be before Katrina ever hit the Gulf coast. Why? Because we identify 
the same lessons again and again, incident after incident. 
In fact, responders can readily predict the problems that will arise in a major 
incident and too often their predictions are borne out in practice. Even a casual observer 
can spot problems that recur: communications systems fail, command and control 
structures are fractured, resources are slow to be deployed. A quick perusal of the 
reports published after the major incidents of the past decade quickly shows this to be 
true. Consider the following: 
Hurricane Katrina, 2005  
In terms of the management of the Federal response, our architecture of 
command and control mechanisms as well as our existing structure of plans did 
not serve us well. Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often 
overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this 
disaster…This lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level reflected 
confusing organizational structures in the field…Furthermore, the JFO [Joint 
Field Office] staff and other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working 
knowledge of NIMS [the National Incident Management System] or even a basic 
understanding of ICS [Incident Command System] principles.  
 – From The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 2006: 52 
September 11 attack, 2001 
It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and Northern 
Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications that 
occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale. The task 
looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated manner 
with the greatest possible awareness of the situation…Emergency response 
agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS).When 
multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a 
unified command. Both are proven frameworks for emergency response. 
– From The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 315, 397 
Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 
The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) and Incident Command 
System (ICS) were weakened early in the event due to the immediate response of 
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numerous local, state and federal agencies, three separate locations of the 
Incident Command Post (ICP), within the first few hours, and the deployment of 
many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing support agencies. 
– From the After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, 2003: 3 
Hurricane Andrew, 1992 
The Committee heard substantial testimony that the post-disaster response and 
recovery to Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, including: 
inadequate communication between levels of government concerning specific 
needs; lack of full awareness of supply inventories and agency capabilities; failure 
to have a single person in charge with a clear chain of command; and inability to 
cut through bureaucratic red tape. 
 – From the Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee Final 
Report, 1993: 60 
As these statements reveal, we repeatedly confront command and control issues in large 
incidents. These are but a few examples from dozens of reports that cite the need for 
sound command structures. Somehow, though, we fail to learn this and other crucial 
lessons that have been identified in after-action reports for decades. The central 
concerns of this paper are why that is so and how we can improve. We report here on an 
exploratory investigation that targets six research questions.  
1. Is it true that lessons recur?  
2. What lessons are persistently identified?  
3. Why do these lessons continue to be identified as important?  
4. Why are these lessons so hard to learn? (That is, why do agencies have difficulty 
devising and implementing corrective actions once lessons are identified?)  
5. How do lessons-learned processes work?   
6. How can they be improved? 
We believe that by explicitly identifying persistent challenges, responders may be better 
attuned to these challenges and more able to address them in their planning and 
training processes. Likewise, by better understanding why these challenges remain 
unresolved, responders may be able to adapt their lessons-learned processes to better 
support behavioral change and improvement. To these ends, we have conducted a 
qualitative analysis of response organizations’ perspectives on lessons and learning. The 
next section describes the context of emergency response learning. We then explain our 
investigative approach. Following that we present and discuss our findings about what 
lessons responders struggle with most and what learning approaches they use. We 
conclude with recommendations for improving these processes. 
 
DISASTERS AND LEARNING 
Disasters are devastating natural, accidental, or willful events that suddenly result in 
severe negative economic and social consequences for the populations they affect, often 
including physical injury, loss of life, property damage and loss, physical and emotional 
hardship, destruction of physical infrastructure, and failure of administrative and 
operational systems. Emergency managers and responders are responsible for 
intervening before and during such events, to minimize the harm disasters cause and to 
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restore order. The large scale, high complexity, profound urgency, and intense scrutiny 
that attend disasters provide a powerful motivation for responders to be good at 
response. 
To address this challenge, responders use their experience to develop systematized 
strategies they can follow when the chaos of disaster erupts. At the same time, the 
infrequency with which disasters occur makes it hard for responders to test and improve 
their strategies, to ensure that they can be counted on to mitigate threats and hazards 
predictably and to resolve their consequences effectively. The appeal of learning from 
experience – both to avoid duplicating mistakes and to be able to repeat successes – is 
widely perceived, and many organizations across the emergency response disciplines 
have formal procedures for identifying, documenting, and disseminating lessons from 
incidents in hopes that they and others will be able to learn from past experience and 
improve future responses. 
Various mechanisms for sharing experience have emerged. These mechanisms are 
generally termed “lessons-learned” processes, and include tools like in-progress reviews, 
after-action reviewing and reporting, “hotwashes,” and various kinds of debriefings. 
While these processes vary, they have the common goal of sharing performance 
information in order to prevent the recurrence of adverse events and actions and to 
better contend with situations and problems that are likely to arise again. Most 
processes involve some version of three core components: 1. Evaluating an incident 
(through systematic analysis of what happened and why); 2. Identifying lessons 
(strengths to be sustained and weaknesses to be corrected); and 3. Learning (specifying 
and inculcating behavioral changes consistent with the lessons). 
Examples of lessons-learned systems abound. One of the best known is the U.S. 
Army’s After Action Review (AAR), a comprehensive reflective learning process 
developed in the 1970s.1 Many emergency responders follow the AAR template to a 
greater or lesser extent, formally or informally. Post-incident reporting is a common 
practice whereby an agency or set of agencies documents what happened during a 
disaster or exercise. These reports usually include accounts of actions and results, as 
well as potential remedies to problems encountered. While these reports are often used 
internally by the agencies that generate them, they are often written in isolation by a 
single agency, rather than through a coherent inter-agency process. There are various 
collections of lessons that have been compiled for broader distribution. Prominent 
examples include the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center collection and the recently 
established Lessons Learned Information System (developed by the memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism and sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security).  
Despite these widespread activities, however, the term “lessons learned” is often a 
misnomer. Our experience suggests that purported lessons learned are not really 
learned; many problems and mistakes are repeated in subsequent events. It appears 
that while review of incidents and the identification of lessons are more readily 
accomplished, true learning is much more difficult. Reports and lessons are often 
ignored,2 and even when they are not, lessons are too often isolated and perishable, 
rather than generalized and institutionalized. 
METHODOLOGY 
To determine whether or not our instinct is correct – that emergency response 
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organizations find it difficult to learn certain lessons – and to better understand why 
this is the case, we decided to conduct an exploratory analysis. We used three qualitative 
approaches in our investigation: interviews, a review of documents, and a focus group 
retreat. We began our study with a series of informal interviews with experienced 
emergency responders to confirm the face validity of our hypothesis that important 
lessons are repeatedly identified and to verify that this was a compelling concern for 
emergency responders. We then reviewed reports produced following incidents to 
discover and classify lessons that are identified repeatedly. We included reports from 
large incidents of all types that occurred within the past two decades. We excluded 
reports from military operations and from exercises. In many cases, individual 
organizations prepare their own reports, and so there are often several reports available 
for a given incident. In these cases, we focused on the reports prepared at the 
government level, rather than at the agency level, often by the department (or office) of 
emergency management, but sometimes by an independent analyst or commission. The 
reports we reviewed are listed in Appendix A. 
Some reports were very general, identifying major issues and general lessons. Many, 
though, were very detailed and the descriptions and explanations provided were very 
particular to the incident at hand. Because we are interested in high-level, cross-cutting 
lessons, we confined our examination to lessons that were called out in an executive 
summary (if provided) or that were in some way highlighted as significant in the body of 
the report. Our review of these reports can best be characterized as systematic, but 
informal. That is, we did not apply formal coding schemes or use sophisticated textual 
analysis methods. While this would certainly be an interesting avenue for further 
analysis, our purpose was to determine whether significant lessons were common across 
reports.  
Finally, we convened a focus group of eleven expert incident managers who could 
reflect on the persistent concerns that arise during major disasters. Most participants 
were chief-level officers. All were from major U.S. municipalities. All participants had 
significant senior-level management experience dealing with large scale incidents. 
Examples of incidents they had managed include: Hurricane Katrina (2005), the 
Columbia space shuttle crash (2003), the anthrax and ricin attacks in Washington, D.C. 
(2001), the September 11th attacks at both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
(2001), the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 (2001), the bombing of the Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City (1995), the Northridge earthquake (1994), the World Trade 
Organization protests (1991), the Air Florida plane crash, as well as numerous other 
“civil” events such as presidential inaugurations, national political conventions, protests, 
major sports championships, Mardis Gras celebrations, and a multitude of natural 
disasters including wildfires, hurricanes, and tornados. Participants represented a range 
of emergency response disciplines including municipal and wildland firefighting, law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, urban search and rescue, and hazardous 
materials response. A list of the participants is provided in Appendix B. 
During an intensive full-day retreat, we conducted a facilitated discussion to elicit 
the perspectives of these managers on our research questions. We had two primary 
objectives. First, we sought independent confirmation of the classes of lessons we 
discovered in our review of AAR’s. To accomplish this we simply asked participants 
what major lessons seemed to come up repeatedly in their experience. Second, we 
wanted to elicit their beliefs about why these lessons were repeated rather than learned. 
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We asked them a series of open-ended questions about why lessons are hard to learn, 
how lessons are identified and reported, and what mechanisms are used to prompt 
learning. Three note-takers independently documented the discussion that ensued. 
Participants were also afforded the opportunity to provide additional commentary to 
clarify or expand points they wanted to make.  
 
FINDINGS: WHAT LESSONS ARE IDENTIFIED REPEATEDLY? 
To reiterate, we sought to be systematic in our analysis, but this remains an exploratory 
investigation – a first step in an area we hope to probe further in a more targeted way. 
The findings we report in this section were garnered both deductively (proceeding from 
loosely-specified hypotheses) and inductively (in that new and unexpected insights 
surfaced and added to our inquiry). Our findings are admittedly subject to the biases 
inherent in subjective, qualitative research. We hope to mitigate this threat by citing the 
perspectives of our participants directly, so that the reader can “hear” how these 
individuals characterized the issues at hand. Thus we report here our synthesized 
findings accompanied by illustrations from the discussions we held. 
Our review of AAR’s bears out our hypothesis that lessons are repeatedly identified. 
Despite the disparity of the reports we reviewed, we found a striking consistency in 
major categories of lessons identified. Table 1 shows important topics that were 
addressed in several prominent incidents. While it is certainly the case that each 
incident had its own unique challenges, it was common to see problems characterized in 
similar ways across several incidents. It is also true that the response to some incidents 
appeared to go well while the response to others went badly, so that certain lessons were 
stated as successes to be repeated in some cases but as problems to be corrected in 
others. A detailed list of the lessons identified in a selection of reports for significant 
recent incidents is available from the authors. 
 





































































































Communications     ! ! !   ! ! 
Leadership ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Logistics ! !   ! ! ! !   
Mental Health         !   ! ! 
Planning ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Public Relations ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Operations   ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Resource Management ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Training & Exercises ! ! ! ! !   !   
 
Table 1: Common Categories of Lessons.  
Correlation between After Action Reports from selected major incidents and significant issues addressed. 
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We gain added confidence in our hypothesis that these lessons recur from the responses 
of our focus group. The focus group participants were easily able to identify lessons that 
emerge regularly from incident responses. There was a very high level of consensus 
among participants about what these lessons are, and the lessons they identified are 
very consistent with those we identified from our AAR review. The lessons our incident 
managers singled out as important and recurring pertain to five main areas: command, 
communications, planning, resource management, and public relations.  
 
Uncoordinated Leadership 
We asked our incident commander focus group “what problems do you see on every 
incident?” Several incident commanders immediately replied: unclear, multiple, 
conflicting, uncooperative, and isolated command structures. Every head in the room 
nodded agreement. Large incidents demand that robust command and control 
structures emerge out of the initial chaos that inevitably ensues when disasters strike. 
Large incidents also involve a multitude of agencies, each of which must direct its own 
resources. As a result, agency- and/or function-specific command structures proliferate. 
Since each agency has legitimate missions, responsibilities, and jurisdiction, each uses 
its command and control process to take charge, in a legitimate attempt to solve the 
problems the agency is supposed to solve. Absent an overarching command structure to 
which all participants subscribe, however, the result is duplicative and conflicting 
efforts. As one responder put it, “People ask ‘who’s in charge?’ The response is usually, 
‘Of what?’” In fact, a coherent joint command structure often fails to emerge; our focus 
group specifically cited weak implementation of the incident command system (ICS) 
and poor understanding of unified command. A fire chief with extensive experience at 
the Katrina response gave a telling example: “In New Orleans, you couldn’t go two 
blocks without running into somebody’s incident command post. But there was no 
coordination between them. Everyone assumes there’ll be a graduation up to some 
larger structure, but nobody knows how to get to that.” At the same time, by using the 
term “command and control,” we do not mean to suggest that structures are unitary, 
rigid, or static. In fact, successful management requires collaboration, flexibility, and 
adaptability across multiple diverse actors. This cannot be achieved anarchically, 
however; it requires that managers employ common philosophies and conventions.  
What accounts for command problems, for failure to collaborate? Our emergency 
response experts cited three main culprits. First, they said, agencies lack the 
commitment to coordinate with each other. At best, they are unaware of what other 
agencies are doing and do not try to find out. At worst, they are unwilling to cooperate. 
This stems from a lack of trust between agencies and a lack of understanding across 
disciplines. Moreover, agencies often find themselves in competition. Day-to-day they 
fight with each other for scarce budget resources. This battle worsens during a major 
disaster when resources become even scarcer. Second, responders told us that the 
primary mechanism for resolving resource-allocation struggles, the Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), is often ineffective. The delegates sent to EOCs are usually 
liaisons who lack decision-making authority, aren’t respected, and/or don’t get along 
with each other. They do not focus on how to make decisions together. Worse, large 
incidents spawn multiple EOCs that tend to be political and parochial – they will not 
exchange representatives to facilitate coordination. As a result, “turf battles” rage and 
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distract incident managers from the real job at hand: mitigating the incident.  
Finally, our experts told us, ICS is in common use, but it is not understood and 
implemented in a consistent manner. Generally, every discipline does their own form of 
ICS training and agencies train in isolation. Often this training is too simplistic to delve 
into the subtle skills of disciplined, team-based, decision making. Further, responders 
cannot be expected to learn the functions of incident management in the heat of an 
event. As one captain told us, “You can’t grab ‘regular’ police officers and firefighters 
and take them away from handling the stuff they’re handling to do incident 
management stuff. If they haven’t already been training in logistics, it will take them a 
long time to figure it out, and they have other things to be worrying about.” Yet, absent 
sound training, this is exactly what happens, with the needless result that recognized 
and well-developed incident management functions are carried out poorly. The reports 
cited in the introduction to this article bear out our focus group participants’ claim that, 
as one manager put it, “Everyone agrees we need ICS, but we don’t share one system.” 
 
Failed Communications 
Our systems of command, control, and coordination are predicated on being able to 
communicate. As one expert told us, “For thirty years, we’ve said that communications 
is our biggest problem because it’s a house of cards: When communications fails, the 
rest of the response fails.” A major challenge of large disasters is that they destroy our 
physical infrastructure, including our communications equipment. The most recent 
example of this comes from Hurricane Katrina, which “destroyed an unprecedented 
portion of the core communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region... 
The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left emergency 
responders and citizens without a reliable network across which they could coordinate.”3 
But communications isn’t entirely (or even fundamentally) a technology problem. 
We know how to build robust equipment and systems; as one participant noted, “CNN 
never goes down.” And even sophisticated interoperable capability exists. But our 
response professionals pointed to an unwillingness to agree to a shared system, a lack of 
commitment to operate using this system, and a lack of discipline to use it correctly. As 
one chief pointed out, “We dump millions into hardware, but don’t think about systems. 
Hardware will do anything you want. You’ve got to get people to agree on how to 
function with it.” In short, technology is only an enabler; communicating requires that 
people are willing to share information with each other. This is not to say there are no 
important technological weaknesses in our communications systems. In part, 
communications deficiencies stem from gaps in research and development, from 
resource constraints, and from problems making some technologies broadly available. 
As one responder lamented, “We can talk to a rover on Mars, but we can’t talk to 
someone inside a building.” Despite being aware of the limitations and fragility of the 
infrastructure, we continue to lack contingency plans for how to communicate when 
technology fails (or is destroyed).  
 
Weak Planning 
Gaps in emergency plans cause serious problems when disaster strikes. Witness the 
evacuation problems experienced in New Orleans: Thousands of people had no way to 
leave the city on their own and no place to go, leaving them stranded in the face of 
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Katrina. This problem was anticipated, yet the city’s evacuation plan was woefully 
inadequate. While it mentioned evacuation, it lacked details about how evacuation 
would be conducted and who was responsible for the process, while some people who 
were assigned roles by the plan were unaware of their responsibilities. This is a 
prominent example, but not atypical of the response plans on which this nation relies. 
Plans are often simplistic and superficial, failing to provide enough detail to be 
actionable. Often plans cover the first hours or days of an incident, but do not consider 
long-duration responses or long-term recovery. 
These gaps are a result of weaknesses in the planning process. The most 
fundamental problem to plague planning processes is a lack of commitment to plans 
across agencies and jurisdictions. While agencies may be at the table during the 
planning process, they may not buy in to the requirements needed to fully enact these 
plans. Alternatively, plans may be watered down to permit compromise, rather than 
requiring hard choices. Decisions about how work will get done are necessarily decisions 
about who has authority and who gets resources. These can be hard conflicts to resolve, 
and agencies often shirk making these hard choices when they are not perceived as 
immediately pressing. Worse, key agencies may be excluded from the planning process, 
even though the plan governs them or counts on their support. These problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that planning processes are typically infrequent, so plans 
become dated and do not incorporate lessons from recent events. 
Ultimately these weaknesses go unnoticed because actual plans are not trained fully 
or exercised realistically. Plans are often developed by mid-level managers. Senior 
managers and political officials may have the plan on their shelves, but get no formal 
training on what is in it or how to use it. Similarly, plans are not disseminated to 
supervisors or training academies. When the time comes for implementation, those on 
the front lines don’t know what the plan calls for.  
 
Resource Constraints 
Large-scale, long-duration incidents demand more resources – personnel, equipment, 
supplies, commodities, specialized capabilities – than any agency or government can 
keep on hand, so these resources must be obtained rapidly when a disaster occurs. This 
makes resource acquisition and management a major function of incident management. 
Unfortunately, while some materials are cached and pre-deployed, they are often 
inadequate to meet actual need. This means that resources must be obtained “real-
time,” but normal resource acquisition systems are too slow and are not designed to 
obtain large amounts of supplies rapidly. The capacity and flexibility of emergency 
requisition and purchasing procedures are uneven. Bid laws and ordering processes may 
be too cumbersome and constraining to permit responders to get what they need. 
Governments often lack standing contracts and agreements for specialized resources. 
Once materials are obtained, poor property-tracking systems leave response agencies 
vulnerable to public accountability problems and lawsuits. 
Remedies to these problems do exist, but they are not broadly implemented. For 
example, there are one-stop-shop mechanisms available (such as those of the General 
Services Administration), but these are neither widely understood nor widely used, and 
the procedures involved must be pre-arranged. Mutual aid relationships can be an 
effective conduit for support, but these are often informal and are not centrally 
coordinated. As a result, a single mutual aid asset may be “counted” by several different 
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agencies as part of their resource bases. The wildland fire community uses a very 
effective nationwide resource ordering and deployment system, but this approach has 
not been replicated by other disciplines. Moreover, common terminology and standard 
resource typing are required for such a system to work; these do not yet exist across 
response disciplines. 
Volunteers and donated resources present a particular challenge to incident 
management. Tracking systems for these resources are weak, and as a result many 
assets go underutilized. Many organizations have useful capabilities but do not know 
how to identify or connect to the incident management system, either because they do 
not understand ICS or because the command system is so fractured it is hard to 
navigate. Even emergency response agencies that do understand ICS often “self-
dispatch” to the scene without coordinating their response. These agencies have 
important skills, but often deploy without the ability to support themselves with food, 
water, fuel, shelter, or communications. Also, it is hard to verify the credentials of 
personnel who show up to help; some are highly qualified, while others have no business 
being at an emergency scene. Yet there is no easy, standard way to confirm the 
background and affiliation of volunteers. Likewise, maintaining accountability and 
tracking volunteer status is equally difficult. As a result, well-meaning volunteers add a 
significant management burden to already over-taxed incident managers. As noted in 
Arlington County’s report after 9/11, “Organizations, response units, and individuals 
proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge 
and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander, complicate the 
exercise of command, increase the risks faced by bona fide responders, and exacerbate 
the challenge of accountability.”4 On top of these problems, much of the material sent to 
the scene is not useful, but must still be managed – transported, stored, and disposed of. 
Agencies often lack plans for getting rid of stuff they receive but do not need. 
 
Poor Public Relations 
Responders told us they believe that the general public wants instructions about what to 
do, but that people may not receive or understand the directions government agencies 
give them. In part, responders say, this is because governments rely heavily on 
mainstream media. Many people don’t pay attention to mainstream media, and 
therefore don’t get the information governments want them to have. Even people who 
do get the information may not understand the message correctly, especially when the 
government gives short shrift to pre-incident public education. This problem is 
exacerbated in the heat of an incident – when agencies fail to use a common message,  
do not control the message carefully, the pressure to get information out quickly 
undermines accuracy, and rumors propagate unchecked.  
Even when directions are clear, received, and understood, some people do not have 
the wherewithal to follow them. As our incident managers acknowledged, some people 
just do not have the will to do as they are told. In the incident managers’ view, the public 
is generally complacent about preparedness. This is borne out by anecdotal evidence. 
For example, during the recent commemoration of the 1906 earthquake, National Public 
Radio reported, “Scientists agree that it’s very likely another big earthquake will hit the 
San Francisco Bay area in the next thirty years, but…many people in the Bay Area still 
live in denial” (April 18, 2006). Interviews with a number of citizens illustrated their 
point. Few had serious plans or any supplies to sustain them in the event of a major 
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disaster. The lack of wherewithal or will on the part of the public presents a recurring 
challenge to governments that have not invested enough resources in emergency 
transportation and shelter. 
 
FINDINGS: WHY DON’T WE LEARN? 
These lessons relate to some of the most important and involved functions of incident 
management, so it is no surprise that problems are identified repeatedly in the areas of 
command, communications, planning, resource management, and public relations. 
Likewise, responders are most likely to notice concerns in these areas by dint of the 
effort expended on them during any incident. Moreover, large, complex incidents are 
inherently challenging to manage. Destructive and unpredictable, they impose 
extraordinary demands on the decision-making and service-delivery systems of the 
affected communities. Nevertheless, responders claim that many problems encountered 
repeatedly are solved anew each time, suggesting that it should be possible to inculcate 
improvements across time and agencies. It should be possible to solve at least some of 
these problems once and for all, rather than time and again. This section reports 
findings that illuminate the challenges to this proposition in five general areas: 
motivation, reporting, learning, exercising, and resources. 
Motivation for Change 
Learning is, at its core, a process of growth; thus a successful learning process requires a 
commitment to change.5 Organizational change is notoriously difficult, but particular 
challenges attend change in the emergency response arena. One challenge is political 
traction. Individual citizens rarely see their emergency response systems in action. They 
generally assume the systems will work well when called upon. Moreover, citizens 
underestimate the likelihood that disaster will befall them. Yet citizens are confronted 
every day by other problems they want government to fix – failing schools, blighted 
communities, and high fuel prices. Politicians tend to respond to these more 
immediately pressing demands, deferring investments in emergency preparedness until 
a major event re-awakens public concern. As one incident commander put it, “Change 
decisions are driven by politics and scrutiny, not rational analysis.” High-profile events 
and the media attention they garner generate opportunities to make changes because 
public fear prompts politicians to support improvements. 
Scrutiny can free up resources for change, but the results can be perverse as well. 
Until Hurricane Katrina struck, the most momentous event in the public’s memory was 
the 9/11 attack. On the basis of that incident, the president and Congress initiated a 
major new homeland security policy agenda, including one of the most significant 
government reorganizations in history. Many of the policies and programs promulgated 
under the auspices of homeland security are targeted at Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and terrorism. This frustrates emergency responders who continue to struggle 
to maintain and upgrade their capacity to cope with a myriad of other (more common) 
threats and hazards. Our experts’ frustration on this point was palpable. They find the 
WMD focus distracting. As one fire chief raged, “It’s terrorism, terrorism, 
terrorism…and I can’t use my resources for the things I know I’ll face. So how many 
major non-terrorism incidents do we have to have before DHS get us resources for other 
things than WMD?” A police chief agreed: “Local agencies are having terrorism shoved 
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down their throats. They can hardly do basic tactical training because of all the 
mandates for certifications, much less terrorism training.” 
Even following a major event, it is hard to sustain a commitment to change long 
enough to accomplish it. After an incident, it takes time to conduct an analysis and 
identify lessons. Washington D.C. and the public have very short time horizons; neither 
waits for these reports to move ahead. The government  tends to focus on fast (and 
inexpensive) solutions – quick wins they can point to before public attention wanes. 
This kind of nearsightedness is inconsistent with meaningful change. By the time 
reports come out, there is no will (nor funding) to implement changes. By then, 
leadership has either turned over or moved on to something else. One local manager 
told us “We thought we did a lot of work with our politicians after the last major 
incident. But they have better things to do. Five minutes after that incident is over, 
they’re on to something else. There are a lot of gains to be made if they do well 
[managing a disaster], but an incident is a political flash in the pan for them.”  
Even in cases where important lessons do make it to the public agenda, the disparate 
emergency response community lacks a shared vision of what to do about those lessons. 
Response professionals see desired outcomes differently based on what agencies and 
disciplines they represent. Our focus group claims this problem has gotten harder since 
9/11, because federal involvement in trying to solve problems is so much greater. The 
federal government has many resources to devote to policy and planning relative to local 
governments, who do not have much capacity. On the other hand, it is the locals who 
deliver services, are closest to the needs of the community, and best understand how to 
meet those needs, whereas federal agencies are removed from the exigencies of 
emergency response operations. As a result, federal and local agencies talk past each 
other. Even in cases where federal and local policymakers see problems the same way, 
federal ambition outstrips local capacity; federal agencies do extensive planning, but 
there are not enough local resources to meet the federal vision. 
Another impediment to change is the episodic nature of significant events. Any given 
agency experiences incidents fairly infrequently, but looking at the nation as a whole, 
relevant events occur all the time. For the nation to improve response overall, the 
emergency response community has to be able to learn from all of these events. This 
calls for organizations to think of their experiences collectively, and be willing to learn 
from each other. But it can be difficult for agencies to perceive the experience of others 
as relevant to their own responsibilities and operations, and it can be hard to prioritize 
these lessons over the daily problems an agency confronts in its own jurisdiction. One 
chief told us, “There [are] no teeth in lessons from someone else’s experience. We don’t 
really learn from others unless we can really imagine ourselves in that other person’s 
circumstance.” Another explained the problem this way:  
We fail to recognize and apply the lessons on a daily basis. We kill firefighters over 
and over again the same way, report after report after report. We look for big 
lessons, but fail to identify the small ones and apply them in ‘onesies’ and ‘twosies’ 
every day. Why? We don’t see the relevance, or think it won’t happen here, or we’re 
too parochial. We’re tone-deaf to things that happen to other organizations. 
Distance in time and space makes this worse. As we get further from each other and 
the event gets further in the past, it is easy to ignore it. And, even if you accept that 
something needs to be done, how do you manage it with everything else that’s 
coming at you as a priority every day? Small lessons just don’t take priority. 
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Beyond this, it seems that pressure for change from within the discipline does not have 
the same force as external scrutiny. As we have said, public fear can motivate rapid 
behavioral change. An example that members of the focus group pointed to was the 
transformation in the active-shooter doctrine that resulted from the Columbine High 
School shooting. The protocol changed dramatically in eighteen months, and the change 
was universal – all S.W.A.T. teams in the country updated their procedures.  
Why did such a sweeping change happen so fast on the basis of a single incident? 
There were three reasons. First, public scrutiny; every community had a school full of 
kids whose parents were afraid. Second, willingness to admit to an important lesson; the 
Columbine Police Department stood up and said, “We didn’t handle this right.” Third, 
rapid dissemination; the new protocol was sent to every department across the country 
through the law enforcement information network. Our focus group participants 
contrasted this example with the fact that it took five years and a lot of firefighter deaths 
to get Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) established, even though many in the field knew 
they were necessary.  
All of this suggests that thinking about learning and change in a single agency or 
discipline faces substantial barriers. Doing this work collectively is even harder, 
especially when long-standing animosity gets in the way. It is common for agencies to 
compete for attention and resources daily, and this only gets worse with big incidents. 
But one chief acknowledged that collaboration is a key enabler of learning. As he said, 
“If you’re not alone in this game it’s a lot easier. If you’re learning alongside others who 
face the same problems and will be your partners in a major incident, then you’re more 
likely to obtain broader, more persistent change because you change expectations across 
organizations.” 
 
Review and Reporting Process 
Assuming that an agency is open to learning and change, the learning process can be 
thought of as beginning with the identification of lessons. This is typically accomplished 
through the publication of After Action Reports (AARs). Our response experts told us 
that while some reports are very comprehensive and useful, lessons reporting processes 
are, on the whole, ad hoc. There is no universally accepted approach to the development 
or content of reports. Moreover, there are often several reports that come out of any 
given incident. Sometimes joint reports are prepared, but more often agencies or 
disciplines write their own without consulting each other. These reports differ and even 
conflict, since perspectives and experiences (even from very reliable sources) vary 
dramatically, so that “sometimes you wonder if people were on the same incident.” It is 
difficult for an agency seeking to learn from the reports to de-conflict them, since there 
is no independent validation mechanism to establish whether findings and lessons are 
“right.”  
Worse than conflicts and possible inaccuracies, concern about attribution and 
retribution is a severe constraint on candor in lessons reporting. It is politically 
dangerous for an agency or a leader to own up to mistakes and problems for fear that 
the leader or agency will be penalized. To contend with this, lessons are often reported 
in a much redacted way; as a result, the level of detail required to make a lesson 
meaningful and actionable is lost. Meaning is also diluted by the lack of a common 
terminology. The same functions are described using different terms in different 
disciplines and parts of the country. Or the same terms are used to describe different 
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things. This leads to a lack of understanding, or a false sense of understanding. 
Another substantive problem is that the focus of reporting is unbalanced. AARs 
typically focus on what went wrong, but chiefs want to know what they can do that is 
right. Reports tend to detail things that didn’t work, without necessarily proposing 
solutions. Incident managers seek a lessons-learned system that provides good answers, 
solutions, and best practices. They want to hear what to do, instead of what not to do. 
They would also like to hear about “near misses,” things that almost went wrong and 
could go wrong again elsewhere without preventive action. This kind of reporting 
requires an additional analytical step; to produce reports that meet these needs, those 
preparing the reports need to understand not only what happened, but also why it 
happened and what corrective action would have improved the circumstances. Reports 
of this depth and quality are relatively rare. Beyond this, many opportunities to learn 
smaller but valuable lessons are foregone because formal reports are typically only 
generated for major events, not for small day-to-day incidents. These “less significant” 
lessons, if disseminated, offer important opportunities to make more manageable 
developmental changes in response procedures, but there is no mechanism by which 
these smaller lessons can be easily reported and widely shared.  
The value of even well-crafted reports is often undermined because they are not 
distributed effectively. Most dissemination is informal, and as a result development and 
adoption of new practices is haphazard. Generally, responders must actively seek 
reports in order to obtain them. Lessons do get reported at conferences, but these 
discussions rarely trickle down to the front line. There is no trusted, accessible facility or 
institution that provides lessons learned information to first responders broadly, 
although some disciplines do have lessons repositories. (The Wildland Fire Lessons 
Learned Center and the Center for Army Lessons Learned are two prominent examples.) 
And there are some consolidated collections of reports that attempt to fill this need. 
(See, for example, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing web site.6)  
 
Learning and Teaching 
Failure to learn is due, in part, to a lack of systems to identify and disseminate lessons. 
Even when lessons are identified, our response experts told us, most learning and 
change processes lack a formal, rigorous, systematic methodology. Simplistically, the 
lesson learning and change process iterates through the following steps: Identify the 
lesson ! recognize the causal process ! devise a new operational process ! practice 
the new process ! embed/institutionalize and sustain the new process.7 It is apparent 
in practice that there are weaknesses at each of these steps. 
Learning begins with an analysis to identify the causal process that underlies the 
lesson. Absent this, there can be no confidence that a remedy will work and this kind of 
analysis is rare. One manager explained, “We don’t study lessons carefully enough and 
apply them in a serious way. We don’t drill down into the details of what changes are 
really required to address lessons.” In particular, our incident managers told us that 
agencies find it difficult to think in general terms to be able to see how lessons from one 
incident or discipline might apply to another. This dilemma is intensified by the fact that 
the emergency response disciplines writ large lack a common operating doctrine. 
Without common, accepted conventions against which to compare behavior, it is hard to 
spot deviations and inconsistencies that suggest the need for learning and change. 
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Moreover, agencies tend to consider individual incidents and particular lessons in 
isolation, rather than as systems or broad patterns of behavior. A chief put it this way: 
“We don’t look enough at the relationships of components. Day to day, we focus too 
narrowly and short-term, so our problem-solving approach doesn’t consider the whole 
system.”  
Following the analysis through which lessons are identified and appropriate 
remedies understood, practice is required to inculcate new behavior. Often the work of 
identifying relevant lessons and devising corrective actions makes the agency feel it now 
knows what to do. One responder admitted, “We spend a lot of time writing AAR’s, 
which gives us the sense that we learned lessons, but the lessons are not consolidated 
into a training regimen, and so we don’t actually learn them.” Our focus group 
participants agreed that practice gets shortchanged. As a result, the link between the last 
two steps in the learning process seems especially tenuous. Agencies that do get to the 
point of practicing a new process are lulled into a false sense that they have now 
corrected the problem. But when another stressful event happens, it turns out this new 
process is not as firmly embedded as the agency thought. “We feel committed to new 
courses of action, but then they fall apart on exercises, much less incidents.” A lack of 
practice means that processes have not been rehearsed well enough to work out details 
and problems, or to develop trust in the new process. Since responders do not really 
understand and trust the new process, they revert to their old familiar ways. These old 
habits seem “safer,” even though past experience has shown they do not work. One chief 
described this pathology as follows: “Lessons represent dramatic changes that are hard 
to entrench. So we fail because we’re not disciplined enough, and we fall back to old 
habits rather than sticking to what we learned.” 
This problem is rarely noticed until another event occurs because follow-up is 
inadequate. Our experts told us that feedback after implementing new practices is 
typically informal and passive; it comes from simply noticing improvement, rather than 
actively testing for it. One responder summed up the problem: “There are breaks 
throughout the cycle. Even if we could identify lessons, identify corrective actions, 
implement them, train them, and exercise them, how do we know if the changes solved 
the problem?” Lessons are not clearly linked to corrective actions, then to training 
objectives, then to performance metrics, so it is difficult for organizations to notice that 
they have not really learned until the next incident hits and they get surprised. As an 
Oklahoma City Chief told us about his experience after the Murrah Building bombing, 
“We’d been through a major incident, and when the next one was inbound, we thought 
we were ready, thought we’d learned and knew what to do. Then the incident hits and 
we have the same problems all over again. Turned out we didn’t really learn what we 
thought we had.”  Responders from New Orleans echoed this sentiment: “We did Mardi 
Gras so well that Katrina felt like a sucker punch.” 
According to our focus group experts, fixing the weak links in the lessons learning 
cycle requires that response agencies have a deeper understanding of how to learn. But, 
they say, the learning process is not taught in our emergency response educational 
institutions. For example, the National Fire Academy (our premiere institution of 
learning in the fire service) doesn’t teach learning science or systems thinking at any 
level of sophistication. Our emergency response agency leaders especially need this 
knowledge. One manager highlighted this need: “We don’t know if we are even creating 
the mechanism appropriate to learning in our agencies.” 
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Perhaps the key mechanism for testing, practicing, refining, and inculcating new 
lessons-derived behaviors is exercising. Almost every AAR discusses the crucial role that 
training and exercising play in building capacity. Unfortunately, our AAR review and 
focus group betrayed several important weaknesses in the way disaster exercises are 
designed and executed. 
One design problem is striking the right balance between the known and the 
unknown. On the one hand, it is very important to prepare for what is likely. But 
preparing for the events that will probably occur does not get responders ready for the 
unusual, unexpected, and unforeseen, and how to handle these kinds of circumstances. 
One chief asserted that “we don’t use our imagination in preparedness,” but also 
acknowledged the opposite problem: some exercise scenarios are so far-fetched that 
they are a waste of time. At the same time, responders, like citizens, would rather believe 
that the possible worst case just will not happen. This kind of denial stems in part from 
the fact that it is important for emergency responders to have confidence and courage in 
the face of extreme adversity. One incident manager explained: “The hardest thing is to 
train a firefighter or a cop to know that they’re overwhelmed. They are trained to feel 
like they can handle it. It’s a rude awakening to recognize your own mortality, but we’ve 
got to.” 
Another design problem is a lack of realism, not with respect to scenarios, but in 
terms of what is required of responders and incident managers. Exercise procedures are 
typically simplified, compared to how they would actually unfold in a real event, in order 
to meet the time and resource limitations of exercises. This masks complexity, however, 
and responders often fail to appreciate what it really takes to get work done; when 
reality hits, “the devil is in the details.” One senior leader explained, “In planning and 
exercising, everything works nicely, but this doesn’t happen in the real world.” This lack 
of realism sometimes stems from the fact that exercises are rarely held without advance 
notice and tend to escalate progressively, rather than erupting suddenly on a broad 
scale. Sudden-onset incidents present a particular challenge for which responders need 
better preparation. One expert described his concern this way:  
As incidents escalate progressively in front of us, we build and add systems. We 
do this naturally. But what happens when the incident starts out big and 
requires a large system right out of the gate? We don’t know how to handle 
instantaneously large, complex incidents. We go in thinking “I can handle this.” 
We don’t go in thinking “I’m overwhelmed from the get-go.” 
Finally, a major impediment to exercising is fear of failure – not in reality, but in the 
exercise. Our response experts told us that most exercises have a punitive tone. Exercise 
designers and evaluators have some “school solution” in mind that is never revealed to 
exercise participants. The participants do not understand in advance what the 
expectations are for success and the exercise objectives are unclear. As a result, 
participants make obscure decisions during the exercise, for which they are later 
criticized. This has occurred often enough that responders are reticent about 
participating in exercises. One senior manager explained the problem this way:  
We exercise wrong. People don’t come to exercises because they’re afraid they’ll 
be tested, that they’ll make mistakes, and that they’ll be embarrassed. They make 
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strange decisions that cause the exercise to veer off. We don’t train people how to 
operate first and then test them afterwards. Instead, we throw them in blind, and 
then tear them apart afterwards. We just expect them to make the decision that 
we had anticipated and then criticize them when they don’t.  
This situation is not helped by the fact that exercises are often designed and delivered by 
contractors, whose interests may have more to do with business than with improving 
response performance in the field during a major incident. Our focus group participants 
fear that this punitive approach will only get worse if exercises become DHS’s main tool 
for assessment and funding allocation. 
There are also important imbalances in exercise goals and the content of exercise 
scenarios. Responders told us that the preoccupation with terrorism and WMD means 
that DHS mandates state and local governments to perform exercises they do not need, 
dealing with scenarios that are far down the list of likely events or do not focus on 
important capability gaps. In fact, a narrow focus on WMD is potentially damaging to 
our preparedness. There is only so much room on an agency’s training schedule. If 
WMD displaces too much, there is not enough time to focus on training to address 
lessons the field has identified. Even making room for the most pressing lessons is 
already hard. Our experts assert that state and local governments need to identify their 
greatest threat and weakest capability and define their own relevant exercise needs. 
Another common problem is that exercises have proliferated in light of events and 
studies highlighting weaknesses in preparedness. Not only are there too many exercises, 
there are too many goals for each one. As a result, locals are inundated with exercise 
requirements to the point that their participation is not productive. Our experts suggest 
fewer exercises with narrower and sharper objectives: “We are already exercised to 
death. More exercises is not the answer.” Finally, exercises fail to target one of the most 
important levers of preparedness: regional relationships. Agencies either exercise in 
isolation with simulated interactions, or the interactions that are required by an exercise 
do not mimic those that would operate in a real disaster. As a result, agencies fail to 
derive perhaps the most important benefit of the exercise process: relationships with 
other agencies, jurisdictions, and disciplines. 
Execution problems further undermine the value of exercises. A major problem is 
that many responders miss exercises, because they happen on a particular day and shift, 
and exercises of a particular type may happen only one time or once a year. So only 
some of the force gets the experience. Moreover, while the same agencies may 
participate together in several exercises, the participants vary from exercise to exercise. 
As a result, people have a “one-shot” experience and do not get a chance to learn from 
their mistakes and then try it again. Worse, uneven participation means that agencies 
miss the opportunity to build strong, trusting relationships. Finally, an important result 
of exercises is to expose deficiencies so that they can be examined and corrected, but 
fear of retribution or penalties impede honest reporting. Too often, public officials 
report wonderful successes and do not reveal problems. As a result, the public thinks 
everything is under control and has unrealistic expectations when a bad incident 
actually happens and agencies do not get the resources they need to correct problems.  
 
Resource Constraints 
Commitment to learning is wasted if resources are not available to support the process. 
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Unfortunately, funds available to sustain corrective action, training, and exercise 
programs are even leaner than those available for staff and equipment. One chief asked, 
“Even if we read every AAR, where do we get capacity to implement lessons in our 
organizations?” Part of the problem is that investments in basic capacity are not as 
marketable – as “sexy” – as equipment for combating terrorism. Furthermore, carefully 
conceived, sophisticated, progressive training and exercise programs are very expensive 
in time and dollars. Unlike the military, which spends a great deal of time training when 
they are not actually fighting, emergency responders have many other ancillary duties 
aside from responding to calls. Response agencies cannot pull personnel off the line or 
off these duties for training and exercises. And, our experts admitted, we shouldn’t be 
investing resources in training and exercises unless we make the effort to improve our 
lessons-learning processes. “If you don’t get the lessons right,” they say, “you chase 
hollow solutions and throw money around without actually solving problems.” 
To synthesize our findings, we believe the fundamental challenge is that it takes 
long-term resource commitment and organizational discipline to solve recurring 
problems. Too often, however, political support is too transient as other, more visible, 
concerns divert resources from longer-term preparedness activities. Even in the 
emergency response domain, attention devoted to terrorism distracts from developing 
the basic capacity needed to respond to more common incidents. Agencies are easily 
distracted by their daily missions, as well. Because lessons from major incidents are not 
easily accessible, are not detailed enough to be useful, and their relevance is not 
immediately obvious, agencies are reticent about committing the time and effort needed 
to really understand, develop, and implement corrective actions that would improve 
their performance. Even if they do decide to adopt new procedures, inadequate practice 
prevents transitional changes from taking hold. Further, those changes most likely to 
become embedded are smaller internal adjustments, rather than broad culture changes 




We asked our participants for ideas to improve our ability to learn the lessons of the 
past. Their ideas centered around three themes. 
 1.  The need to radically improve the way we train and exercise.  
2. The need for a comprehensive, nation-wide capability to gather and validate the 
information we learn from incidents, develop and vet corrective actions, and 
disseminate them to those who must inculcate the changes. 
3. The need for incentives to institutionalize lessons-learning processes at all levels of 
government.  
 
Training and Exercising 
Across the board, our study participants felt the key to learning lessons is to improve the 
way we train and exercise. Most importantly, exercises must be recast as learning 
activities targeted at improving performance, not as punitive tests where failure is 
perceived as threatening an organization’s ability to garner funding or maintain political 
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favor. This requires improvements in exercise planning. In particular, exercise planners 
should explicitly link the lessons a jurisdiction seeks to learn to a limited set of focused 
exercise objectives, rather than trying to accomplish numerous ill-defined goals. Our 
participants recommended that exercise planning should follow the military-style crawl 
! walk ! run structure where participants first learn expectations about appropriate 
actions and decisions (crawl), then move slowly through a scenario taking the time to 
practice decision making (walk), and then pick up the pace and the challenges as they 
get more adept (run). This suggests that responders should engage in smaller, more 
frequent, narrowly tailored exercises with limited goals before they get to exercises on 
the scale of TOPOFF. An exercise program with this sophisticated, progressive structure 
is resource-intensive and will require federal support. DHS should reorient and enhance 
their exercise planning resources to help state and local agencies plan and execute 
exercises that fulfill these goals. 
The participants offered advise for their own agencies as well, beginning with 
making training for large-scale events tougher. While the table-top exercises commonly 
employed provide valuable practice with strategic and tactical decision making, they are 
not realistic enough to test jurisdictions’ abilities to coordinate resources and 
communicate with each other. We must find a way to introduce the chaos and common 
failures likely in a real event into state, regional, and local exercises. And local agencies 
need to find a way to inculcate practice with the protocols and behaviors suggested by 
lessons in daily activities. For example, jurisdictions that explicitly set up incident 
commands for every event they respond to – even the small ones – are better able to 
inculcate this way of operating as a habit responders will draw on during major 
incidents when it is especially necessary.  
Finally, individual agencies also need to do a better job of adopting disciplined 
processes for reporting lessons and updating plans to reflect them, so that lessons, 
planning, training, and exercising can be better integrated. None of the lessons  
identified in this study as recurring are hazard-specific. They arise from incidents of all 
types. This suggests that even though disasters seem unique, solutions to them can be 
generalized. Most experienced incident managers will tell you that the best way to make 
a decision in an emergency is to make it well ahead of time, before an incident happens 
and before the specific nature of the problems that will arise is known. This suggests two 
things: first, that an all-hazards perspective is appropriate and should be emphasized, 
and second, that many of the issues that will arise from an incident of any type can be 
addressed in a rigorous planning process. To support lessons-focused planning, 
agencies must establish and follow a requirement to document events and lessons 
learned immediately post-operation, for small events as well as large incidents. 
Adopting a standard format for this process will make it easier for responders to follow 
this mandate. Agencies must also require that lessons learned (both theirs and other 
organizations’) are consulted and considered as plans are revised. To assist this process, 
the incident managers in our study see an important role for the federal government in 
creating a national capability to identify and advocate lessons learned. 
 
National Emergency Response Lessons Learned Institute 
Learning lessons depends on the development of a robust analytical capability. Such a 
capability could be the core of a new national doctrinal institute or part of an existing 
federal academy or preparedness activity. Any of these arrangements would be a 
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significant undertaking, however, and would not succeed as simply an “additional duty” 
of an existing organization. Analysts who support this institution would need to be able 
to understand the information in AAR’s, translate them into a common language, 
identify and resolve conflicting information or conclusions, develop the required 
changes in policy and procedure, vet or test those new concepts, and deliver them to the 
organizations who need them. This would require analysts with both expertise in 
learning science and in-depth knowledge and experience in the emergency response and 
incident management domains.  
For this institute (whatever its configuration) to be effective, it must begin by 
promulgating a sound reporting system. Good reporting is demanding and resource-
intensive; it requires clear criteria for what is to be reported, a standardized reporting 
process, a robust and secure data management capacity, and a user-friendly interface. A 
universal national reporting methodology would help response organizations 
understand what they should include in their reports so that they will be useful tools for 
learning and change. A common format would make it easier for agencies to understand 
each other’s reports. 
Once reports are submitted, the institute’s analysts could work on understanding the 
lessons indicated in reports in order to consolidate findings and develop proposed 
procedural changes and alternatives, additions to doctrine, or new concepts of 
operations. Then, the institute should use sophisticated information technology to make 
their findings easily available across response disciplines. Tools such as databases with 
smart search engines, electronic update bulletins, and web-based training, should be 
employed so that responders could easily find information relevant to their missions, 
disciplines, service responsibilities, and hazard environments. Just creating a database 
will not be enough, however. It must be broadly recognized across response disciplines 
as a definitive, comprehensive, and valid information source. To ensure the ideas, 
information, and proposals generated by the institute are trusted by the response 
community, a peer review process to validate the lessons and ensure the proposed 
solutions are legal, workable, and effective is essential. 
Also essential are activities to push important information out to users proactively 
and regularly through several modes and in a variety of forums. As examples, safety 
bulletins and time-sensitive alerts should be rapidly disseminated. A system akin to the 
National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) and other messaging 
systems currently used by police agencies could be effective. The institute should also 
have a regular publication and submit articles and columns in established emergency 
response trade journals. The institute should sponsor broad, multi-disciplinary, lessons-
focused conferences. Finally, the institute should conduct senior leadership training 
forums that focus not only on lessons that need to be learned but on how to learn them. 
A crucial concern when developing an effective lessons analysis institute is liability. 
For a lessons reporting and dissemination system to have integrity requires that those 
who report be protected from retribution. Absent this protection, reports cannot be 
specific enough to be useful. If lessons databases are fodder for lawsuits, jurisdiction 
attorneys may prohibit participation. The need for a high level of protection argues for 
enactment of such a system in legislation that assures immunity from Freedom of 
Information Act requests and restricts the use of reports in lawsuits, regulatory 
enforcement, or personnel actions. There are models for how a system like this could 
work. For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a joint NASA-FAA 
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initiative that collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety 
incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. Pilots, air traffic 
controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, ground personnel, and others involved in 
aviation operations submit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, 
an incident or situation in which aviation safety was compromised. All submissions are 
voluntary and reports sent to the ASRS are confidential. The FAA has committed not to 
use ASRS information against reporters in enforcement actions.8 Another example that 
demonstrates how this might be developed for the emergency response community is 
the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System, which is intended to be a 
voluntary, confidential, non-punitive, and secure reporting system targeted at 
improving firefighter safety by sharing the details of unintentional unsafe occurrences. 
It is currently funded by grants from the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Firefighters Grant Program and the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.9 
 
Incentives 
The incident commanders who participated in our study pointed out that discussions of 
lessons are moot unless they can be disseminated to the grass-roots level nationwide so 
that line responders can adopt them. They noted that it is important to recognize that 
people respond to incentives – that is, line troops will change their behavior to reap 
rewards or avoid punishment. Currently, fear of retribution drives responders away 
from participating in exercises or reporting their mistakes, for example. We need to 
develop incentives that cause regions and localities to support and promote lessons 
reporting, change, and learning. One obvious approach is to make federal and state 
funding contingent on developing and using lessons-learning systems. This kind of 
“carrot” can work. For instance, Fire Act and SAFER grants require that agencies 
participate in the National Fire Incident Reporting System for the grant year and three 
subsequent years. This is one possible model.  
In order to achieve broad consistency, our participants argue that it is important to 
promote a regional commitment to identifying problems and adopting best practices. 
They believe that local agencies were “more likely to adopt and indoctrinate lessons if 
the people they work with every day across a region are doing the same thing.” 
Identifying appropriate regions is not a trivial task, however. Who constitutes the “right” 
set of local collaborators depends on the characteristics of the prospective participant 
jurisdictions, the resources they have available, and the hazards they face. Successful 
regions cannot be imposed arbitrarily; they should be formed according to some 
commonality identified locally. This will be especially challenging when natural regions 
cross state lines. Regionalization could be enabled by enhancing (and in some cases 
fixing) existing regional processes and mechanisms (e.g. Local Emergency Planning 
Committees and State Authorizing Authorities). Regional response plans could be a 
prerequisite for receiving funds from a regionally-targeted preparedness grant program. 





The fact that challenges to learning lessons persist, despite regular experience with 
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them, is a serious concern. In today’s environment, where the emergency response 
mission space is expanding dramatically to include broader homeland security 
responsibilities, the ability to capitalize on experience and improve capacity is ever more 
important. But organizations cannot just be told to “change.” Enduring change needs to 
address the structure, system, and culture of an organization so that patterns of 
behavior can be adjusted. Truly institutionalizing a new process requires long-term 
commitment. This is what makes learning processes especially vulnerable: there are too 
many short-term distracters. Other political priorities, sensational concerns like 
terrorism, workforce turnover, other concurrent organizational change efforts, and daily 
missions all conspire to derail organizational transition. As a practical matter, then, the 
main problem with lesson learning can be seen as a lack of will and commitment, rather 
than a lack of ability. If lessons learned become a priority for leaders – especially local 
leaders who will be called to manage disasters directly – then lessons learned have a 
better chance of becoming a priority for everybody. Moreover, this commitment needs 
to be vertical; federal agencies must also commit to identifying and learning the lessons 
that are relevant to them. As one responder put it, “You can fix all the wagons locally, 
but if the wheels fall off FEMA’s wagon, the system fails.”  
An additional conclusion is that most big lessons are inter-agency lessons. Learning 
them requires learning within and across agencies. It is not enough for agencies to try to 
learn these kinds of lessons in isolation. Despite its profound advantages, federalism 
gets in our way: we have national, state, and local governments but few robust regional 
forums for decision-making. Our system lacks substantial support and incentives for 
regional (multi-state within the nation, or multi-local within and across states) activities 
and for broad integration across the response disciplines. Disasters are regional – they 
do not recognize jurisdictional boundaries or disciplinary parochialism. Our systems for 
learning from disasters must therefore span these barriers. 
Another key observation is that, as one reviewer of this article pointed out to us, 
much of what after action reports focus on is tactical, operational, and retrospective in 
nature. Reports tend to offer relatively little insight into the more strategic dimensions 
of disasters, and do not tend to take a prospective view of what can be done to prevent 
them. Our purpose in this article has been to consider how well we learn from our 
experiences, with the contention that it is by learning from successes and mistakes that 
we can be better prepared to act when something else happens. Yet, we also believe that 
prevention is an important (and often ignored) goal. This suggests two things: first, 
those who prepare reports often forego the opportunity to comment on how to avoid 
problems altogether (rather than contending with consequences); and second, further 
research is warranted to understand learning in the context of prevention (as opposed to 
response). 
Finally, from an academic perspective, focused research can improve our 
understanding of how to make lesson learning work well. Immediate research 
opportunities include more rigorous textual and content analysis of the AAR’s to 
validate our suggestive findings, to identify causal processes (understanding of which 
may enhance learning), and to understand the differences in perspectives that emerge 
across all agencies participating in the same incident. Researchers should bring the 
learning science and social psychology literature to bear on developing approaches to 
effective learning tailored to the challenges of preparedness and emergency response. In 
short, helping organizations navigate the complexities of lessons learning should be 
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informed by the substantial academic literature that has developed around this issue. A 
brief synopsis of some key insights is included in Appendix C for reference. 
The very real consequence of failing to learn lessons is loss of lives and property. In 
short, as one responder told us: “If we don’t learn these lessons, people are going to die 
again, because we failed to fix the problems that killed people the last time.” We should 
not belittle the magnitude of this challenge, however; problems recur because they are 
inherently very difficult to solve. If solutions were evident, emergency response 
professionals would have adopted them long ago. This should motivate agencies in all 
emergency response disciplines and at all levels of government to give serious attention 
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APPENDIX C: LITERATURE ON LEARNING AND CHANGE 
This paper is about how emergency responders can more ably recognize flaws in past behavior 
and implement new behaviors that will result in better outcomes in the future. In short, we are 
concerned with learning and change. These are complex fields of theory and research. A brief 
review of some established insights from the literature is instructive.  
Fiol and Lyles define learning as “the development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.”10 Learning is multi-
dimensional: it has cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components, each of which is 
susceptible to particular instructional or educational approaches.11 The cognitive domain 
involves the attainment of knowledge and the development of intellectual skill. Rudimentary 
learning in this domain includes information acquisition and comprehension, while 
sophisticated learning involves synthesis and evaluation. The affective domain deals with 
emotional intelligence or the emergence of attitudes, values, and feelings associated with a 
particular phenomenon. Receiving and responding to these phenomena are at the lowest levels 
of learning, while organizing and internalizing values associated with the phenomena are at the 
highest levels. The behavioral domain involves learning that requires physical activity, ranging 
from simply observing an activity to adapting the skill to new purposes or origination of new 
action. 
It is evident that learning is an individual-level activity – people use their brains to observe, 
think, reason, and develop new insights. But since the early 1970s it has been understood that 
learning also occurs at the collective level. That is, organizations can be considered to learn 
when they acquire, process, store, and distribute knowledge, understanding, techniques, and 
practices.12 Organization theorists have long discussed how learning is shaped by the use of 
routines to guide behavior. Levitt and March summarize this body of thought as follows: 
Organizations depend on accepted routines (operational rules, procedures, and conventions that 
may be formal or informal). That is, they tend to follow habits believed to be appropriate to their 
circumstances, rather than selecting actions to achieve a particular result. These routines 
develop incrementally over time as a result of past experience, rather than consciously in 
anticipation of future conditions. Organizations adjust their routines based on successive 
comparison between outcome targets and the outcome levels they actually achieve. Thus, 
historical experience and established routine profoundly shape organizational learning.13 From 
these insights, Levitt and March draw the important conclusion that “Organizations are seen as 
learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior…The experiential 
lessons of history are captured by routines in a way that makes the lessons, but not the history, 
accessible to organizations and organizational members who have not themselves experienced 
the history.”14  
Organizational behavior (routines) change as errors develop in the organization’s collective 
memory, as new experiences or the experiences of other organizations threaten the veracity of 
organizational beliefs about what is appropriate, and as the results of organizational activities 
diverge from desired or expected outcomes. As a result, organizations adjust their behavior. 
Meyer terms this adjustment “adaptation,” and suggests that adaptation takes two forms: 
deviation-reducing (where adjustments are made based upon existing organizational 
assumptions) and deviation-amplifying (where adjustments use new causal relationships 
founded on revised assumptions).15 To the extent that organizations must revise their 
assumptions, learning is fundamentally about changing culture, where an organization’s culture 
is its system of shared values, perceptions of work, and perceptions of success.16 To establish 
culture, assumptions are made and tested. When they are upheld, they become embedded 
(“frozen,” in Lewin’s classic conceptualization).17 Culture change occurs when assumptions are 
challenged. Alternatives are proposed and tested, and if they are upheld repeatedly, adjustments 
may be made to adopt these alternatives. While this process of examining and revising 
assumptions is tacit, its effects are practical: for new organizational approaches to be upheld, 
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organization members must find them credible and witness short-term “wins.” In short, lesson 
learning can require culture change.  
An important question is what kind of change is warranted in light of what has been learned. 
An appreciation of the change process can help managers understand how to instigate and 
sustain it.18 Ackerman distinguishes three types of change.19 The simplest form of change – and 
a process that organizations commonly and comfortably use – is developmental change, which 
can be thought of as an incremental process of improvement and increasing sophistication. This 
form of change involves adjusting, enhancing, or correcting what already exists. It generally 
targets skills or methods that fall short of expectations or requirements. At the other extreme, 
the most difficult and disruptive kind of change is transformational change. This is radical 
change typically prompted by some shock to the organizational system that challenges the 
organization’s assumptions about environmental demands, resulting in a period of chaos from 
which an entirely new culture or way of doing business emerges. 
An intermediate form of change is transitional change, where an organization discards its 
old ways of accomplishing its work in favor of new processes.20 Transitional change is planned, 
defined by movement to a known state. Typically an organization continues to use its existing 
process, but becomes increasingly dissatisfied with this process, either because it doesn’t work 
well or it becomes known that something else works better. The organization develops a new 
process, which it then begins to “try out” in parallel with its old process. During this period of 
overlap, an organization works in its old process but may increasingly dip into the new process. 
As the organization gets comfortable and confident, it ultimately switches to the new process. 
But, if it doesn’t have long or strong commitment, a difficult event may cause the organization to 
revert to its old habits. 
What do these insights about learning and change suggest about why change in response to 
lessons identified from disasters is so hard? Developing a sustainable sense of commitment to a 
new process requires a persistent sense of urgency about change and improvement, but other 
political exigencies may overwhelm commitment to emergency response. Since disasters are 
infrequent, agencies do not have reason to adjust their operating assumptions, and lack 
continuous opportunities to test out and embed new processes. In effect, organizations will stick 
with their accepted routines, absent persistent challenges to their assumptions or feedback 
about their performance relative to desired outcomes. This problem is made harder when an 
agency is asked to consider a new process that comes, not out of its own experience, but from 
someone else’s. Levitt and March tell us that organizations can capture the learning of other 
organizations through the transfer of encoded experience, though the mechanisms of diffusion 
(shared learning through a network) are even more complex than at the level of a single 
organization.21 Thus we can anticipate that, absent an explicit strategy to learn and change, the 
emergence of improved behaviors may be slowed or even obstructed. 
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 Social Capital: Dealing With Community 
Emergencies 
 
Russell R. Dynes 
 
 
Recent events in the United States have generated considerable discussion about 
dealing with emergencies. Such discussion has produced congressional 
investigations and governmental reorganization while blaming victims for their own 
ineptness. Much of that discussion misses the point. Every community shows 
evidence of past problem solving and many of those problems were considered 
emergencies. Everywhere, people solve their problems within their own social and 
cultural context. Cities that experienced traumatic damage in World War II – 
London, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Tokyo – are still vibrant communities.1  
San Francisco recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of the 1906 earthquake.  
Some celebrated the city’s continuity but others predicted a dangerous future. We 
easily recall the disasters but forget the continuity and creativity of these 
communities. 
When new threats appear, they are usually seen as more deadly and more 
disorganizing than those that have come before. On the other hand, we often miss 
the effectiveness of individual communities in addressing these threats. In 1995, 
when the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed by domestic terrorists, the 
city was home to a population of 450,000 and had fifteen hospitals. Within ninety 
seconds after the blast, emergency medical services had seven ambulances and two 
supervisory vehicles en route to the scene. The final report indicated that by 9:45 
a.m., there were more medical personnel, drivers and people wanting to help than 
the site could handle. By 10:30 a.m. there were 442 people treated at various 
emergency rooms, eighty-three hospitalized and 243 treated by private physicians; 
all live victims, with perhaps two exceptions, had been removed from the damaged 
building. This effort – centering on a bomb-destroyed building – involved 167 deaths 
and 675 non-fatal injuries. The unanticipated emergency response from the 
community dealt with the immediate injuries in a little more than an hour.2   
Of course, the central symbol of international terrorism in the United States was 
the collapse of the World Trade Towers in New York and the perhaps 3,000 deaths 
that resulted from the collapse. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that at the 
time of impact there were an estimated 17,400 occupants in those buildings and 
eighty-seven percent of them evacuated successfully. Most of the deaths were on the 
floors or above the floors where the planes hit. It is now determined that ninety-nine 
percent of those below the impact floors successfully evacuated.3 This successful 
evacuation was not accomplished by conventional search and rescue groups; it was 
the result of people on site helping others and themselves to take protective action to 
get out of the towers and to a safe location. While the loss of property and life 
occurring on 9/11 is frequently recalled, the protective actions of the other “victims” 
in the building are often overlooked. 
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Much of the contemporary discussion about emergency planning assumes that 
community members “panic” and that strong authority is necessary. The vocabulary 
of “command and control” suggests chaos rather than citizen adaptability and 
creativity. Such assumptions can be questioned by the research evidence 
accumulated in recent years.4 While we calculate damage to physical and human 
capital, we usually ignore the social capital available within communities to deal with 
emergencies. Social capital is our most significant resource in responding to damage 
caused by natural and other hazards, such as terrorism. 
 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CAPITAL 
Insight into the ways in which communities respond to emergencies can be found by 
looking at the types of capital used to construct the human community. Most obvious 
is physical capital. We have tools and materials to build houses and streets, string 
wires or go wireless, build 110-story towers and create the material environment we 
experience every day. Also obvious is the necessary human capital. We build schools 
and colleges, as well as clinics and hospitals, to provide people with skills, 
knowledge, and health care. The concern for human capital is obvious. We want to 
improve it, not lose it, so we develop programs to improve test scores, increase stays 
in school, improve nutrition, and prevent diseases.   
Most recently, attention has been given to another kind of capital: social capital.  
Social capital is not located in individual people, as is human capital, but rather is 
embedded in social relationships and networks between and among members of a 
community. These relationships can be used to guide collective action in emergency 
situations. In other words, even with losses to physical and human capital, social 
capital is less affected, can be quickly repaired, and provides an essential resource in 
accomplishing critical tasks. 
The concept of social capital has been used in different ways.  This discussion is 
based on the work of James Coleman, who identifies six different forms of social 
capital: obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective 
sanctions, authority relations, appropriable social organizations, and intentional 
organizations.5 
Obligations and Expectations. Living within a community creates a network of 
obligations – to other family members and kin, to neighbors, workmates, other 
members of religious and social groups, and to unknown members of the 
community. Within this context, we develop trust that our obligations will be repaid 
when we need help. Over time, we build up many obligations that serve as an 
indication of the interconnectedness of our social world. These types of 
interconnectedness increase the resources available to all individuals involved in 
those relationships when a need presents itself. These obligations and expectations 
are rarely visible to “outsiders;” in fact, they may be difficult to articulate even for the 
people included in such networks.  But they represent resources that will become 
available when the need is apparent and action is necessary. 
Informational Potential. Information is important as the basis for action – what 
needs to be done. With sudden and unexpected changes, information can be 
obtained by using social relationships maintained for other purposes. While the 
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media has been given heightened importance in the modern world, individuals – by 
interacting with other informed members of the community – can increase their 
knowledge without having to obtain that information directly. In addition, while the 
media might provide “general” information, the specific implications for an 
individual have to be tailor-made. People talk to one another.   
Norms and Effective Sanctions. The communication of a “declaration” of an 
emergency signals that self-interested behavior needs to be subjugated to the 
interests of the community. Norms defining what needs to be done and what should 
not be done organize action. They facilitate some actions and constrain others. 
Authority Relations. When groups are organized to pursue specific goals, a leader 
is often chosen to make decisions and speak for that group. This leader has access to 
an extensive network of capital that amplifies the social capital of individual 
members. Such a leader can “volunteer” the network to engage in specific tasks.  
Volunteering is never an isolated act, but rather the action of some people involved 
in several other networks.   
Appropriable Social Organizations. One outcome of social life is the creation of 
organizations for specific purposes. Most organizations, however, can be used for 
purposes other than those for which they were initially intended. A school intended 
to educate can be used as a first aid station, a shelter, or a coordination center, 
staffed by school personnel (including current students). A house of worship can be 
used in similar ways. Such reallocation of organizational effort provides flexibility to 
cope with unexpected problems. Routine activities can always be suspended for more 
urgent problems. This allows a community to reallocate its efforts and to utilize its 
physical and human capital in different ways. 
Intentional Organizations. As human communities have added complexity, 
organizations engaged in recurrent activities of continuing value have emerged, each 
with its own history. Fire departments, police departments, emergency medical 
services, sanitation departments, traffic and parking have become routine and 
expected community services. Most recently, some political units (from local to 
national) have begun to think of emergency management as a routine community 
function. This has led to the development of specialized training and the emergence 
of a new occupation and career path. Such innovations point to another source of 
social capital now available to deal with emergencies. 
 
The discussion here will focus on the community as the social system, within what 
are called developed societies, especially the United States. (Developing societies 
present a series of different issues, which will not be discussed here.) In part, the 
emphasis on developed societies is dictated by the scope of existing research 
available for analysis. Further, the focus will be on the response phase. It has become 
conventional to categorize disaster along a time spectrum – preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. The most difficult part of the spectrum to study is 
response, primarily because this phase is short and often unexpected. This makes 
response difficult for “planned” research. Much of the research on response has been 
opportunistic and lacking in the cumulative continuity necessary to develop 
generalizations. Also, some “response” research is done months and years after the 
DYNES, SOCIAL CAPITAL    4 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
event, which raises questions about the nature of recall and, perhaps more 
importantly, misses the emergent qualities of the response. 
The most systematic research on disaster response in the United States was 
initiated at the Disaster Research Center (DRC) in the late 1960s, where field teams 
were able to research a number of different communities.6 Much of that research has 
been reported and published. In Organized Behavior in Disaster, conceptualizations 
from that fieldwork are recorded, in terms of the theoretical ideas that guided the 
research at that time.7 Here, those materials are used as the basis for 
reconceptualization in terms of social capital. In addition, comments will be added 
from other studies of disaster response that illuminate this concept.   
From the earlier research, the concept of emergence seems particularly important. 
The original DRC research design was predicated on a Time I/Time II comparison of 
changes in community structure. It soon became apparent that certain critically 
important elements in the response had no pre-response existence: the phenomenon 
called emergence. As Thomas Drabek suggests in a later summary article: 
What is it that makes an appearance? Within the literature, the two general 
categories of social phenomena have been described – behavior and 
expectations.  In short, what emerges is a sequence of patterned behaviors – a 
social structure. These behaviors...may form relatively simple social systems.8  
 Here emergence is seen as the creation of new social capital. In many instances it 
emerges from existing social capital, but at other times it is “new” in that it is created 
to meet new problems created by the disaster. This view is contrary to most media 
accounts of disaster, which portray community structure as fragile and unable to 
deal with disaster problems, often implicitly suggesting that “survival” is dependent 
on external aid. As Coleman points out in an earlier and different context: 
It may seem paradoxical that problems create community organization, but 
such is nevertheless the case. A community without common problems, as 
many modern bedroom suburbs tend to be today, has little cause for 
community organization; neither does a community that has been largely 
subject to the administration of persons outside the community. When 
community problems subsequently arise, there is no latent structure of 
organization, no “fire brigade” that can become activated to meet the 
problem.  
A new town, a budding community, is much like a child; if it faces no 
problems, if it is not challenged, it cannot grow. Each problem successfully 
met leaves its residue of sentiments and organization; without these 
sentiments and organization, future problems could not be solved.9  
It is the intent of this article to examine the research done on disaster response, 
primarily in the United States, in the context of the six dimensions of social capital 
identified by James Coleman. While the cited research was not initially guided by 
these concepts, there are sufficient descriptive materials to make realistic inferences. 
 
OBLIGATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
There are two rather dramatic changes regarding obligations that occur in the 
emergency period. Pre-disaster “normal” community functioning is oriented toward 
achieving many different goals relating to work, family, education, and leisure. A 
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disaster situation changes things rather dramatically since now community 
resources may not be sufficient to pursue all goals. Taking two illustrations, while 
health and medical issues are always important, the disaster situation increases their 
priority, centering on attention to disaster “victims.” On the other hand, education 
(normally given a high priority), becomes less important; school buildings and 
school personnel can be utilized in ways related to caring for victims. In a sense, the 
pursuit of certain activities and obligations are reordered as to how they become 
relevant to disaster impact. This process can be referred to as the development of an 
emergency consensus.10 It provides a new and distinct ordering of priorities, in 
contrast to the seemingly random and competitive activities of pre-disaster 
community life. 
A second change can be seen as the expansion of the citizenship role. In “normal” 
times, the obligations of citizenship are quite modest, mostly centering around 
“housekeeping” norms relating to the maintenance of property, control of pets and 
children, making an appearance at neighborhood celebrations, exhibiting 
community pride at school athletic events, and participating in periodic elections. 
For some, the obligation may involve becoming a member of a volunteer fire 
department or providing goods and labor for events that support such communal 
activities. In most of cases, the costs of participation are minimal and even 
enjoyable. Disasters, however, create unknown problems (some even life 
threatening) and provide the opportunity for stronger identification with the 
community on the part of its residents. In effect, the obligations of citizenship are 
enhanced and the focus of activity is clarified. This provides guidance in sorting out 
the appropriate role behavior in response to the emergency. 
Because individuals play multiple roles, they have multiple obligations and 
expectations. In sudden-impact situations, it is likely that the initial set of 
obligations is conditioned by a person’s role at the time (the family role at home or 
the professional role at work). In some popular discussions of disaster, considerable 
interest has centered on the possibilities of role conflict: ways in which people were 
forced to choose between family-role obligations and disaster assistance. The general 
assumption has been that people abandoned their work roles, especially in 
emergency organizations. Research has shown that the image of roles as rigid and 
conflictual is less accurate than seeing roles as adaptive. Disaster situations often 
provide guidance on the importance of certain roles and obligations and highlight 
the lesser importance of other role obligations.11  
Individuals in a disaster context have the potentiality of playing many different 
roles: family member, neighbor, worker, and for everyone within the community, the 
citizenship role.12 For example, if a person engages in search and rescue activity, it 
might be done in terms of his or her specific role-obligation, or in relation to a more 
generic role as a “good” citizen. The felt obligation of the rescuer is, in large part, 
irrelevant to those rescued. Any disaster “victim” has a cadre of people who have an 
obligation to help; other family members, neighbors, workmates, or any other 
member of the impacted community.  
The importance of obligations and expectations is reflected in search and rescue. 
During the first period after disaster impact, search and rescue efforts are carried on 
primarily by other “victims” in the area; they seek and extract victims and take them 
to where they can receive medical treatment.13 When emergency medical personnel 
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arrive on the scene, they have to use the knowledge of neighbors to locate remaining 
victims and the members of the community continue to help in all phases of the 
rescue operation. Much of the rescue operation will be terminated when formal 
rescuers arrive. In the 1980 Italian earthquake, ninety-seven percent of the 
entrapped and injured victims evacuated and transported to medical care were 
rescued by bare hands and shovels, not heavy equipment.14 This illustrates the 
importance of social networks. Of those who were trapped and living in single-
person households, forty-six percent were rescued, as compared to sixty-one percent 
of people living in multiple households. People living in single households 
experienced a death rate 2.4 times higher than those living in households with one or 
more of the household present. Michael LeChat suggests that, given the usual delay 
in the arrival of external rescue teams and equipment, there is a need in earthquake-
prone areas to educate local communities in rescue procedures, particularly since the 
longer a person is trapped, the higher the mortality rate.15  
An excellent study of search and rescue following a gasoline explosion in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, in which victims had been buried alive and rescuers were near 
them, comments on these findings: 
People did not participate in the search and rescue efforts at random. Instead, 
their participation was a function of the strength of their preexisting social 
linkages and interdependencies with the victims and fellow rescuers. Their 
search and rescue efforts were part of a stream of ongoing social relations in 
which people participated, and from which their activities on behalf of their 
relatives, friends, acquaintances, or even strangers obtained meaning. The 
rescuers prioritized life; all human life was precious for them but the lives of 
those socially closest to them were deemed more important.  
The chances of people surviving the blast were directly proportional to the 
presence among the searchers of a person or persons who cared for the victim 
and who knew the victim’s likely location at the time of the blast.16 
Even the decision to seek medical help on the part of the victims is not necessarily 
obvious. A study of a sample of tornado victims in Edmonton, Alberta indicated that 
while 15.3 percent of the victims made that decision themselves, family and friends 
made 28.6 percent of the decisions. While 19.4 percent of the respondents did not 
know how the decision had been made, only 26.5 percent of the decisions were made 
by some ‘official’ source. In addition, about forty-five percent of the victims were 
provided transportation to medical attention by family, friends, and others; about 
the same percentage were transported by official means (ambulance, in the car, or by 
a casualty bus).17  
In other contexts, family obligations continue to be important. “When people 
evacuate, they commonly do so as group members – most typically the group is a 
family unit. This means that evacuation planners at any level of government must 
explicitly recognize the social webbing and seek to design plans that complement it, 
rather than neutralize it.”18 When families evacuate, where do they go? Some studies 
show that up to eighty-five percent prefer to go to relatives and friends, rather than 
to public shelters.19 That preference to stay with friends and relatives is reinforced by 
invitations offered by kin. A study of the May 1980 eruption of Mt. Saint Helens 
indicated that almost thirty-five percent of the evacuees were contacted first by 
someone at their evacuation destination.20 All of this suggests that behavior during 
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the evacuation phase is prefigured by normal daily routines and action choices are 
guided by obligations that existed prior to the disaster situation.21  
In a study of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which used a sample of the entire 
city population, ten percent of respondents indicated that they left their homes in the 
year after the earthquake; eighty-six percent went to relatives and another five 
percent went to friends. Of the people included in the study, 11.2 percent indicated 
they had temporarily sheltered relatives or friends in their own homes sometime 
during the year following the earthquake.22  
While the previous examples emphasize the importance of family and 
neighborhood obligations, there is another source of obligations that are reflected in 
what we called earlier the expansion of the citizenship role. Residents feel obligated 
to participate in actions that will reduce the threat to other members of the 
community, even if family and other relatives have not been directly impacted by the 
disaster. A disaster occasion is characterized by a significant number of volunteers 
who become involved in a wide variety of assistance activity. Media depictions of 
volunteer activity often imply that the outpouring of volunteers is a consequence of 
“failure” on the part of organizations to mobilize regular employees. Or volunteers 
are seen as an interesting, but not very significant, source of help; at times, the 
reliance on volunteers is seen to support the argument for increased external help. In 
the Mexico City study cited above, there was an opportunity to ascertain the extent of 
volunteer activity and the ways in which volunteers had become involved. About ten 
percent of the sample indicated that they volunteered immediately after the 
earthquake. Such a percentage may seem small, but given the population base of 
Mexico City (one of the largest urban areas in the world) ten percent represents over 
2,000,000 people – certainly a significant volunteer response.  
Most of these volunteers either engaged in search and rescue or helped in the 
procurement and processing of supplies. Nearly half indicated that they had worked 
four days or longer, and almost eighteen percent had worked ten days or more. In 
terms of daily time commitment, forty-five percent said they had worked an average 
of nine hours a day. The volunteers were not just from the areas of the city 
immediately affected by the earthquake, but from all over the city; people who had 
no direct family or kin ties to the victims. This significant volunteer response 
occurred within the context of an estimated loss of less than two percent of the city’s 
housing stock. Among our sample, only 5.5 percent suffered considerable damage to 
their housing, plus disruption of all utility services.  
The volume of volunteers often creates a different type of problem for emergency 
managers. Instead of anticipating the lack of volunteers, a more important problem 
emerges: how to make the most effective use of the volunteers in realistic emergency 
activities. (Some community organizations will have extensive experience in utilizing 
volunteers in other situations.)  
The importance of obligations and expectations as a form of social capital in 
disasters can be stated negatively in the following way. Socially isolated individuals 
are less likely to be rescued, seek medical help, take preventative action (such as 
evacuating), or receive assistance from others in the form of shelter. Conversely, 
existing social networks provide effective search and rescue in removing victims, 
helping them to seek medical attention, and providing transportation to medical 
help locations. The same social networks provide motivation and encouragement to 
DYNES, SOCIAL CAPITAL    8 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
take preventative action, such as evacuation, by their willingness to provide 
temporary shelter as well as longer-term housing assistance. These same social 
networks are the channels that motivate volunteers to provide labor for important 
disaster-related tasks, which compensates for losses in physical capital.  
 
INFORMATIONAL POTENTIAL 
The role of informational potential as social capital can be identified in several 
different aspects of disaster behavior. Certainly, one of the universal observations 
regarding emergency situations is the increased need for information and the actual 
increase in information: The increase does not necessarily fit the need. When 
situations change, and a disaster is a classic case of a sudden change in reality, both 
individuals and social units need new information to orient their actions. For social 
units representing the community, this may mean “damage assessment” of what 
actually happened. Prior to impact, individuals may need to gather information for 
preventative action. Again, social networks provide the channels whereby individuals 
develop a perception of risk and are motivated to take some type of preventative 
action.  
To illustrate this point, both warning and evacuation will be discussed in the 
context of information potential. There have been times, in certain situations, when 
“officials” have been reluctant to issue warnings based on their assumption that 
“people” would panic. In addition, evacuation has at times been discussed as a 
“failure of will” on the part of citizens who were trying to avoid some kind of threat. 
Fortunately, those assumptions are increasingly rare. But there are still troublesome 
assumptions, on the part of emergency managers, that the best way to warn people is 
to provide “official” public information through the media. This is based on the 
assumption that individuals will watch television or listen to the radio, hear the 
official warning, and consequently take the recommended action. Research-based 
descriptions of the warning process and effective evacuations underscore ways in 
which the “public information” imagery is likely to fail, however, and show how 
social capital is an important element in effective action. 
In examining the research base on warning and response, Colleen Fitzpatrick and 
Dennis Mileti outlined the process in five different steps: hears, understands, 
believes, personalizes, and decides/responds.23 Each of the stages is interactive and 
independent of individualistic mental stages. Other people help you “hear”; not 
everyone watches the media all the time. Others help you understand and believe; 
people still talk to one another. Others help personalize the message, pointing out 
that the general message actually applies to the current situation, and then assist in 
discussing appropriate action. Research has shown that if protective action is not 
taken, there is an effort to seek additional information. That is, the process is 
iterative. As Fitzpatrick and Mileti point out: “People respond to warnings through a 
social psychological process...which persons in an endangered public do and do not 
hear, understand, believe, personalize, and respond to emergency warnings is not 
the result of chance.”24  
Ronald Perry has developed a model to understand how people comply with an 
evacuation plan in a sample of three different disaster models. He underscores the 
importance of the social nature of the warning process, emphasizing the importance 
of warning-source credibility and the way in which warnings are confirmed by other 
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people; he also considers the content of warning messages. Perry notes, “The three 
events studied here represent comparable events in that each involved some 
forewarning and was characterized by definable speed of onset, duration of impact, 
and scope of impact.” He adds, “the idea that the same model will predict evacuation 
behavior in connection with a flood, a volcanic eruption, and a hazardous materials 
incident, calls into question the popular strategy of classifying research on disaster 
events in terms of the type of event (e.g. Natural versus Manmade).”25 Perry also 
includes family context in his model since evacuation is not individualistic; families 
evacuate as a group or, when missing members, only when those missing members 
are determined to be safe (although in Perry’s samples, no family member was 
missing at the time of evacuation).  
The importance of social networks for informational potential can best be 
appreciated when there are failures to take protective action. One such example, 
described by B.E. Aguirre, examined the conditions whereby the community of 
Saragosa, Texas was not provided tornado warnings. Saragosa, an unincorporated 
town in Southwest Texas, had a population of 428, and there were twenty-nine 
known deaths from the impact of the tornado. The community, comprised almost 
entirely of residents of Mexican-American descent, was part of a geographically large 
county.  The description of the possible path of the tornado in warning messages was 
difficult to identify in familiar locational terms for those in the community. A major 
element in the warning’s failure was that almost the entire community watched 
Univision, the national Spanish television network, which did not provide localized 
weather information. While some local radio stations did provide some warning 
messages, there were difficulties in making distinctions, in Spanish, between a 
tornado watch and a tornado warning, and the weather conditions immediately prior 
to the tornado provided few clues of the impending danger. As a result, the 
population of Saragosa did not receive the official warning messages, because their 
own social networks were isolated linguistically and geographically from the Anglo 
networks. 
The importance of social networks as information potential is not undermined by 
the presence of several social networks within the same community. Certainly one of 
the key tasks of emergency managers is to understand the plurality of networks and 
how they might require different channels to convey important messages rather than 
assuming that a single media source will reach a mass audience and that all groups 
within the community will be part of that mass. This issue will become increasingly 
important since the 2000 census points to the growing diversity in the U.S. 
population; both television and radio address an expanding number of diverse 
audiences, reflecting distinctly different social networks. Returning to Fitzpatrick 
and Mileti’s formulation of the warning process, if people do not hear, it is 
impossible for them to understand, believe, personalize, or decide and respond. 
 
NORMS AND EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS 
Effective norms constitute a powerful form of social capital. This form of social 
capital facilitates certain actions and constrains others. Allan Barton suggested a 
series of relationships between a disaster event and the emergence of altruistic 
behavior that continues to have considerable face validity.26 Examples include: (1) 
The higher the proportion of victims and the average loss, the more communication 
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and knowledge there will be about the losses suffered by the victims; (2) When 
informal social connections are strong within a population, the sufferers are more 
likely to be more salient as a reference or identification group; (3) Social randomness 
of impact influences beliefs about the causes of the suffering; (4) The more 
communication and knowledge there are about the losses suffered by the victims, the 
more people will feel sympathetic towards them; (5) The greater the informal social 
connectedness of the community, the higher the percentage of members with 
opportunities to help victims; (6) The greater the proportion sympathetic to the 
victims, the more people will actually help the victims. 
These propositions suggest that many disasters produce the optimum conditions 
for the development of altruistic norms. Disasters are relatively free of ideological 
disputes about cause, which tend to reduce channels of communication. If impact is 
sudden and creates socially random damage, this makes for greater saliency of 
sufferers as a reference group. All these conditions combine to create obligations to 
help and to emphasize helping as a community norm. The widespread perception of 
the community norm increases the actual behavior of helping. 
In addition to the conditions that provide normative support for helping behavior, 
the development of an emergency consensus, mentioned earlier, provides a ranking 
of values and suggests that care for victims and the restoration of routine community 
services should assume high priority while education, leisure, and non-critical work 
efforts can be set aside until the higher priority goals are achieved. In addition to the 
effort directed toward high priority goals, there is a reduction in enforcement of what 
is seen as inappropriate norms for the situation. For example, conventional norms, 
which enforce appropriate work dress, are ignored; coats are replaced by jackets and 
dresses are replaced by slacks. In addition, certain conventional bureaucratic norms 
are abrogated – expenditures that require two signatures are made with one; 
meetings based on appointment are replaced by meetings based on need. In all of 
these actions, there is a greater informality and less attention to status. (In fact, one 
indication of the end of the emergency period is when such norms are re-sanctioned 
again.)  
There are two situations that deserve mention here since they are, seemingly, 
attempts to sanction appropriate disaster behavior. First is the admonition 
frequently made by emergency officials in the media urging people not to panic. 
Second is the reassurance coming from various agencies that these agencies are 
doing “everything” to prevent looting. Both of these repetitive themes, accentuated 
during the emergency period, suggest that panic and looting are frequent and 
problematic in these situations. Research suggests otherwise, although this review 
centers on conclusions.  
Panic describes a condition of acute fear coupled with flight. While extremely rare, 
it can occur when certain conditions are present – when people are aware of a 
specific threat to themselves, perceive they are entrapped, and are isolated from 
others – producing feelings of social isolation. These conditions are rarely found in 
disaster situations.27  Many “victims” do have some anxiety and, in certain situations, 
flight may be a very appropriate response, especially if it is an evacuation.  
It is obvious that the admonition not to panic is sometimes an expression of 
“macho” ideology. At other times it is an official message designed to encourage 
behavior an agency might desire, rather than letting individuals decide for 
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themselves, regardless of the “official” plan. In any case, such admonitions have little 
effect in curbing behavior that probably would not occur anyway. On the other hand, 
the belief that panic is a widespread response to disaster can be self-destructive if 
officials are reluctant to issue warnings and alerts because they fear citizens will 
panic if informed about potential risks. Otherwise, the ritual of reminding others not 
to panic is as effective as parental warnings to be good.  
A second situation deals with the strong media focus on various efforts to prevent 
“looting.” Such reports seem to suggest that looting is widespread and problematic 
during disasters. The concept of looting conjures visions of an invading army, but the 
evidence suggests that looting is a rare occurrence in natural disasters. Nevertheless, 
the image of disasters followed by the looting of property persists.28 The primary 
explanation for this discontinuity – between popular conceptions and the absence of 
evidence for the behavior – centers on appropriate norms regarding the proper use 
of community resources after a disaster. 
Property has reference not to any concrete thing or material object, but as a 
shared expectation about what can or cannot be done with respect to something. 
Property thus is a type of social relationship – a shared understanding about who 
can do what with the valued resources in a community. These understandings are 
widely shared and are embedded in legal norms indicating the appropriate use, 
control, and disposal of valued resources within the community. Those norms 
change radically in what are seen as wide-spread emergencies; the concern for 
property norms are reflected in the fear of looting. In this, the fear may be real but 
the behavior is infrequent or absent: 
In natural disasters, in American society at least, there quickly develops a 
consensus that all private property rights are temporarily suspended for the 
common good. In one way, all goods become community property and can be 
used as needed for the general welfare. Thus, warehouses can be broken into 
without the owner’s permission to obtain generators necessary to keep 
hospitals functioning, and the act is seen as legitimate if undertaken for this 
purpose even though in a strict sense the participants might agree that it was 
technically an act of burglary. However, the parties involved, the local legal 
authorities and the general public in the area at the time of the emergency do 
not define such actions as looting and would react very negatively to attempts 
to impose such a definition.  
On the other hand, there is very powerful social pressure against the use 
of goods for purely personal use while major community emergency needs 
exist. In a way, the individual who uses anything for himself alone is seen as 
taking from the common store. The new norm as to property is that the 
affected group, as long as it has emergency needs, has priority.29  
In both of these instances, panic and looting, there are convictions that such 
behaviors are both common and problematic. Perhaps the only way to resolve this 
contradiction is to see these convictions – that people behave badly in disaster – as 
symbolic sanctions for “appropriate” behavior in disaster, the recommended 
etiquette for unusual circumstances. Such concerns are symbolic reminders, not 
effective sanctions, aimed at preventing these behaviors from emerging. Again the 
preoccupation with preventing looting often leads to the allocation of security 
personnel to non-existent or trivial tasks. On the other hand, such an allocation is 
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likely to be successful since prevention is quite possible when the problems do not 
exist. Consequently, the concern for these issues following a disaster does not mean 
that they are, in fact, problematic, but rather that disaster provides the opportunity 
to celebrate the virtues of rational behavior and respect for property. 
Finally, there are two special circumstances worthy of note. First, a number of 
researchers have commented on the development of “disaster subcultures.” For 
example, Dennis Wenger has noted: 
...in fully developed subcultures, the local community may not even perceive or 
define the impact of a disaster agent as being “disastrous.” Some communities 
have institutionalized their mode of response to the point that they view such 
events as floods as simply nuisances or possibly even look forward to the flood 
period as a time of “carnival.”30  
Such subcultures arise in communities that have repetitive experiences with a 
particular agent so that the disaster occasion becomes a part of the annual calendar 
of community life. Norms-appropriate behaviors are already in place to cover the 
situation. Such subcultures tend to develop in communities where there is a 
considerable amount of instrumental knowledge based on previous experience.  
A second circumstance has come about through the adoption of emergency 
planning by emergency organizations, especially those in the public domain with 
disaster responsibility. In this instance, there is the development of norms applicable 
to emergencies, which remain “latent” in non-emergency times. These may involve a 
responsibility to monitor particular hazards, planning for work force reporting and 
shift extension, and mechanisms for communicating organizational information to 
employees. Many of these latent emergency norms are simply extensions of routine 
organizational activities. The sanctions for violating these norms in an emergency 
context are already embodied in the reward and punishment system of the 
organization. So the emergency norms are unique only in the sense of the timing of 
their implementation, but they are based on the pre-disaster structure of these 
organizations. The transition does not lack continuity and is rooted in familiarity.  
While disasters are frequently seen as situations of normative disorganization, in 
fact the social processes provide the conditions for priority and effectiveness. The 
development of the emergency consensus gives high priority to care for victims and 
the restoration of essential community services, and de-emphasizes other usual 
community activities so that human and material resources can be reallocated to the 
higher priority tasks. The conditions are such that altruistic norms are supported. 
Some of that support takes the form of rumors, moral tales, and stories that 
underscore appropriate behavior for the situation. The emphasis on, and spread of, 
emergency planning have provided guidance for appropriate behavior in emergency 




To treat authority relations as a form of social capital in disaster response seems 
paradoxical, especially when a conventional view of disaster is seen as the prototype 
for social disorganization, primarily from the loss of authority. This conventional 
view of the loss of authority during disasters has been the rationale for public policy 
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arguments for the necessity to create “command and control” structures as a central 
feature of emergency management. On the other hand, in American society in 
particular, there has always been a popular skepticism of authority of all kinds and a 
particular distaste for those who claim authority without any social justification. This 
suggests that it is difficult to create authority for special situations. It also suggests 
that most forms of authority relations continue as social capital in disaster and that 
other forms can be modified, adapted, and transformed to fit the particular 
circumstances. Consequently, it is useful to talk about authority relations in the 
context of family and neighborhood, community organizations, and the community 
as a social unit. 
 
Family Authority 
As has been suggested in the discussion of obligations and expectations, family 
authority does not break down. In fact, family units continue to make allocative 
decisions as to how family resources are used. For example, in search and rescue 
efforts, family members can be “released” to assume certain disaster tasks while 
others take on additional family duties; a husband and wife may become involved in 
search and rescue efforts while assigning the oldest child or a grandparent to deal 
with childcare during that time. Too, it is quite common for certain emergency roles 
to be filled by families rather than individuals. A wife may have responsibilities to 
open and maintain a shelter operation for evacuees, while her husband and children 
deal with the shelter’s day-to-day maintenance; children might be moved out of their 
bedrooms to house relatives whose houses have been damaged. These are all 
allocative decisions on how to use family resources, made within the usual family 
authority structure and through the usual decision processes. None of these 
decisions can be “mandated” by the community and none of them is planned or even 
anticipated, but they occur and constitute social capital. None of the activities 
violates or changes previous family authority.   
 
Organizational Authority 
Existing community organizations carry most of the burden of disaster response. The 
pattern of organizational involvement has been well documented by what has been 
observed in a variety of disaster occasions.      
       
Figure I 
Pattern of Organizational Involvement 
  STRUCTURE TASKS  
 Regular Non-regular 
Old Established Type I Established Type III 
New Established Type II Established Type IV 
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Four types of organization reflect two dimensions: structure and tasks. Some 
organizations perform the same tasks in disaster response that they normally do, but 
others take on new activities. Too, some organizations function with the same basic 
relationships among members during the disaster response than they had 
previously. In other cases, totally new structures emerge. By cross-tabulating the two 
dimensions (structure and tasks), four different types of groups can be identified.31 
Using that typology, the implications for authority relations can be assumed. For 
example, established organizations (Type I) become involved in disaster response 
with the same authority relationships that existed prior to their response. A Type II 
organization continues with the same authority relations, but with expanded size and 
volunteers with previous involvement in the organization (and thus knowledge and 
some experience with the normative authority structure). Type III organizations 
have a pre-disaster existence, but extend their activity by dealing with realistic 
disaster tasks. This might be exemplified by a construction company that becomes 
involved in debris removal or a church group that takes over responsibility for a 
temporary feeding operation. While there are new tasks, the pre-disaster authority 
relationship continues. These personnel constitute a group rather than individual 
volunteers and, in their actions, they maintain their pre-disaster structure.  
The only type not to have a pre-disaster history is the Emergent Organizations 
(Type IV). While there is a considerable literature on emergence, there has been little 
direct attention given to issues of authority relations.32 One of the most complete 
descriptions of a work crew that emerged in the aftermath of a tornado is Louis 
Zurcher’s discussion of the social psychological functions of ephemeral roles.33 In 
that description, Zurcher emphasizes the development of a division of labor among 
the participants and the emergence of group solidarity. His description suggests that 
an emergent group that develops around an “immediate” need in the post-disaster 
environment is very task-related and the focus is on the division of labor necessary to 
accomplish those tasks. His description focuses on the process of differentiation; the 
work groups dissolved prior to any attempt to institutionalize and insure their 
continuity. 
It is important to note that the different organizational patterns also have 
different combinations of social capital.  For example, Type I organizations enter the 
emergency with homogeneous relationships – bonding relationships that strengthen 
the social capital that exits prior to the emergency period.  On the other hand, Types 
II and III are usually a mixture of bonding and bridging relationships. Type IV 
emergent groups link parts of the community structure together, a linking necessary 
for the new tasks at hand. Such linking may have been unnecessary prior to the 
collective cooperative response.  One consequence of this activity is to strengthen the 
identity of members of the community under crisis.  
The pattern of involvement indicates that authority relations within organizations 
provide the social capital necessary for the overall emergency response. Authority 
relations do not have to be reworked in the disaster context and the return to the 
pre-disaster authority context is usually an easy transition. Emergent groups, 
however, constitute a newly-created form of social capital for dealing with newly- 
created and unanticipated problems. These groups tend to be task-oriented and the 
relationships within the groups tend to be based on an emergent division of labor in 
which authority relations are built on function rather than status.  
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Community Authority  
There is a widespread perception, especially by the media, that there is confusion 
and disorganization within the community authority structure immediately after 
disaster impact. Such a perception more accurately describes a “natural” process 
whereby the community is able to achieve coordination of the many necessary tasks, 
some of which are new to previous community experience. In the early stages of 
disaster impact, there is uncertainty as to what has happened and urgency to act – to 
do something – on the part of community members. Mistakes may be made. Some 
organizations may allocate considerable resources to obvious, visible problems, 
which might not be central, given a more inclusive view. Some may over-mobilize, 
resulting from members wanting to do something. Others may find it confusing that 
volunteers are already doing tasks that organizations see as their exclusive province. 
Some organizations may find that they cannot “work” until another organization 
finishes its tasks. For example, one cannot transport injured people to the hospital 
until roads are cleared (what some call sequential interdependence).  
These problems begin to be solved with efforts to coordinate community activity. 
Coordination is often a by-product of the search for information and leads to the 
development of a coordinating locus within the community (usually centered in the 
local government) that has come to terms with priorities.34      
In this process of developing coordination, organizations with pre-disaster 
legitimacy continue. Police deal with social order and traffic. Fire departments deal 
with fire and other safety problems. Public Works departments deal with utilities 
and road problems. Hospitals and medical personnel deal with the injured. While 
some organizations might find themselves working with segments of the community 
for the first time in a new relationship, even emergent groups are an amalgam of pre-
disaster authority relations rather than something completely novel.  
In fact, the basis for the emergence of coordination of disaster tasks within the 
community is the pre-disaster authority structure. Thus, it is an important form of 
social capital. While some organizations may not be disaster relevant and may not be 
involved, others may play roles more important than those of their pre-disaster 
status. But the basic structures of the organizations that deal with the health and 
welfare of the community maintain their importance during the emergency period. 
In many ways, the priority of disaster-related tasks makes decision-making more 
rational. And one can argue that such decision-making is more effective than the 
diffuse and individualistic decision-making norm in the pre-disaster situation. In 
any case, the authority structures within families, within community organizations, 
and in the community as a whole generalize from their pre-disaster patterns and 
serve as the base for the community effort in the emergency period. They do not have 
to be changed or radically modified. Continuity is the dominant theme and 
familiarity is a consequence.  
 
APPROPRIABLE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
 One result of a reordering of community priorities, as reflected in the emergency 
consensus, is that not only are certain tasks given high priority, but other activities 
are assigned low priority in the overall emergency needs. This means that many 
community members can be allocated disaster tasks, which can greatly increase the 
DYNES, SOCIAL CAPITAL    16 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
available work force. Two forms of this reallocation of social capital are more 
common: Type II Expanding Organizations and Type III Extending Organizations 
(See Figure I).  
Expanding organizations are designed to utilize volunteers who have previous 
contact with the organization. These individuals express their helping behavior 
through conventional social organization. They are members of or participants in an 
organization that has emergency responsibility in its charter and so has established 
plans that call for the addition of personnel to meet disaster needs. These 
organizations have a latent structure that is activated when emergencies occur. This 
latent emergency structure has, in its preplanning, already specified the necessary 
roles and relationships. When such a plan is activated, those who have positions in 
the emergency organization are notified by a call-up system or may report to assist 
simply by their recognition of the presence of conditions on which the plan is based.  
Such a system for channeling helping behavior is characteristic of most traditional 
emergency organizations, such as police and fire departments, civil defense offices, 
Salvation Army units, public works organizations, and local Red Cross chapters. A 
police department may have an auxiliary police unit that is activated under certain 
conditions. The norms that guide helping behavior already exist within the pre-
disaster organizational structure and, in addition, the volunteer is placed in 
preplanned social relationships. The volunteer fits into a rank structure within the 
auxiliary police unit, and the relation of the regular departmental authority structure 
has already been established. These structures allow for relatively efficient matching 
of personnel to tasks at hand in an emergency.  
The second form of social capital reallocation, extending organizations, can best 
be described as a group of volunteers or members of an organization that has no 
specific emergency-related purpose. Such groups may, however, be concerned 
broadly with community service and so, when a disaster occurs, see disaster-related 
activities as a logical extension of their previous orientation. The individual group 
member does not volunteer; the organization does. The member’s involvement is an 
extension of group membership. The behavior then follows pre-disaster patterns of 
social relationship, while new norms emerge, focusing group activity on new 
disaster-related tasks. 
Examples of extending organizations include a scout troop mobilized by the 
scoutmaster to act as messengers for an emergency operation center; a church 
building used as a shelter and staffed by church members, or a parochial school 
staffed by the parent-teacher association; or a Veterans of Foreign Wars post that 
assumes responsibility for feeding disaster workers. In all these instances, 
considerable personnel can be mobilized quickly and channeled toward tasks created 
by the emergency. In addition to personnel, such groups and organizations have at 
their command many other types of resources – buildings, supplies, money, and 
information. 
It is important to emphasize that the behavior of the two types of volunteers 
described above follows lines of already-established social relationships. These are 
not spontaneous, random acts of generosity on the part of isolated individuals; they 
are extensions of pre-disaster relationships. 
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INTENTIONAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
One can find, in the historic record, specific occasions when central governments 
have been involved in disaster situations, often with immediate relief. Most of that 
involvement has been on an ad hoc basis; when the immediate tasks were finished so 
was the governmental responsibility. In that context, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 
can be identified as the first modern disaster because of the emergency 
responsibilities initiated by the early patterns of a central government.35 That has 
changed. E.L. Quarantelli, using the broader term of civil protection, suggests: 
As we enter the 21st century, civil protection has finally become explicitly 
accepted as a major governmental responsibility in practically every country in 
the world. At the national level, usually the relevant activity is quartered in a 
formal governmental agency, very close to but relatively rarely at the highest 
level such as a cabinet office.36  
In the United States, a bifurcated system developed whereby national security issues 
were the concern of a national civil defense system, but local offices of civil defense 
were primarily concerned with local disasters. In a study of local civil defense in the 
1960s by the Disaster Research Center, the following conclusions were noted: 
1.  The scope of disaster planning was broadened to include a wider range of 
disaster agents... 2. There was a decline in the assumption that preparation for 
a nuclear attack was sufficient planning for all types of disaster contingencies… 
3. There was a shift in focus of disaster planning from the emphasis on security 
of the nation to the concern with the viability of the local community.37  
 
The DRC report went on to say that in the 1970s, the local community civil defense 
offices varied considerably in the scope of the hazards with which they were 
concerned: 
Some are completely focused on planning and the associated task of dealing 
with nuclear attack. Others are primarily concerned with natural disaster 
hazards. Many are concerned with both but the degree of emphasis on one or 
the other will vary. A smaller number show a range of concern with a wide 
range of hazards –  man-made, nuclear, natural disaster, etc.38  
During the ‘60s and ‘70s new concepts emerged. There was considerable discussion 
of “dual use” – the idea that facilities could be used for both national security and 
local disaster problems. There was the notion that the focus should be on all hazards 
within the community and the idea of “comprehensive emergency management” 
(CEM) began to be seen as an increasingly important function of local government. 
In some states, divisions of emergency management were created. And, in 1979, 
federal agencies with disaster responsibility were combined and reorganized into a 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.39  
The development of FEMA into a functioning emergency management 
organization took a long time. Its development as a federal/state partnership was 
enhanced by pressures on the agency from states where major disasters occurred. In 
addition, concern for traditional nuclear and civil defense issues receded. During the 
first Clinton administration, a former emergency management director from the 
president’s home state began to restructure FEMA to deal with the full range of 
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policy concerns – from mitigation of hazards to disaster recovery. These concerns 
were severely truncated with the terrorist attack in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, a 
new presidency, and the incorporation of FEMA into a large new agency called the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).   
In general, this reorganization was made with the rationale of strengthening 
national security and addressing the threat of terrorism. In this transition, many of 
the assumptions coming out of World War II and the Cold War were revived and re-
institutionalized. The necessity for homeland security seemed to be predicated on 
the weakness of individual citizens and the fragility of our social structure, requiring 
the government to enhance its ability to “command and control.” The necessity of 
command and control has been revived and in general is based on a set of 
assumptions about what happens in emergencies, especially those caused by 
terrorist attacks. Specifically, the command and control approach: 
1. Assumes social chaos and dramatic disjunctures during the emergency. 
2. Assumes the reduced capacity of individuals and social structure to cope. 
3. Creates artificial social structures to deal with that reduced capacity. 
4. Expresses a deep distrust of individuals and structures to make intelligent 
decisions in emergencies. 
5. Places responsibility in a top-down authority structure to make the right 
decisions and to communicate those “right” decisions in official 
information to insure action.  
6. Creates a closed system intended to overcome the inherent weakness of 
“civil” society to deal with important emergencies. 
The vocabulary of “command and control” is reflected in the issuance of a national 
response plan in December 2004 in which, in describing the proposed organization 
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The national structure for incident management establishes a clear progression of 
coordination and communication from the local level to regional and national 
headquarters level. As illustrated in Figure 2, the local incident command structures 
(namely the ICP(s) and Area Command) are responsible for directing on-scene 
emergency management and maintaining command and control of on-scene incident 
operations.40   
 
Alternative Assumptions 
The first test of this “reorganization” in the United States came with Hurricane 
Katrina and was not reassuring. Perhaps the catastrophic scope of Katrina was not a 
fair test.41 On the other hand, it prompted every legislative body, every political unit, 
and every media outlet to offer criticism, and some of the suggestions were relevant.  
Such criticisms have reenergized the move toward standardization, 
bureaucratization, and militarization of emergencies in modern democratic societies.  
This movement will continue to inhibit the effectiveness of social capital and to 
maximize the ignorance of authorities regarding the dynamics of the resources of 
local communities. These issues will continue to be problematic. 
A much more realistic set of assumptions for emergency planning should center 
on “problem-solving” rather than command and control: 
1.  Emergencies may create some degree of confusion and disorganization at 
the level of routine organizational patterns, but to describe that as “social 
chaos” is incorrect. 
2.  Emergencies do not reduce the capacity of individuals and social structures 
to cope. They may present new and unexpected problems to solve. 
3.   Existing social structure is the most effective way to solve those problems.  
To create an artificial emergency-specific authority structure is neither 
possible nor effective. 
4.  Planning efforts should be built around the capacity of social units to make 
rational and informed decisions. These social units need to be seen as 
resources for problem solving, rather than as the problem themselves. 
5. An emergency, by its very nature, is characterized by decentralized and 
pluralistic decision-making, so autonomy rather than the centralization of 
authority of decision-making should be valued. 
6. An open system could be created in which the premium is placed on 
flexibility and initiative among the various social units, whose efforts are 
coordinated. The goals of efforts should be oriented toward problem 
solving, rather than avoiding chaos. 
 
Kathleen Tierney observed that the response to the September 11th terrorist attack 
was so effective because it was flexible: 
The lesson here is that the response to the September 11th tragedy was so 
effective because it was not centrally directed and controlled.  Indeed, it was 
flexible, adaptive and focused on handling problems as they emerged.  It was 
a response that initially involved mainly those who were present in the 
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immediate area where the attacks occurred and then later merged the efforts 
of officially designated disaster response agencies with those of newly formed 
groups as well as literally thousands of other organized entities that had not 
been included in prior emergency planning and that were not subject to any 
central authority.42  
An alternative model for emergency response, based on the utilization of social 
capital, would be to use what exists and to capitalize on the characteristics that 
emerge during the crisis, rather than to create an artificial set of norms and 
structures. The continuity and persistence of behavior and structure that 
characterize the notion of social capital are evidenced in the following ways: 
 
! Rather than interpreting emergencies as a direct break in experience, individuals 
tend to normalize threat, to define situations as normal, and to continue habitual 
patterns of behavior.  
! Rather than exhibiting irrational and abnormal manifestations of behavior,    
individuals exhibit traditional role behavior and maintain occupational and 
familial obligations. Irrational and anti-social behaviors do not, in aggregate, 
increase (in fact, they probably decrease). 
! Traditional social structures such as families maintain their viability and can be 
utilized to assume additional emergency responsibilities. For example, there is 
good evidence that almost all search and rescue activities are done by kin and 
neighborhood groups. In addition, there is evidence that warning messages are 
mediated through traditional social structures, rather than through impersonal 
media. There is also evidence that kin and neighborhood groups provide mass 
shelter for a large majority of affected populations and that planned mass shelter 
is useful only for a small segment of the population. 
! Rational social structures such as community organizations maintain their 
viability and can be utilized to assume additional emergency responsibilities. For 
example, traditional health care institutions carry out almost all emergency 
medical care. Health care offered by first-aid stations or by hastily-constructed 
emergency facilities tends to be ignored and rejected.  
! The way people define the situation and determine appropriate behaviors 
requires heightened, rather than restricted, communication. The command-
control model places great faith on “correct” information, officially decreed. What 
are officially defined as rumors to be controlled are actually part of the 
definitional process. Thus, messages and channels of communication need to be 
increased rather than restricted. 
! Rather than seeing self-initiated helping action as disruptive because such 
actions were not planned, it is more appropriate to see planned action as 
supplemental to self-initiated actions. 
! Rather than attempting to centralize authority, it is more appropriate to structure 
a coordination model. The fact that emergencies have implications for many 
different segments of social life, each with their own pre-existing patterns of 
authority and the necessity for simultaneous action and autonomous decision 
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making, indicates it is impossible to create a centralized authority system (that it 
is probably unnecessary). The centralization of authority is usually predicated on 
the image of disintegration of social life. The evidence points to a viability of 
behavior and the adaptability of traditional structures, suggesting that authority 
is more of a problem in the minds of planners than an actual problem of life 
under emergency conditions. Planning should focus on coordination and the 
development of communications, rather than the creation of authority. 
 
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR ENHANCING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The basic assumption relating to social capital is that the local social system is the 
logical and viable base for all stages of emergency action. Certain specific courses of 
action can be suggested as a guide to policy: 
1. Utilize a variety of mechanisms to increase community identification and 
collective responsibility. Enlist religious and other civic organizations to 
build disaster responsibility into routine messages about moral and civic 
responsibility. In particular, there is a need to remind the community that 
the greater the disaster, the more the community will have to depend on 
its own resources. Disaster memorials, anniversaries, and other civic 
occasions provide such opportunities. 
2. Involve civic organizations in planning activities. Develop an inventory of 
and knowledge about community resources, both people and materials. 
Encourage organizations to develop certain useful disaster skills. For 
example, groups with physical locations, such as churches, schools, and 
some civic organizations, might develop skills in running mass feeding 
operations, shelters, information centers, etc. Local contractors might be 
encouraged to have meetings discussing the latest information on search 
and rescue in high-rise building collapses. Certain community skills such 
as knowledge of first aid might be encouraged as an important attribute of 
civic responsibility. More specific guidelines should be utilized for those 
community members engaged in disaster planning. 
3. Utilize existing habit patterns as the basis for emergency action. To do this 
effectively, knowledge of the patterns of social life and their routines is 
essential. For example, in making plans for evacuation, it is best to utilize 
usual patterns, e.g. easily-designated and commonly-traveled routes.  
4. Utilize existing social units, rather than create new ad hoc ones. If families 
are the major point of resource allocation within the community, utilize 
that system. Much of the thought in American society is individualistic; 
much of the activity in emergency situations is family-oriented. 
Organizations running shelters should think in terms of family units, not 
collections of individuals. The same thinking should characterize 
evacuation plans. In addition, much governmental assistance is directed 
toward individual applicants. To modify that suggests radical change, 
which is unlikely, but there needs to be a constant reminder that the 
“people” come in social units and need to be accommodated that way. 
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5. Utilize the existing authority structure, rather than create new ones. The 
speed with which decisions are made can be increased more easily by the 
use of a traditional structure than by the creation of a new one. The 
establishment of authority, which involves not only power but the 
acceptance of that power, takes time and is not easily or quickly reversed. 
It is better for outsiders to supplement local leadership than to assume  
locals are incompetent and incapable or outsiders are wise and competent. 
6. Utilize existing channels of communication and increase them, rather than 
restrict and narrow them to “official messages.” Information about 
potential risk, potential threat, and potential preventative action are not 
disorganizing; the lack of information, in the quest for certainty, may be. 
Any effective emergency plan is based on the autonomous and 
independent decisions of many to take appropriate action. These actions 
are more effective when communication is enhanced than restricted. 
Remember that people talk to one another, so these interpersonal 
channels should be used in addition to the mass media. Citizens are at 
work or school, engaged in many different collective activities and are not 
attached to the mass media. Remember that members of minority and 
immigrant communities may not access the same communication 
networks that the “official” community utilizes. Some citizens may be 
socially isolated because of disabilities, age, illness, and geographical 
location. Attempts to reach these people can also utilize conventional 
methods of social capital. 
7. Since it is difficult for citizens or politicians to maintain interest in 
activities concerned with local risks, at least a minimum level of concern 
should be maintained by institutionalizing support for emergency 
management functions within local government. Encouragement should 
continue for training activities leading to the professionalization of the 
emergency manager. This task may be best supported at a national level. 
Collectively, training efforts should become an integral part of municipal 
services, which would require only a small part of the cost of current 
emergency services. This would mean the creation and cultivation of 
citizen lobbying for the initiation and continuation of such services, 
making them as routine as the functions of the police, fire, ambulance, and 
other emergency services. 
8. The aim of emergency planning is to move back to the “normal” as quickly 
as possible after a disaster. This means the restoration of commerce, the 
reopening of schools, and the reinstitution of usual community patterns. 
Inconvenience is more easily adapted to than absence. And the therapeutic 
process, both for individuals and communities, is enhanced by the 
reestablishment of habitual actions. 
9. The recovery stage should not be seen as the opportunity for massive (and 
directed) social change. Nor should possible mitigation opportunities 
during the recovery be implemented so as to drastically alter the 
traditional social structure of the community. This does not imply that 
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there are no opportunities for mitigation during the recovery period; it 
suggests these opportunities be approached with humility rather than 
enthusiasm. Mitigation efforts can be effective if adapted to local 
community practices. 
 
LOOKING BACK AND FORTH 
This article began as an effort to examine the utility of the concept of social capital 
when applied to the existing research findings relating to disaster response. This 
concept has the advantage of moving away from a current preoccupation with 
hazards as a cause of, and mitigation as a solution to, disasters. It has the advantage 
of shifting attention away from making the environment sustainable and looking at 
how social systems can function in any environment. The concept of social capital 
has the advantage of seeing social systems as active resources, not passive victims, 
shifting the focus away from human vulnerability toward an emphasis on human 
capability. It has the advantage of identifying the creation of social resources in 
emergency situations, rather than focusing primarily on the destruction of physical 
capital. In these respects, the concept of social capital shows considerable promise. 
Moving back to disaster-related topics, there are a number of possibilities where 
social capital theory might be helpful. First, emergence here has been treated, mostly 
implicitly, as indicating the creation of new social capital. It would be useful to 
examine the literature on emergence, scattered through the disaster literature, to 
examine the outcome. Second, social capital theory might be useful in an analysis of 
the problems of external aid in disaster since such aid disrupts existing obligations, 
distorts informational potential, and imposes new authority patterns. Third, social 
capital theory is useful in the way it links microanalysis with macro-analysis. Most 
psychological studies of disaster victims have focused on psychodynamic causation 
with borrowed concepts, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Such theoretical 
approaches have been largely unsuccessful. Since social capital theory links the 
consequences of individual action to social resources, such a linkage holds the 
possibility of explaining individual “trauma” and individual resilience to disaster. 
Conceptually, social capital theory can be useful in comparative studies, both at 
the community level and at a social level. It might be useful to examine communities 
that have persisted and grown in situations that are now seen as high risk, and have 
led to enduring disaster subcultures. More complex, of course, are historical and 
comparative studies. As Gregory Bankoff has suggested: 
Perhaps the whole notion of threat is so interwoven into the pattern of 
historical development and daily life that many aspects of culture perceived as 
distinctive have their origins, at least, partly in the need for collective action in 
the face of common dangers.43  
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Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the 
Psychometric Paradigm 
 
Clinton M. Jenkin 
 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF RISK 
Suppose for a moment that the New York Port Authority receives a threat of a 
radioactive “dirty bomb” to be detonated on a container ship in the Port of New York.  
Lower Manhattan is evacuated, and most of the other five boroughs’ residents also 
choose to leave. Business grinds to a halt as both consumers and workers take cover.  
Within thirty-six hours, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announces that 
the threat has passed. However, many residents wait several more days before 
returning, while others do not return at all.  Business continues to wane as tourism stalls 
and factories and shops close down. It will be several months before the city fully 
recovers. This illustration demonstrates the importance of perceived risk regarding 
terrorism.  The perception of risk – whether or not risk is actually present – is sufficient 
to cause real and long-term damages. Understanding how specific factors drive the 
perception of risk is essential to understanding how people will respond to threats of 
terrorism. 
There are many benefits to the empirical study of risk perception among the general 
populace. This research provides a better understanding of how risk perception 
influences political attitudes; it provides insight into how risk perception impacts 
various behaviors; it allows the mapping of social processes such as risk amplification 
and attenuation; it informs the development of effective communication and education 
programs; and it is useful for identifying which situational factors contribute to 
perceived risk. Each of these benefits will be discussed in turn, along with an 
examination of previous contributions in this field and explanations of how they inform 
homeland security research and policy. 
The concept of risk is a psychological one. Risk, as opposed to danger, is a socially 
constructed phenomenon.1 Riskiness is based on perception rather than fact, and this 
perception is based on qualitative, not quantitative characteristics of the hazard being 
considered.2 Paul Slovic argues that risks are made up of qualitative attributes like 
voluntariness or probability.  He further posits that no single attribute defines the risk of 
a particular hazard; neither are specific attributes equally influential across different 
hazards.3 Even when the facts and probabilities of a particular hazard are well defined 
and well known, human judgment is required to determine which information is most 
important to defining the risk of that hazard.  A study by Slovic and others found that 
participants’ ratings of risk did not match their own mortality estimates, indicating that 
factors other than death toll must be related to risk decisions.4 Whether a risk is 
considered acceptable is also a matter of priorities and values, which are psychological 
by definition.5 The subjective and perceptual nature of risk makes it an important area 
of study for the psychological sciences. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the subjective nature of risk is the discrepancy 
between expert and lay evaluations of a hazard. When judging the risk of a hazard, 
experts rely much more heavily on mortality estimates and probabilities than do 
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laypersons. Slovic and his associates reported that expert judgments of risk 
corresponded to objective statistical data, whereas layperson judgments did not.6  Slovic 
explained such a discrepancy by concluding that experts view risk as the likelihood of 
actual harm based on mortality estimates, whereas lay perceptions of risk are based on a 
number of qualitative (and subjective) characteristics.7 Some of the characteristics 
linked to lay perceptions of risk include the voluntariness of exposure, the dread 
associated with the hazard, the extent to which the risk can be controlled, the potential 
for catastrophe, the level of uncertainty associated with the hazard, and the perceived 
inequality of risk/benefit distribution.8 It is well-documented that expert and lay 
judgments of risk are different; this difference can be traced to qualitative dimensions of 
risk that are applied to lay judgments, but not to expert judgments. The inconsistency 
between expert and lay judgments of risk demonstrates the psychological nature of risk.  
This inconsistency also creates a debate about the appropriateness of using expert 
evaluations alone for policy decisions. In most cases, government and business policy 
makers rely almost exclusively on quantitative risk assessment to guide policies. In 
many cases the involved public fails to accept such assessment. One example is nuclear 
power generation, which has been largely rejected in this country even though it is both 
safer and cleaner than fossil fuel alternatives. Another example is the decrease of 
property values near toxic waste sites, despite repeated assurances that the materials 
have not and will not impact local residents. Participants in a study conducted by 
Donald MacGregor and Paul Slovic considered the standard cost-benefit analysis used 
by experts to be morally insufficient for evaluating and regulating risk, but acceptable as 
part of a more subjective evaluation process.9 Abraham Wandersman and William 
Hallman agreed that such analysis was insufficient for a number of reasons. First, 
quantitative risk assessments are based on a number of assumptions that introduce 
uncertainty into the process; second, the credibility of the risk assessors may be suspect; 
and third, expert assessment often fails to consider issues that are important to the 
public interest.10 The unwillingness of the public to accept expert risk assessment is a 
further demonstration of the psychological nature of risk.  
In summary, the concept of risk is socially constructed and psychologically oriented.  
Comparisons of expert and lay judgments of risk illustrate that public assessments of 
risk are tied to qualitative, rather than quantitative, characteristics of a hazard. The 
relative importance of these qualitative characteristics varies across people or across 
hazards. Risk perception research techniques can identify which characteristics are 
important and when. The question of using only expert judgments for policy decisions 
involving risk is especially salient in the area of terrorism. The Department of Homeland 
Security is engaged in various projects designed to objectively assess risk.  Whether such 
assessments will be adequate to provide public support for policy decisions is far from 
certain.  
By itself, keeping people safe is not sufficient: they must also feel safe. The 
importance of this point in implementing homeland security and emergency 
preparedness programs is difficult to overstate. Without a perception of safety, voters 
will locate and authorize new leaders (both local and federal) who share their priorities, 
and will implement a more “acceptable” security policy.  Such a potential action is not 
just a political threat; it can have a serious negative impact on legitimate programs that 
are effectively reducing risk, and divert money to programs that increase the feeling of 
safety without increasing actual safety.  The answer, from the standpoint of authorities 
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attempting to minimize risk and maximize recovery, is to find a middle ground between 
measures that reduce objective risk and measures that reduce perceived risk. Risk 
perception research can inform policy makers on how to balance objective assessments 
with public opinion regarding security priorities. 
 
BENEFITS OF RISK PERCEPTION RESEARCH 
Slovic uses the Ford Pinto as a case study to illustrate the value of understanding risk 
perception. After producing and selling the Pinto, Ford discovered that a defect in the 
fuel tank could cause the car to catch fire. Ford did a cost-benefit analysis and concluded 
that a recall would be too expensive. If Ford had considered perceived risk in the 
analysis they might have made a different decision.11 Declining to fix the problem via a 
recall resulted in a public relations nightmare that cost Ford much more than a recall 
would have.  Even though the actual fires did not create a significant economic problem, 
the perception that Ford’s product might catch fire did. The mere perception of a threat 
was enough to cause severe problems. The same holds true for terrorism. If a terrorist 
organization provided a credible threat that a nuclear bomb would detonate in New 
York Harbor, the resulting evacuation and general atmosphere of the city would cripple 
the state and perhaps the national economy, independent of whether the danger was 
real. Understanding risk perceptions and responses to risk is vital to understanding – 
and ultimately affecting – public responses to terrorism. 
 
Risk Perception and Political Attitudes 
The study of risk is important in several ways. The first benefit to studying risk is that it 
allows psychologists to better understand political attitudes. Perceptions of risk drive 
public priorities.12 As in the case of the Pinto, or nuclear energy, or airline security, the 
perception of risk – rather than actual danger – drives public demands for action. This 
phenomenon is demonstrated in cases of environmental hazards. Public perceptions of 
risk seriously affect management and regulatory organizations’ budgets, agendas, and 
priorities.13 For policymakers, especially elected policymakers, the psychological impact 
of environmental hazards is just as important as the physical impacts.14 Thus, 
perceptions of risk are an important component of political attitudes. 
Brian Gerber and Grant Neeley studied how perceived risk of routine hazards was 
related to attitudes about government regulation. They found that increased perceived 
risk of a hazard was positively related to support for regulation of that hazard, even 
when the cost of such regulation was stated to be significant. Two other variables 
affected this relationship: issue awareness and trust in the regulators. If respondents 
considered themselves to be ill-informed on an issue, there was no relationship between 
perceived risk and support for regulation. Trust moderated the relationship between 
perceived risk and support for regulation; if the respondents did not trust the regulators, 
then they were less likely to support regulation, even if perceived risk was high.15  These 
results also apply to terrorism. Leonie Huddy and associates found that levels of 
perceived risk were linked to willingness to support aggressive anti-terrorist policies.16 
Studying which features of a terrorist hazard affect perceptions of risk allows 
policymakers to understand which terrorist hazards are likely to become important to 
the public and why. In our democratic society understanding public priorities is 
essential to developing a politically acceptable action plan. 
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Risk Perception and Behaviors 
The second benefit of studying risk is that researchers can understand how perception of 
risk impacts behaviors.17 Along with Ellen Cohn, the author has documented that 
perceived risk of terrorism was positively related to adaptive behaviors such as having 
an emergency supply kit.18 Similar studies have found this relationship to hold true for 
fear and perceived risk of crime as well.19 J. Sherwood Williams and others, in a study of 
urban adolescents, found that fear of crime was an important predictor of defensive 
behaviors such as going out in groups, learning self-defense, carrying spray, or carrying 
a safety whistle.20 Paul Lavrakas compared suburban and urban dwellers and found that 
urban dwellers, who had a higher fear of crime, restricted their behavior more than the 
subjects living in the suburbs.21 David McDowell found a positive link between fear of 
crime and gun ownership.22  Gustavo Mesch found that an increase in perceived risk was 
indicative of a decrease in nighttime activities.23 The behavioral effects of perceived risk 
and fear of crime are well documented, though the research has not differentiated 
behavioral changes related to fear from those related to perceived risk. Numerous 
behavioral changes were also observed after 9/11, though it is unclear which of these 
changes were caused by perceived risk.24 Identifying the extent to which perceived risk 
changes behaviors is an important goal of risk researchers. 
 
Risk Amplification and Attenuation 
The third benefit to studying risk is that it can clarify the conditions under which 
perceptions of risk either increase or decrease. Risk researchers have developed a 
descriptive mechanism known as risk amplification. Risk amplification is concerned 
with factors, both personal and social, that create either a heightened or lowered sense 
of risk within a society.25 Risk amplification ties reactions to socio-economic processes 
as well as event characteristics.26 This framework considers issues such as the stigma 
associated with a hazard, assignment of blame, and the social dynamics within a society 
in order to understand why a risk might become over- or under-estimated.27  
Understanding the complex interplay between perceptions of risk and social processes is 
an important contribution of risk research, and can inform communication and policy 
decisions regarding risk.  
The social amplification of risk framework can be a useful tool for tracing the social 
evolution of attitudes toward terrorism. Consider that several major terrorist attacks 
occurred that involved U.S. citizens before 9/11, such as the two previous World Trade 
Center bombings, the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Marine barracks bombing in 
Lebanon, and the dual U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Counter-
terrorism did not become a national priority, however, until after 9/11. While the 
damage of the 9/11 attacks is one variable, the risk amplification framework provides a 
mechanism for understanding what other social factors were involved in alternately 
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Risk Perception and Communication  
The fourth benefit of studying risk is that an understanding of risk perceptions is vital to 
developing proper communication and education strategies.28 It is important for 
decision makers and enforcement officials to be able to explain any hazard and the 
related course of action to the public. Educational initiatives must also build an accurate 
and useful public awareness base. Neither of these goals can be accomplished unless 
communicators understand how risk is defined and perceived by the public. In the case 
of terrorism, communication is particularly important because any major warning must 
be accompanied by instructions, and those instructions must be heeded by the public at 
large. 
Several factors are known to impact risk perception. The first and most important is 
trust, which has been repeatedly linked to perceived risk. Margaret Heldring identified 
credibility as the first requirement for effective risk communication.29 Trust in 
information source was found to impact perceived risk of environmental health 
hazards.30 In a study that manipulated various features of communication of risk, the 
manipulations were not as important as issues of trust in government and authority.31   
Trust seems to be more important when communicating hazards about which the 
perceiver has little knowledge.32 Any communication or education initiative that lacks 
credibility will have minimal effect on perceptions of risk. It is vital that agencies and 
persons responsible for communicating terrorism information to the public maintain 
this trust, or any directions concerning evacuation, sheltering, et cetera, stand a fair 
chance of being ignored by the public. 
Lennart Sjöberg suggested that the issue of trust may explain why lay person risk 
perceptions seem irrational to experts; if the experts themselves lack credibility, then 
disbelieving their assurances is the only rational response.33 Slovic addresses systemic 
influences that destroy trust. These influences are noticeably present in the arena of 
terrorism. One, failures are more noticeable than successes. This is especially true for 
the war on terror, where most successes cannot be identified or publicized because such 
information might compromise intelligence sources. Two, failures are given greater 
weight than successes, even if salience is equal. With regards to terrorism, the costs of 
failure are much more noticeable than are the benefits of success, because success 
merely preserves the status quo. Three, once an audience loses trust, it screens future 
perceptions. Failures become even more noticeable, because people tend to retain 
information consistent with their attitudes.34 Julie Barnett and Glynis Breakwell use the 
1995 contraceptive pill scare in England to illustrate how contradictory expert testimony 
erodes credibility and inflates risk.35 Due in part to the 24-hour news cycle, the 
American public is treated to constant contradictory “expert” testimony. While trust is 
an extremely important variable in risk communication, it is also a very fragile one. 
Specificity is another communication factor that impacts perceptions of risk. Risk 
communications that are not specific are more likely to increase anxiety without 
increasing awareness.36 One example of the importance of specificity in terrorism 
communication is the color-coded alert system used by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). For law enforcement officials, this alert system is marginally useful, if 
each level of alert is accompanied by specific actions and procedures. Such procedures 
are developed at the local level, however, so the DHS system by itself is only useful if the 
local jurisdictions have attached their own set of specifics. More useful to local 
authorities is information received through law enforcement channels such as Law 
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Enforcement Online or the FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force gateway; this information is 
more useful precisely because it is more specific. For the general public, the DHS color-
coded system is rightfully criticized for being counterproductive, precisely because it 
offers no useful information to a public audience.  
Heldring outlined criteria for risk communication to be considered useful: credibility, 
specific information about the risk, specific information about what is being done by 
authorities, specific information about what the audience should do, and empathy.37  In 
the case of terrorist warnings, unfortunately, such specific information is usually 
unavailable, or cannot be shared with the public. But risk research provides insight into 
how terrorist warnings should ideally be constructed and relayed. 
Barnett and Breakwell postulated a mechanism by which past risk communications 
influence the response to further risk communications. The series of previous hazard 
notifications (a hazard sequence) impacts the way a hazard is normalized; this 
normalization results in a hazard template – a social heuristic that speeds the 
processing of information related to the hazard. The hazard template is the public’s 
conception of the hazard and includes such characteristics as the organizations 
responsible, potential victims, causes, and consequences; this template provides a 
common ground for interpersonal communication about the hazard. Barnett and 
Breakwell conclude that in order to understand how people will react to a future risk 
communication, we must first understand how previous communications have shaped 
the audience’s hazard template.38 Because so much of the average person’s experience 
with terrorism is from media messages, it would be useful to examine how these 
messages have constructed the hazard template of “terrorism” and how this template 
filters new messages. 
 
Situational Factors  
A fifth benefit to studying risk is to identify situational factors that influence risk 
perception. Psychological research has identified four situational factors that influence 
how people judge risk: expected loss, catastrophic potential, other qualitative 
characteristics (these will be discussed in greater detail below), and beliefs about 
cause.39 Risk perception research provides insight into which event or situational 
features will be most important for particular hazards. In the case of terrorism, such 
information assists researchers or public officials – given specific information about the 
characteristics of a terrorist threat – to predict how people might react to that threat. 
 
Personal Factors  
Several intra-personal factors have been linked to risk perception. In the health 
psychology literature, three factors have been associated with risk perception: 
demographics, socio-psychological variables (like those discussed previously regarding 
responses to terrorism), and structural variables such as experience with the hazard or 
depth of knowledge.40 Sjoberg postulates that certain individuals may demonstrate a 
greater sensitivity to risk, and this possibility deserves empirical analysis.41  
Slovic linked risk judgments to gender (women judge risk to be higher), race, 
(minorities judge risk as higher), political worldview, personal affiliations, emotional 
affect, and trust (as outlined above). Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that 
race and gender differences in perceived risk can be tied to the “white male effect.”   
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About one-third of white men have much lower risk judgments than everyone else, 
regardless of gender or race; when these responders are excluded from analyses, race 
and gender differences become non-significant. Examining these low-risk respondents 
reveals that they tend to be well-educated, have high socioeconomic status, conservative 
political orientation, and higher trust in authority.42 The white male effect may provide a 
link to other personal factors that influence risk perceptions. Fortunately, intra-personal 
variables is one area in which terrorism attitude researchers have acquired a great deal 
of useful information; as previously discussed, however, most of the research failed to 
differentiate between reactions to past events and reactions to potential events. The risk 
literature provides the empirical background to devise and test specific hypotheses 
regarding potential terrorism and personal variables. 
In sum, studying risk perception is beneficial in many ways. It provides insight into 
how risk perception is related to attitudes and lifestyles. It provides a framework for 
understanding how risk is amplified or attenuated across a culture. It allows for the 
proper development of effective communication and education strategies and it provides 
an understanding of situational and personal factors associated with risk perception. 
The natural inclination of the individual is to reduce risk. It is an important contribution 
of psychology to provide empirical analysis of how and why risk is perceived, and what 
consequences are associated with risk perception. 
 
THE PSYCHOMETRIC PARADIGM 
The psychometric paradigm was developed as the research paradigm that logically 
follows the assumption that risk is psychologically determined. The primary assumption 
of the psychometric paradigm is that risk is inherently subjective.43 Recall the 
importance of qualitative hazard characteristics to lay perceptions of risk. The 
psychometric paradigm is based on techniques that collect and analyze subjective rating 
of these qualitative characteristics, including both global (e.g. riskiness, etc.) and 
dimensional (e.g. controllability, familiarity, etc.) evaluations of particular hazards.44  
These subjective ratings then form a sort of personality profile for each hazard being 
studied. It is this pattern of qualitative ratings that affect perceptions of risk. 
Psychometric studies have discovered five factors that generally account for risk 
perceptions: qualitative features of the hazard, benefits of the hazard, annual mortality 
rates, catastrophic mortality potential, and relative mortality seriousness.45 For the 
purposes of the proposed studies, the factor of greatest interest is the qualitative 
features, or personality profile, of the hazard itself. An understanding of how these 
qualitative ratings impact perceptions of risk is a vital step in understanding attitudes 
toward terrorism. 
 
Dimensions and Factors of Risk  
Psychometric studies have studied numerous dimensions of risk for scores of hazards.  
Dimensions commonly used are listed in Table 1. Obviously, so many dimensions can 
lead to very cumbersome research designs, so most risk studies include the dimensions 
most applicable to the study at hand. For example, a terrorism study may elect to 
exclude inequitability, because the inequity of terrorism risk is not likely to be an issue 
as it might be for the risks of a toxic waste dump or nuclear power plant.  
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Qualitative Dimensions of Risk Used in the Psychometric Paradigm46 
 
Voluntariness The extent to which exposure to the hazard is voluntary. 
Immediacy The extent to which the consequences are noticed 
immediately. 
Knowledge of exposure The extent to which a person knows if he has been 
exposed. 
Expert knowledge The extent to which experts know about the hazard. 
Controllability* The extent to which a victim can control the severity of 
consequences due to exposure. 
Novelty The extent to which the hazard is new to society. 
Catastrophic potential* How many fatalities occur at once. 
Dread* The extent to which the effects of exposure are dreaded. 
Severity* The extent to which the consequences of exposure are 
severe. 
Delayed The extent to which the consequences of exposure are 
delayed. 
Certainly fatal* The extent to which exposure will definitely cause 
fatality. 
Increasing* The extent to which the risk is increasing over time. 
Preventability* The extent to which the hazard is preventable. 
Inequitable* The extent to which risks and benefits are not equally 
distributed across society. 
Affects future generations* The extent to which the hazard will affect future 
generations.  
Global catastrophe* The extent to which the hazard threatens a global 
catastrophe. 
Easily reduced* The extent to which risk associated with the hazard can 
be easily reduced. 
Personal impact* The extent to which the risk affects the respondent 
personally. 
Observability The extent to which the effects of exposure are 
observable. 




Risk studies have also sought to reduce the number of analyses by reducing these 
qualitative dimensions into factors via factor analysis. This approach has been very 
successful and has lead to robust research findings. Two factors have been consistently 
(though not exclusively) identified: dread risk, which is associated with lack of control, 
dreaded consequences, catastrophic potential, inequitable distribution, increasing risk, 
and fatal consequences; and unknown risk, which is associated with unobservability, 
novelty, unknown exposure, unknown to science, and delayed consequences.48 Two 
other factors have also been identified in individual studies: number of people exposed 
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and severity of consequences.49 The most consistent finding, however, is that the dread 
risk factor has been the best predictor of the overall perceived risk of a hazard.50   
Identifying the importance of dread and its impact on perceptions of risk is a valuable 
contribution of risk research in general and the psychometric paradigm in particular. 
The identification of two primary factors that qualitatively described hazards has 
allowed risk researchers to map out a number of hazards in two-factor space. Such 
taxonomy is useful for two purposes. The first value is that it explains differences in risk 
perceptions across hazards. In fact, the perceived risk of a hazard is related to its 
position in the two-factor space. The second value is that it explains discrepancies 
between lay and expert estimates of risk. While lay perceptions of risk are consistently 
tied to dread risk, expert ratings are not.51  
One risk judgment that merits special attention is signal value. An event is high in 
signal value if its occurrence changes the perceived probability of future occurrences.52   
For example, 9/11 was extremely high in signal value because it was taken as evidence 
that such attacks were more likely than before to occur again. In contrast, a suicide 
bomber on a bus in Tel Aviv has a low signal value, because this occurrence does not 
alter perceptions of how likely it is to occur again. Along with overall perceived risk, 
signal value has been linked to the position of hazards within a two-factor space.53 
Differences in signal value appear to account for differences in ratings of worry, need for 
awareness, and need for preventative efforts.54 Signal value is also related to how well 
known a hazard is; new hazards tend to be higher in signal value. Signal value may be an 
important political consideration as well, because a hazard with high signal value is 
particularly open to risk amplification processes.55 Barnett and Breakwell suggest that 
novel information is key to intensifying perceived risk, while confirmatory information 
has little impact on risk perception.56 Signal value is an important variable in risk 
perception. Given the extremely high signal value of 9/11, this concept should be an 
important consideration in any study of attitudes toward terrorism. 
In sum, the psychometric paradigm is a research methodology derived from the 
assumption that risk is subjective and that qualitative features of hazards will be linked 
to perceptions of risk. Numerous qualitative features (dimensions) have been studied; 
some are consistently related to risk and some are not. One of the most relevant features 
to terrorism hazards is signal value. These dimensions can also be reduced to underlying 
factors – dread and unknown risk. These two factors allow the hazards to be mapped on 
a Cartesian plane. The location of each hazard is useful for understanding how it is 
perceived. This paradigm provides a promising set of techniques with which to better 
understand attitudes toward terrorism. Researchers may be able to develop “personality 
profiles” for different attacks, profiles which in turn could lead to the creation of a 
taxonomy of terrorism based on subjective evaluations. 
 
The Psychometric Paradigm and Specific Hazards  
While most psychometric studies have examined many different hazards, the paradigm 
can be adapted to accommodate an in-depth study of one hazard. Single hazard domains 
have been studied using the psychometric paradigm, and they too can be represented in 
two-factor space, where position is predictive of perceived risk.57 Slovic examined 
attitudes toward unwanted land uses and also provided several examples of hazards that 
have been studied using psychometric techniques to specific hazards, such as 
automobile structural defect, railroad accidents, and automobile subsystem failures.58 
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While in these studies risk dimensions were reducible into factors, the factors did not 
always match those found in multiple-hazard studies; for example, the factors observed 
for automobile subsystem defects were “foreseeable” and “severe, uncontrollable 
damage.”59 Given the nature of the hazard, these factors are more logical than dread risk 
and unknown risk, the factors discussed above. The psychometric paradigm has also 
been successfully applied to single hazards, but Slovic cautions against representing 
complex events as a single homogenous data point.60 While terrorism has been included 
as a single hazard in past psychometric studies, the complexity and relevance of 
terrorism in today’s society merits an empirical exploration of terrorism as the entire 
hazard space. 
 
APPLICATION TO HOMELAND SECURITY/EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
Based on the principles outlined above, several recommendations can be made for those 
directly involved in homeland security, emergency preparedness, and disaster recovery. 
These recommendations are purposely general, because the specifics of how to 
implement them will vary from one context to another. This list is not intended to be 
exhaustive; surely other recommendations can be made, again based on a specific 
context. The following do provide, however, a framework within which to apply the 
research cited here. 
First, it is essential for an organization to build trust with its audience/constituents.  
Without trust, any information from that organization will likely be discounted, 
including information about levels of safety, disaster scenarios, or evacuation 
procedures. One important aspect of gaining and/or maintaining trust is to make the 
successes of an organization as visible as possible. This task is more difficult than it 
sounds, because the failures of any organization are generally more apparent and 
noticeable than are its successes. In some cases, particularly with intelligence 
organizations, successes cannot be shared with the public because such information may 
compromise future efforts. But it is essential that agencies involved with homeland 
security have proactive campaigns designed to build trust with the public by actively 
communicating information favorable to the agency.  Agencies can also build trust in the 
way that they deal with failures. Open communication about the cause of a failure, and 
steps being taken to prevent another, can and should be used to rebuild trust after an 
agency fails to meet its responsibilities.  
A psychological phenomenon that naturally inhibits trust is hindsight bias, or the “I-
knew-it-all-along” phenomenon. Once an event has occurred, observers tend to 
overestimate the predictability of the event. This phenomenon means that failures are 
not only more noticeable, they are considered to be inexcusable, especially failures of 
foresight. From the public’s perspective, any catastrophe or disaster could have been 
avoided, because there was sufficient evidence beforehand that it was going to occur. 
From an agency’s perspective, the evidence predicting an event was buried within the 
evidence against the event occurring, and thus no foresight was possible. Agencies, and 
especially their press liaisons, must be aware of this difference in perspective and be 
ready to publicly account for it. 
Second, agencies must offer specific information whenever possible. This point is 
particularly salient for organizations tasked with motivating people to take action.  
People tend to ignore general instructions that do not include specific actions. Of course, 
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the actions requested must also be sensible to the public, or even specifics will be 
ignored. Therefore agencies must not only provide specific instructions, but give 
detailed (and simple) explanations for those instructions. Specific information is also 
needed for warnings. As discussed above, the color-coded system is largely useless to the 
general population because of its lack of specificity. If details cannot be given, the 
agency must consider whether releasing general instructions or warnings will actually 
cause harm to their communication efforts, either through creating distrust among the 
public, or through desensitizing their audience to such communication. In some cases, it 
may actually be advisable to present no information rather than to present information 
that the audience cannot use. 
Third, organizations must understand the public’s priorities. In cases of general 
homeland security or emergency preparedness issues, public opinion polls can offer a 
basic level of insight. In more specific cases, some level of primary research may need to 
be conducted in order to identify priorities. Once an organization can understand the 
perspective (and thus the priorities) of its constituents, they are better prepared to 
address those priorities. Often an agency is already addressing these priorities, and it 
simply needs to do a better job of communicating these efforts to the public. In other 
cases the public priorities may need to be altered; this is a very difficult thing to do, but 
it is possible if the issues of trust and specificity have already been addressed. If an 
agency does find it necessary to conduct a campaign to alter the public priorities, 
awareness of public opinion will inform decision makers of the progress of such a 
campaign. 
Fourth, the qualitative dimensions (and responses to them) discussed above should 
be incorporated into scenario development exercises. Scenario development may be 
more accurate if the subjective features of a threat are included along with the objective 
features. Of course, the impact of these subjective features is still a matter of ongoing 
research, especially in the area of terrorism, so such a process would necessarily be 
iterative. Once this information is added to our current knowledge and accounted for in 




The study of attitudes toward terrorism is a vital psychological endeavor in the post-9/11 
world. Fortunately, much work has been done and the resulting literature provides a 
great deal of insight into how people respond to terrorism and other threats of 
violence.61 Unfortunately, most of the empirical work has focused on responses to past 
terrorist incidents and has looked mainly at personal factors that are related to such 
responses.62 Because each terrorist attack evokes anger and resolve, however, terrorists 
primarily achieve their goal of fear and intimidation through the threat of future attacks 
rather than the occurrence of previous ones. From a psychological perspective, the 
terrorism that has not yet happened is as important as the terrorism that just happened. 
Terrorism’s future-orientation highlights the importance of understanding how 
people respond to threats as well as to actual incidents. The best psychological approach 
to such attitudes is through the field of risk. Risk is based on judgments, and thus is 
psychological in nature. The psychological study of risk provides insight into how people 
view various threats, and therefore informs predictions about how people will react to 
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the threat of terrorism. The psychometric paradigm specifically offers a valuable 
methodology to explore which features of a terrorist incident drive psychological 
perceptions and reactions to that incident.  
Terrorism – more specifically the threat of terrorism – has become a driving cultural 
and political force. Credible threat is the currency of terrorist organizations. An 
organization that cannot threaten and be taken seriously has no power to change 
attitudes and behaviors. Because the power of terrorism comes from such threats, 
controlling risk has taken on national significance, with an entire cabinet-level 
department, as well as local and state-wide partner agencies, devoted to managing (and 
hopefully reducing) risk. These agencies cannot properly reduce risk, though, without 
first understanding how risk is perceived. Because of the United States’ political 
structure, public attitudes toward terrorism occupy a pre-eminent place in establishing 
government priorities. It is essential that psychologists develop empirically-tested 
knowledge about how these attitudes are constructed, how they change across time, and 
how they impact behavior. The literature reviewed here provides essential progress 
toward understanding terrorism attitudes, and outlines a promising framework for 
continuing that progress.  
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The National Military Strategic Plan for the War 





The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (hereinafter 
referred to as the NMSP or Plan), released by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) on February 1, 2006, sets out the Pentagon’s broad strategy for 
executing, and presumably winning, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The 
NMSP can be viewed as an elaboration of part of the larger and more holistic set 
of policies spelled out by the Department of Defense (DoD) in its June 2005 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  The Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support envisions a layered approach towards homeland 
defense and security based on a distinction between: Forward Regions, 
Approaches to the U.S., the U.S. Homeland and the Global Commons (space and 
cyberspace).1  Although the NMSP does not specifically position itself within the 
rubric of the larger June 2005 strategy paper, its focus on attacking terrorist 
networks abroad, strengthening international governance and creating a global 
environment inhospitable to terrorists suggest that it should be viewed as a DoD 
articulation of the “Forward Regions” component of the overall strategy.   
This article will focus on the Pentagon’s “Forward Regions” strategy through 
analysis of the NMSP.  The Department of Defense, of course, recognizes that 
combating the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies requires an 
approach that differs in many critical ways from the approaches needed in order 
to effectively carry out conventional warfare and even counterinsurgency warfare.  
An effective homeland security strategy, first and foremost, requires the military 
to “team-up” with civilian intelligence, law-enforcement, and, for specific 
missions, with emergency service and public health agencies as well.  With the 
exception of the National Guard, much of the military is largely unaccustomed to 
this effectively unprecedented role in which the Pentagon must “share power” 
with civilian entities.  The Department of Defense has attempted to cope with this 
quandary by supporting the distinction between “homeland defense” and 
“homeland security.”  A cynic might maintain that this distinction has been 
created in order to enable the Pentagon to retain “ownership” of a major part of 
the overall effort at securing the American homeland from terrorist threats and, 
at the same time, to enable it to play an important role under certain 
circumstances as the lead agency and under others as a supporting agency in 
domestic security and response activities.  Of course, the DoD must also comply 
with U.S. law (which limits the military’s domestic role) and, equally importantly, 
avoid irritating public and congressional sensibilities with respect to the power 
and influence, real or perceived, exercised by the military.  
Potential motives aside, it is doubtful that many would argue that protecting 
the United States from terrorism should not require a holistic approach in which 
the firefighter trained to deal with a possible chemical attack in an American city 
and the special forces soldier trained to attack terrorist hideouts in some remote 
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corner of the globe are viewed as part of the same overall mission.  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes this continuum in its emphasis on 
prevention, reduction of vulnerability to attacks that do occur, and swift recovery 
from attacks.2  Homeland Defense and Homeland Security should not, therefore, 
be viewed as different strategies, but rather different ends of a continuum that 
moves from the international arena, to the North American land-mass (and 
associated offshore areas), to the domestic arena.   
Nevertheless, if we attempt to somewhat artificially separate Homeland 
Defense from Homeland Security, we are still confronted with a lack of clarity as 
to the precise role the military must play.  The DoD’s Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support places the military in the lead role with respect to 
“defending the maritime and air approaches to the United States and protecting 
U.S. airspace, territorial seas, and territory from attacks.”3  However, civilian 
agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of 
Homeland Security (via Customs and Border Protection or the U.S. Coast Guard), 
as well as municipal police departments and county sheriff’s departments in 
border areas, would also be involved in responding to a terrorist attack in 
American airspace or across a land or maritime border.  Furthermore, it is 
entirely conceivable, particularly with respect to terrorist attacks across land or 
maritime borders, that non-DoD agencies will not only be the first to respond to 
such attacks, but may also bring those incidents to their conclusion before the 
military arrives.   
Ostensibly, there is one area of the overall homeland security-homeland 
defense continuum that lies purely within the military’s purview: overseas 
missions.  Here too, however, upon closer inspection, the picture becomes 
decidedly less clear-cut.  Fighting terrorism abroad can be viewed primarily as a 
warfighting activity and, to the degree that it is such, clearly falls within the 
purview of a purely military activity (though reports of CIA commandoes 
operating during Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, as well as the global 
activities of various defense contractors, suggest that even here the military does 
not enjoy a complete monopoly).  Fighting terrorism abroad, can also be viewed 
as a law-enforcement activity – as it is with respect to coping with terrorist 
threats emanating from the territory of America’s allies (such as those in Europe) 
or other states operating within the rule of law as legitimate members of the 
international community.  In this context, the military can, at best, play only a 
minor supporting role.  Moreover, as will be discussed below, addressing the 
terrorist threat in a truly comprehensive manner requires focusing on efforts and 
delineating policies in areas in which the military has traditionally played little or 
no role and for which it is unclear that the military possesses or intends to build 
the capabilities to address these issues. 
The upshot of the above argument is that the military, in trying to stake out a 
role in homeland security, homeland defense and overseas counter-terrorism 
efforts, has created what is likely to be an impossibly broad and multifaceted 
“operational area” requiring expertise and experience in so many different modus 
operandi and environments that the Pentagon may be placing itself in danger not 
only of doing a poor job in areas for which it lacks experience and expertise, but 
also of losing its core competency skills in the process.  In looking strictly at 
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overseas efforts, the NMSP mirrors some of these problems in that it spells out a 
very broad mission statement, far beyond core military competencies, for coping 
with overseas terrorist threats. 
The NMSP is laudable in that it shows an understanding that the terrorist 
threat is multifaceted and that it encompasses not only military, but political, 
social, economic, cultural and educational components.  However, despite the 
sophistication of its analysis of the problem, the NMSP contains a number of 
internal contradictions and, more critically, is both unachievable and takes the 
initiative out of the hands of the U.S. military on the one hand, while on the 
other, tasks the military with a broad range of largely non-military missions.  This 
article will focus on three central problems and suggest an alternate strategic 
approach and role for the military likely to be significantly more successful and 
allow it to fulfill a clearer role within the overall homeland security-homeland 
defense continuum. 
 
PROBLEM # 1: Goals Unclear and Unrealistic 
The Plan sets out the policy goal of defeating violent extremism and creating a 
global environment inhospitable to terrorists.4  While this is unquestionably a 
desirable goal, it is not fundamentally realistic and sets the bar too high with 
respect to any achievable outcomes for the GWOT.  It is highly unlikely that the 
GWOT will succeed in defeating and/or eradicating violent extremism as a threat 
to the United States for the foreseeable future and even more unlikely that the 
global environment can be made inhospitable to violent extremists to the degree 
that they will be substantially curtailed.  The intensity and scope of terrorism may 
ebb and flow over time due to a range of factors, including effective counter-
terrorism policies, but a complete negation of the present Jihadist terrorist threat 
will, under the most optimistic scenario, take several decades at the least (by 
which time new terrorist threats may well have emerged).   
To illustrate the tenacity of the terrorist phenomenon one need only turn to 
the Northern Ireland example.*  The so-called “Real IRA’s” attack in Omagh in 
August 1998 (the single worst terrorist attack carried out in Northern Ireland 
since the start of the “Troubles,” the attack resulted in twenty-nine fatalities and 
over 300 injuries) serves as one illustration of the tenacity of the terrorist 
phenomenon in the face of profound and multifaceted efforts made in the 
political, diplomatic, and military spheres to weaken popular support for terrorist 
organizations and undermine the infrastructure of those organizations.  Despite 
the ostensible “evolution” of Republican (and Unionist) groups away from 
terrorism and towards political dialogue, as represented by the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement, and despite the findings of the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning under General Sir John de Chastelain in 
September 2005 that the IRA has put its weapons “beyond use,”  Britain’s 
Security Service (MI5) was reportedly ordered in May 2006 to devote twenty 
                                                
*
 Examples of this abound, including the FARC, the PKK, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups who 
have been the subject of intensive counterterrorism activities and yet continue to pose a threat.  Space 
limitations, however, preclude the provision of additional examples to further substantiate this point. 
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percent of its already- overstretched resources to disrupting the activities of 
Republican splinter groups in Northern Ireland.5     
Consequently, while governments may adopt multifaceted approaches to 
dealing with the terrorist threat and may be able, over the span of several 
decades, to significantly impact terrorist organizations and even force some of 
them to abandon the “armed struggle,” there is still no guarantee that even more 
extreme splinter factions breaking off of those organizations will not continue to 
act. Moreover, as technology advances, significant acts of terrorism may be  
executable by increasingly smaller terrorist infrastructures and it would thus 
clearly be naive to assume that small groups of people wanting to do harm to the 
United States will no longer be a part of America’s threat environment in the 
future. 
Since the launching of the GWOT, the State Department’s Counterterrorism 
Office has indeed documented a reduction in the number of casualties from 
global terrorist attacks from 5,806 in 2001 to 3,072 in 2002, though the number 
subsequently increased to 4,192 in 2003.6  Leaving aside questions relating to the 
problematic nature of the methodology used by the State Department in 
documenting terrorist attacks, it is nonetheless clear that there is no evidence to 
point to a trend towards significant decreases in terrorism.  Admittedly it has 
been fewer than five years since the current campaign against terrorism was 
launched and thus it is difficult to predict its ultimate outcome (which is likely to 
be several decades away).  Nevertheless, if the Pentagon proposes a strategy 
geared towards the destruction of terrorism, one would expect that it should have 
a fairly clear idea as to whether or not that outcome is achievable and what is 
patently obvious at present regarding the GWOT is that no individual today can 
reasonably predict the outcome of what American leaders, from the President on 
down, have consistently portrayed as a long war.  Whether or not said terrorism 
constitutes a threat to the “American way of life” as well as the existence of a “free 
and open society” in the United States is unclear as these concepts are not clearly 
defined by the CJCS in the NMSP.   
Since September 11, 2001, there has been only one documented domestic 
terrorist attack (against passengers at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles 
International Airport on July 4, 2002 carried out by a “lone wolf” terrorist with 
no known connections to al Qaeda) as well as a few interdictions of suspected 
terrorists.  The overall paucity of attacks or attempted attacks would seem to 
suggest, given the presumably continued high motivation on the part of terrorists 
to attack the American homeland, that the threat of terrorism has substantially 
decreased within the United States.  However, terrorism still constitutes a serious 
threat to American military personnel, American interests, and U.S. allies 
worldwide – and these may be considered, by some, to be important components 
in the process of maintaining the “American way of life.”  It is also possible, for 
example, that the current “Jihad” in Iraq is acting as a lightning-rod of sorts in 
drawing Salafist recruits keen on killing Americans (military and civilian) in that 
direction, rather than towards American shores. Of course, no one can say for 
sure whether the war in Iraq has actually heightened security in the American 
homeland or potentially decreased it, due to the radicalization of larger numbers 
of Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere in the wake of the U.S. invasion.  At any rate, an 
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eventual U.S. withdrawal may free up significant numbers of Salafists for future 
attacks on the United States itself.     
Ultimately, regardless of the situation in Iraq, there are no guarantees that the 
American homeland will continue to be largely free of attacks and the CIA has 
reportedly indicated that it considers a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, or high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) terrorist attack within the United 
States to be highly probable.7   Additionally, with al Qaeda and its affiliates 
maintaining cells worldwide, increased terrorism in Europe (e.g., the Madrid and 
London attacks), and the strong electoral showing of Hamas in the West Bank 
and Gaza, extremist Shi’a factions in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
one can hardly deduce that the global environment has become substantially less 
hospitable to terrorists.  It is also unclear as to what criteria the CJCS is using to 
define the term “inhospitable.”  If that term is taken to mean that terrorists the 
world over will suffer from a lack of popular support and be constantly and 
consistently hunted down by government security forces, then, as the 
aforementioned examples illustrate, this goal is far from being achieved. 
Policy-makers in the Pentagon and elsewhere who desire to follow a realistic 
approach will be better served by not framing their counterterrorism policy in 
stark and unequivocal terms such as “defeat[ing] violent extremism” or creating 
an “inhospitable” global environment for terrorists.  There is little logic in setting 
policy goals that are unattainable, however well-meaning they are.   If one were to 
take a cynical approach and view the NMSP exclusively through the 
“Bureaucratic Politics” lens, one might conclude that the CJCS has drafted this 
strategy solely for the purpose of convincing Congress, the White House and the 
American people that the military needs to enjoy enhanced budgeting and greater 
political and operational freedom of action.  Viewed in this context, the document 
makes sense because it suggests that the military can and will actually win the 
GWOT and that the military has the capabilities to operate in a wide range of 
contexts – traditional and non-traditional – thus both reinforcing the military’s 
argument for increased funding and its argument for making the military the lead 
agency and centerpiece in the homeland security-homeland defense continuum.  
It would, however, require a highly suspicious mind to conclude that institutional 
and budgetary interests are, in fact, the main motivating factors behind the 
issuance of the NMSP.  The DoD, like any other bureaucratic entity, is interested 
in strengthening its resources and its power relative to competing agencies.  Yet 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Pentagon would risk putting forth a 
strategy of great significance for the country, based on Machiavellian 
considerations of narrow institutional interests.  This would require assuming 
that leadership in DoD, from the Secretary of Defense on down, was highly 
selective in its form of patriotism as well as reckless.  Moreover, such an 
approach would be extremely risky because if the true motivations were to come 
to light (and leaks have not been unheard of at the Pentagon), this would severely 
undermine the credibility, not only of the leadership at DoD, but of the entire 
military establishment.  Finally, the NMSP itself points to the need for a 
partnership between the military and civilian agencies and hence, while putting 
the military in a central role, does not appear to promote a DoD monopolization 
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of the war on terrorism.  It seems, at least to the author, that the strategy has to 
be taken at face value and judged based on the logic and realism of its approach.   
The most critical problem, therefore, with taking an unrealistic approach to 
designing a counterterrorism policy is that real and effective efforts to reduce 
terrorism (as opposed to defeating it) may be undermined in the public 
perception because the overall goal of the policy has not been achieved.  And it is 
clear that the phenomenon of terrorism is very much a public relations-focused 
phenomenon as both the terrorists and the government find themselves 
effectively waging a conflict for public opinion.8  To the degree that the public 
perceives itself to be reasonably safe, the government’s policies will be seen as 
successful.  Consequently, success in countering terrorism can be measured by 
the degree to which the public feels safe from terrorism.  This sense of safety has 
important ramifications for economic activity and other parameters by which a 
society may be judged capable of coping with terrorism.9   
Clearly, the public will feel completely safe if terrorism is truly eradicated, but 
as this is not a realistic proposition (given the fact that disgruntled persons are a 
constant and technology is increasingly empowering small groups of such 
persons) policy-makers are best advised to find the ways and means to bolster the 
public perception that the government is working to enhance their security rather 
than promising the public something it cannot deliver.  For this reason, it is also 
highly unlikely that the NMSP was drafted purely as a public relations document 
designed to create a popular sense of safety because if that was the primary 
reason behind its creation, this would represent an extremely risky and 
fundamentally illogical public relations strategy. 
From a public relations perspective, it is preferable to provide honest and 
accurate information to the public – even if that information is not completely 
reassuring – than to paint a rosy picture that proves to be completely wrong 
(when the almost inevitable terrorist attacks occur) and results in the military 
losing its credibility in the eyes of the public.  Such an outcome can only serve the 
terrorists by driving a wedge between the authorities and the population and 
encouraging mass hysteria, economic crisis and, in very extreme cases, the 
possible breakdown of governmental control. 
One final note on this point:  it is clear that only a tiny minority of Americans 
will ever read the NMSP. Therefore one might argue that promises galore may be 
made as no one will take the Pentagon to task for failing to achieve the goals 
spelled out in the NMSP, nor will this have much of an impact on Americans’ 
collective sense of security.  While it is undoubtedly true that the great body of 
Americans will remain ignorant by choice regarding specific strategies for waging 
the GWOT and securing the homeland, one cannot comfortably assume that the 
perhaps five to ten percent of Americans who have a real impact on life in the 
United States (prominent elected officials, economic elites, key bureaucratic 
players, members of the news media, the rare academic, and the occasional movie 
star) will remain ignorant of these strategies – particularly if they fail.  Moreover, 
while the general public may not be particularly interested in questions of 
strategy, they clearly do expect the military to protect America from terrorists.  If 
the United States falls victim to a sustained campaign of terrorism, the above 
groups, as well as growing numbers of the general public, are likely to perceive 
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the military as ineffectual and this may produce a crisis of credibility that could 
“trickle down” to society at large. 
 
PROBLEM # 2: Policy Implementation Primarily Dependent on Non-
DoD Entities 
In order to achieve the goal of defeating terrorism in the homeland and creating a 
global environment inhospitable to terrorism, the CJCS suggests that the 
Pentagon can only succeed in this mission through cooperation with other U.S. 
governmental agencies (presumably also with state and local agencies, though 
this is not explicitly clear in the language used) and with foreign governments.  
The DoD is accordingly authorized to work in cooperation with other American 
governmental entities and foreign partners to (1) thwart or defeat terrorist 
actions against the U.S. and its allies, (2) attack and disrupt international 
terrorist networks abroad, (3) deny terrorists access to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, (4) assist other countries in combating terrorism and denying 
terrorists safe havens in their national territory, and (5) creating a global 
environment inhospitable to terrorism.10   
Some of the above missions are unclear with respect to their scope or their 
intention.  For example, “thwart[ing] or defeat[ing] attacks against the U.S. and 
its allies” suggests that the Pentagon plans to militarily intervene in a wide range 
of terrorist “theaters of action” including many that are not directed at the United 
States, but rather at its allies.  This would seem to imply, therefore, that the 
Pentagon plans to fight groups as disparate and geographically dispersed as 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, Abu Sayyaf, 
the Real IRA, the followers of Shamil Basayev in Chechnya, and the like.  As it is 
doubtful that the Department of Defense is really planning to “declare war” on 
disparate terrorist organizations worldwide, suggesting that this is United States 
policy is likely to mislead allies and create unrealistic expectations as to the scope 
of the GWOT as well as its targets.  To provide just one example, it appears that 
Indo-Pakistani tensions, which almost led to the outbreak of war between the two 
nations in December 2001, were related to, on the one hand, India’s expectation 
that Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri separatist terrorism would put Pakistan 
within the camp of U.S.-defined terrorism supporters, thus bringing full U.S. 
support to bear behind India.  On the other hand, Pakistan apparently believed 
that its centrality with respect to the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda meant 
that the United States would back Islamabad in its conflict with New Delhi.11 
In addition to the issue of possible ally misunderstandings, should the United 
States fail to subsequently engage these disparate terrorist organizations, after 
seemingly having declared war on them, Washington will likely be viewed by 
international terrorists as weak, thus strengthening the belief among al Qaeda 
affiliates and others that the United States is not really capable of defeating global 
terrorism.  As matters stand now, even without the possibility that the Pentagon 
has unwittingly created a misleading perception as to the organizations to be 
targeted in the GWOT, al Qaeda has been claiming that American involvement in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has weakened the United States irreparably (and this when 
the organizations targeted by the U.S. in those countries have represented a 
fraction of global terrorist movements).12  Consequently, the creation of a 
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perception and expectation that the U.S. will fight all terrorists without exception 
will simply play into the hands of terrorists who, for purposes of political 
prestige, recruitment and the like, are working to portray the United States as 
weak and the GWOT as an abject failure. 
Another problematic element of the strategy has to do with the commitment, 
outlined in the Pentagon plan, to assist other countries in fighting terrorism and 
preventing their national territory from being used as a safe haven for terrorists.  
This represents an extremely significant commitment on the part of the U.S. 
military.  A broad range of “failed states,” “failing states,” or otherwise weak and 
misgoverned states exist in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.  
Moreover, many advanced, post-industrial states – the United States included – 
cannot guarantee complete control over their own homeland and are unable, with 
any degree of certainty, to guarantee that terrorists cannot operate from their 
territory.  Consequently, this policy implies a profound commitment in resources 
(economic and military) to a large number of countries.  There seems little doubt 
that terrorists are invariably on the lookout for failed states in which they can set 
up an infrastructure and the United States must clearly take this fact into 
account, as President Bush noted in his first National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.13  However, building a policy around the goal of assisting states in 
preventing terrorists from operating in their territory is so ambitious as to be 
largely unrealistic.  This may work to some degree in specific cases, such as with 
respect to the Philippines, but it is not likely to be successful on a significant scale 
given limited resources.14  As in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United 
States military has been unable to deny terrorists the use of at least some of the 
territory of those countries as operational safe havens.  Moreover, the cost of 
rebuilding Afghanistan has been estimated in the billions of dollars and the U.S. 
may be called upon to cover some one quarter of rebuilding costs for failed states 
such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (estimated at between 
$750 million and $3.75 billion over five years).15   
Two final examples will suffice to provide a sense of the daunting task of 
coping with the possible security threats emanating from failed states.  At 
present, sixteen of the eighteen United Nations peacekeeping or peace-building 
operations worldwide take place in failed or failing states with close to 90,000 
UN personnel involved in such missions.  For the present fiscal year, the cost of 
these missions has been estimated at $5.03 billion.16  The United Nations, 
moreover, is not the only agency involved in the peacekeeping business.  The 
West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG), which has been in existence since 
1990, has been deployed to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and has 
been instrumental in bringing at least partial stability to these failed states – yet 
the cost has been high.  In 2001, Nigeria, the largest contributor to the force, 
estimated that it has spent some $13 billion on ECOMOG since its creation.17  It 
should be borne in mind, furthermore, that these international peacekeeping 
operations fulfill a tiny fraction of the overall need for policing and stability in a 
wide variety of failed states, most of which can be used, in one form or another, 
as effective bases for global terrorism.   
Adding to the extremely problematic nature of the National Strategy is the 
fact that all of the above missions for the GWOT require significant, and in many 
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cases, primary, efforts to be made by non-DoD entities (whether U.S. 
governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local levels or foreign 
governments). This also makes the policy largely unrealistic because it is 
predicated, in essence, on the full cooperation of a broad range of American and 
international governmental entities.  Even in the highly unlikely event that this 
“coalition” of entities can be assembled, there is not likely to be agreement as to 
which agency should take the lead (not to mention which country).   Moreover, if 
the United States feels sufficiently threatened, it is not likely to want to encumber 
itself with a multilateral international response.  And, for that matter, the 
Pentagon is likely to want to maintain control of the response and not have to 
share decision-making authority with other federal agencies.  Take Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, 
as an example. At European urging, NATO (invoking Article V of its founding 
treaty) declared that an attack on the United States was an attack on all member 
states, yet the United States largely bypassed the alliance in favor of what was a 
primarily unilateral action.18  
Quite a number of countries are involved in different aspects of the GWOT and 
each operates autonomously and with its own set of interests.  Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, to name just two countries, clearly have very different objectives and 
interests in fighting global Jihadism; to expect both to follow American priorities 
and interests is simply impracticable.  Moreover the problem is not just an 
international one.  Within the United States, the GWOT (in its Homeland 
Security context) is “fought” overwhelmingly by law enforcement entities – most 
of whom are local governmental entities.  A host of legal and resource issues 
ensure that the U.S. Northern Command plays a largely marginal role in domestic 
counterterrorism. Beyond this, the myriad of diplomatic, informational, 
economic and financial counterterrorism efforts is largely not within the purview 
of the military, this despite the fact that the military has, through the NMSP, 
established that its policy is predicated on success in these areas as well. 
Consequently, by establishing the above goals as its policy objective, the 
Pentagon is putting itself in a position of weakness because it will be unable to 
achieve, on its own, objectives that are essentially dependent on the goodwill and 
cooperation of other entities, foreign and domestic.    
 
PROBLEM #3: Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism is Not a 
Feasible Goal 
The National Military Strategy puts much emphasis on its assertion that 
ideological support for terrorism constitute the enemy’s “strategic center of 
gravity,” and that the military can help undermine such support through: (1) 
creating a secure environment for political moderates (presumably in countries 
where such moderates face intimidation in the face of support for terrorists), (2) 
demonstrating goodwill through humanitarian assistance, (3) strengthening 
military-to-military contacts in order to influence foreign leaders in their 
counterterrorism policies, (4) conducting operations abroad in a manner that 
does not offend the sensibilities of foreigners, and (5) strengthening the voices of 
moderates abroad through information operations.19   
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While the document does acknowledge that the military is not likely to be the 
lead agency in this area, it nevertheless sets goals, in partnership with other 
federal agencies, that will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.  Most students of 
terrorism acknowledge that in order for terrorism to be effective, it requires a 
minimal base of popular backing in the form of passive and active cadres of 
supporters or, using the systems analysis model, a series of mutually 
interdependent concentric rings moving from the hard-core leadership to various 
levels of sympathizers fulfilling a myriad of support and infrastructure 
functions.20  It is therefore clear that terrorists will have a significantly more 
difficult time operating in a hostile public environment and a number of cases 
have shown that terrorist groups will sometimes change tactics when faced with a 
possible significant drop in support among traditional groups of supporters.21  
Consequently, the goal of encouraging political moderates in countries in which 
terrorists derive popular support is unquestionably praiseworthy.  The problem is 
that it is not clear how this will be accomplished and whether the Pentagon, in 
cooperation with or independent of other federal agencies, possesses the 
wherewithal to achieve this objective.    
The creation of a secure environment for moderates throughout the Middle 
East, to take what is perhaps the most problematic region in this context as an 
example, requires a mind-boggling investment in resources and manpower.  
Among the many measures that such a policy is likely to require are: (1) the 
provision of significant military forces to maintain law and order in the absence 
of the ability and/or willingness of the host country to provide a physically safe 
environment for moderates (something that does not exist in Iraq today despite 
the current deployment of some 150,000 U.S. troops in that country), (2) the 
revamping of educational systems in most Middle East countries in a manner 
that will encourage the teaching of moderation and democratic principles and 
eschew time-honored religious and societal values, (3) the creation of democratic 
political systems that encourage political moderation and moderate debate, and 
(4) the creation of a significant upwardly-mobile middle class that can act as a 
repository of moderation and democratic values.  In short, the task is daunting to 
say the least – so daunting in fact, as to be wholly quixotic.  Moreover, such a 
policy would clash with the fourth policy goal: conducting foreign operations in a 
manner that is politically, socially, and culturally acceptable to the target 
populations.  The deployment of significant numbers of U.S. troops in order to 
provide security for political moderates is not likely to endear the United States 
to those target populations and not likely to foster credibility for the kind of 
moderate and democratic values that the policy aims to encourage and solidify.  
Similarly, the creation of U.S.-funded, or at least U.S.-vetted, educational systems 
is highly likely to be seen (given the current environment of mistrust, if not 
outright hostility, towards the United States) as a form of American “cultural 
imperialism” and consequently has a very low probability of success.   
The National Strategy also suffers from inherent contradictions in that, on the 
one hand, it tasks the military (albeit in cooperation with other federal agencies) 
with the job of creating a supportive environment for moderates in the Islamic 
world and yet, on the other hand, recognizes that support for moderation and the 
eschewing of violence and terrorism must come from the Muslim inhabitants of 
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these countries.  The Islamic world is expected to “progressively recognize… 
[that] violent extremist actions… [are]…a threat to itself through introspection” 
(emphasis added).22  It is not clear whether the National Strategy envisions that 
introspection to come about as a result of introducing U.S. “boots on the ground” 
in those countries (in order to provide security to moderates and thus foster a 
climate of debate and introspection) or whether it will come about through active 
hostilities that will cause sufficient hardship to Muslims that they will realize the 
“error of their ways” and, through introspection, reach the conclusion that the 
path of moderation is best.   
It thus appears that the “bottom line” of the CJCS’s National Military 
Strategy for the War on Terrorism is that the success of U.S. counterterrorism 
policy is dependent on the willingness of the Islamic world to overcome the 
powerful attraction of Salafist Islam.  By essentially suggesting this, the Pentagon 
has absolved itself of ultimate responsibility for effectively fighting terrorism as 
the military is not likely to be a successful agent for change at the grassroots level 
in the Islamic world.   Yet at the same time, the CJCS has set the initiation of this 
change, and the subsequent expected reduction in, or eradication of, terrorism as 
a central policy goal for the military. 
 
 
LIMITING GOALS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS 
The NMSP’s primary flaw is that it sets out policy goals that are highly 
impractical and ultimately largely unachievable.†  In so doing, it will not only 
embolden America’s enemies when the United States invariably fails to achieve 
those policy goals, but also will create unrealistic expectations among allies and 
the American public (or at least the more prominent segments within it).  The 
danger here is that not meeting those expectations will create a sense that the 
government and military are losing the war on terrorism because central policy 
goals set out by the military are not being met.  Furthermore, due to the highly 
psychological nature of terrorism, if Americans become convinced that the 
United States is losing the war on terrorism, the United States will, in effect, have 
lost.  Even in the case of conventional wars, public sentiment can play a crucial 
role (many historians point to the fact that the U.S. lost the Vietnam War in the 
court of public opinion and not on the battlefield).  What is true for a 
conventional war is true even more so for the Global War on Terrorism.   
                                                
†
 While one might argue that the goals set out in the NMSP do not have to be achieved simultaneously and 
therefore some of the objectives may meaningfully be addressed first and others later, a closer look at the 
strategy shows that progress in one area is dependent on parallel progress in other areas.  The NMSP in fact 
refers to elements of the strategy being buttressed by “cross-cutting enablers” (i.e., factors that affect all of 
the components of the strategy).  For example, attacking terrorists abroad, one of the components of the 
strategy, requires expanding foreign partnerships, strengthening capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition of 
CBRNE, and institutionalizing international strategies against terrorism – all of these being cross-cutting 
enablers.  Consequently, the policy being proposed resembles a matrix in which forward movement 
requires advancement both in the components of policy and in the so-called cross-cutting enablers.  This, in 
fact, largely precludes the option of focusing first on only a few components of the policy and then moving 
forward on others. 
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Some may argue that the DoD should purposefully set out goals that are more 
“aspirational” in nature – in other words, goals that one does not expect 
realistically to achieve, but that outline the vision and direction policy should 
take.  It is intuitive that policymaking without vision lacks coherence and 
cohesion.  Viewed within this rubric, the NMSP might not be seen as quite so 
problematic.  However, the need for vision does not mean that all policy 
documents at all levels should incorporate so-called aspirational goals.  In this 
instance, the vision for defeating global terrorism would probably best be 
expressed at the White House/NSC level (rather than at the level of those who are 
more frequently tasked with implementing policy) and when it is expressed by 
the president, should be clearly labeled as “aspirational,” “long term,” “visionary,” 
and the like, so as not to create the impression that is within the country’s 
immediate grasp. 
Given the above, in order to develop a credible and realistic strategy for 
dealing with terrorism, the military should play to its strengths and comparative 
advantages.  The military establishment’s primary role is to apply physical power 
in order to achieve national objectives.  In this case, this means that the military 
focuses on the physical disruption of terrorist networks and the apprehension or 
liquidation of individual terrorists.  The NMSP correctly spells out these goals 
and notes that they are a major part of the military’s mission,  but then it goes 
into unfamiliar territory, for the military, by dealing with overtly non-military 
issues as well as ones in which the DoD subordinates itself to other domestic 
agencies and/or foreign countries.  The American public can legitimately and 
realistically expect the military to be competent and effective (though not 
necessarily successful 100% of the time) in counterterrorist efforts within the 
purely military sphere.  Why, then, should the Pentagon willingly embrace 
“mission creep” and dive head-and-shoulders into complex and muddled 
economic, financial, cultural, educational, etc. issues that relate to broader 
societies?  The military is infinitely more prepared and competent to arrest or kill 
terrorists and destroy their bases than it is to change values, societal structures, 
and political regimes.  It is immeasurably better to produce a successful limited 
policy than a failed all-encompassing one.  As with any illness, it is always better 
to treat the root causes, but some diseases are presently incurable and the best 
way to manage them is by addressing their symptoms.   
The Pentagon should also understand that it cannot stand aside and put the 
impetus for change on others – particularly societies that are not predisposed to 
view the United States, or Western values and culture in general, in a positive 
light.  If the success of the military’s counterterrorism efforts is dependent on 
fundamental change being initiated by Muslims from within the Islamic world, 
then the military has willingly abrogated its control of the situation and virtually 
ensured that its policy (barring any sudden, dramatic democratization of the 
Islamic world – something which is a distinctly unlikely eventuality) will be seen 
as a failure.  This will ultimately create serious misgivings within American 
society and produce the opposite of what the military is trying to achieve.  Instead 
of strengthening America’s security (through creating a strong public sense of 
security) the military will have unwittingly contributed to undermining that 
security.   
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In sum, the National Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism should be 
just that: a military strategy, not a political, economic, or social one.  The 
argument presented here does not suggest that the elements of “Soft Power” 
referred to in the NMSP (such as economic, cultural, educational, and attitudinal 
issues) do not need to be addressed or that they are not desirable components 
(allowing for the fact that some are more aspirational in nature and others more 
concrete) of an overarching counterterrorism policy.  Rather, the author takes 
issue with the military taking “ownership” of this strategy because the military is 
far more qualified to address the elements of “Hard Power” (in this case, 
attacking terrorist bases overseas and the regimes that harbor them) than it is in 
addressing these other issues. 
Whether Americans and other Westerners care to admit this or not, Jihadist 
terrorism is likely to be a reality for some time to come and there is probably little 
the United States can do to fundamentally alter the status quo in the lslamic 
world.  The U.S. military can, however, fight terrorists in the traditional sense of 
the term.  By setting this as its true policy goal, the Pentagon will be creating a 
goal that is achievable.  “Fighting” does not imply always “winning,” but 
ultimately the American public will be more reassured when they see a limited 
and realistic policy pursued rather than seeing their military touting a military 
cum-political-economic-cultural-educational panacea that is highly likely to be an 
unmitigated failure.   
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Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat 






The greatest security threat facing the United States is not from formal states, but from 
terrorist organizations that attack informally, using terror at any time and place, with 
the goal of undermining confidence in U.S. institutions and the American way of life. No 
longer a structured battle that can be fought with military power, the war against 
terrorism will be won with superior knowledge. 
Due to the changing nature of homeland security issues, a new type of intelligence is 
needed by homeland security: social network analysis (SNA). The basis of social network 
analysis (also known as network science or network sociology) is that individual nodes 
(which, depending on the type of network, can be people, events, etc.) are connected by 
complex yet understandable relationships that form networks.1 These networks are 
ubiquitous, with an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural 
basis of many natural events, organizations, and social processes. 
Terrorist organizations are well-suited to study using social network analysis, as they 
consist of networks of individuals that span countries, continents, and economic status, 
and form around specific ideology. Terrorist organizations are different from 
hierarchical, state-sponsored appointments in characteristics such as leadership and 
organizational structure. Social network analysis can provide important information on 
the unique characteristics of terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network 
recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas. Specifically, social 
network analysis can be used to understand terrorist networks, inform U.S. homeland 
security policy, and form the basis of a more effective counter-measure to net war. 
 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The origin of contemporary social network analysis can be traced back to the work of 
Stanley Milgram.2 In his famous 1967 experiment, Milgram conducted a test to 
understand how people are connected to others by asking random people to forward a 
package to any of their acquaintances who they thought might be able to reach the 
specific target individual.3 In his research, Milgram found that most people were 
connected by six acquaintances. This research led to the famous phrase “six degrees of 
separation,” which is still widely used in popular culture.   
Another important step in the development of social network analysis was the work 
of Mark Granovetter on network structures. In his widely-cited 1973 article “The 
Strength of Weak Ties,” Granovetter argues that “weak ties” – your relationships with 
acquaintances – are more important than “strong ties” – your relationships with family 
and close friends – when trying to find employment.4 Granovetter's article and 
subsequent research extended this argument by positing that more disperse, non-
redundant, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, 
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denser, and more interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of 
knowledge and information. 
D.J. Watts’ small world hypothesis builds upon both Milgram’s “six degrees of 
separation” concept and Granovetter’s “weak ties” argument by stating that most 
networks in the natural and man-made world are highly clustered yet far-reaching.5 
These networks have a “clustered” center, where most nodes are neighbors, tightly 
interconnected.  In addition, each has weak ties that can connect it to any node in the 
network in a few short connections. For example, if a node represents a person, a 
person’s friendship network is generally tightly connected, with common friends, 
similar backgrounds, and overlaps. However, despite this “clustered” inner core, as 
shown with Milgram’s “six degrees of separation,” a person can reach a stranger in the 
world through only a few small steps/connections. Watts’ small world argument has 
been extended by numerous researchers to help understand the structure and behavior 
of various networks, including the spread of AIDS, the collapse of financial markets, and 
the spread of information.6   
The value of social network theory versus other political science and sociological 
approaches is its focus on the value of the network structure rather than the 
characteristics of the individual. While social network analysis leaves room for 
individuals to affect their fate, it argues that the structure of the network and 
relationships and ties with others in the network are more important. The network 
structure of an organization (in this case a terrorist organization) will affect its ability to 
access new ideas, recruit new individuals, and achieve sustainability. Network analysis 
seems to work because it provides a structural analysis while still leaving room for 
individual effort. In a sense, network analysis builds upon many organizational theories, 
since networks are just another organizational structure. As Charles Perrow discusses in 
his work Complex Organizations, many organizational theories have evolved over time 
in an attempt to explain the organization structures of the related era.7 Network 
structure is a modern organizational structure, whose power may be built upon the idea 
of disintermediation. Disintermediation is the removal of the intermediary role in a 
process or supply chain, a proverbial "cutting out the middleman." Modern social 
networks are building upon this idea of disintermediation as individuals can directly 
connect to each other especially with the advancements of modern telecommunications 
and the Internet. The power of loosely structured networks is that they can move quickly 
and be adaptive, as they do not need to go through layers of a hierarchical chain. 
Disintermediation is important for terrorist networks as they have cut out layers of 
bureaucracy; individuals can join a network through weak ties and plan attacks through 
loose connections.   
While social network analysis has been present in some form for decades, the concept 
entered popular culture in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Malcolm Gladwell’s 
bestseller The Tipping Point uses basic network ideology to describe how real-world 
social epidemics occur, such as the popularity of Airwalk shoes and the decline of crime 
in New York City.8 Gladwell describes the importance of three types of people: 
connectors, mavens, and salesman. Gladwell builds upon Watts' research as he 
describes connectors – those with wide social circles – as the hubs of the human social 
network and responsible for the small world phenomenon.   
The use of social network analysis in the mainstream has increased with the growth 
of a number of new online Internet sites based on social network principles. For 
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example, MySpace, Friendster, and Facebook are three websites that allow users to 
connect with friends and friends of friends to share photos, blogs, user profiles, and 
messages. Especially important in teenager culture, these sites map out each user's 
network of friends and acquaintances. According to Alexa.com, a web trafficking service, 
as of April 2006, MySpace is the third most popular website in the U.S. and the sixth 
most popular in the world ("Top 500 Sites"). Further, similar websites have been 
created in the employment field. Sites such as LinkedIn allow members to map their 
professional connections and allow employers and employees to use their associations 
as references in job matching. 
 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND TERRORISM  
The importance of SNA in fighting the war on terrorism was recognized even before the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s work Networks and 
Netwars, which was released in 2001 before the terrorist attacks, describes the 
increased network principles in modern criminal organizations.9 The premise of the 
book is that war is no longer a head-to-head battle of two powers. There is no formal 
hierarchical-based enemy like the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. Modern war is netwar, 
a lower-intensity battle by terrorists, criminals, and extremists with a networked 
organizational structure. These networked structures are often leaderless and able to 
attack more quickly. Novel, asymmetric approaches are needed to combat a network-
based criminal organization.   
After the attacks of 9/11, academia, the government, and even mainstream media 
began to discuss the importance of social network analysis in fighting terrorism. 
Mainstream media outlets such as the Washington Post and the Dallas Morning News 
ran articles describing the potential benefits of network science.10 Authors of popular 
press network books, such as Antonio-Laszlo Barabasi (Linked), were interviewed 
extensively, on television and radio programs, on how we could use the knowledge of 
social networks to fight terrorism. Further, when the National Security Agency’s 
warrant-less eavesdropping program hit the news in 2006, the importance of social 
network analysis in fighting terrorism reemerged in a New York Times article discussing 
the ability of network analysis to map and potentially make meaning out of the millions 
of communications NSA intercepts daily between individuals.11 
 
Academic Activities 
After 9/11, social network experts in academia began to look explicitly at the use of 
network methodology in understanding and countering terrorism. The listserv 
associated with the leading social network organization, International Network for 
Social Network Analysis (INSNA), was inundated with questions, comments, and 
concerns over the role of social network analysis in the fight against terrorism. In the 
winter of 2001, Connections, the social network journal affiliated with INSNA, devoted 
an issue to social network analysis and terrorism. In this issue, Valdis Krebs begins to 
map the Al-Qaeda network by collecting public available data on the Al-Qaeda hijackers 
and running basic network principles through computer software.12 The rest of the 
articles in this issue are more or less data-free. Kathleen Carley and others describe the 
potential uses of social network analysis and multi-agent modeling to destabilize 
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terrorist networks.13 Richard Rothenberg conjectures on the structure of the al Qaeda 
terrorist network based on newspaper articles and radio commentary.14   
Since the winter of 2001, the academic world has increased the attention paid to the 
social network analysis of terrorism as a result of public interest and new grant money.15 
Network analysis of terrorist organizations continues to grow and can be divided into 
two groups:  the data collectors and the modelers. 
 
Data Collectors 
Data collection is difficult for any network analysis because it is hard to create a 
complete network. It is especially difficult to gain information on terrorist networks. 
Terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members, and the 
government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data. A number of 
academic researchers focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, 
analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling. Valdis 
Krebs was one of the first to collect data using public sources with his 2001 article in 
Connections. In this work, Krebs creates a pictorial representation of the al Qaeda 
network responsible for 9/11 that shows the many ties between the hijackers of the four 
airplanes. After the Madrid bombing in 2004, Spanish sociologist Jose A. Rodriguez 
completed an analysis similar to Krebs’ by using public sources to map the March 11th 
terrorist network. In his research, he found diffuse networks based on weak ties 
amongst the terrorists.16  
Another bright spot is the 2004 publication of Understanding Terror Networks by 
Marc Sageman. Using public sources, Sageman collects biographies of 172 Islamic 
terrorist operatives affiliated with the global Salafi jihad (the violent revivalist Islamic 
movement led by al Qaeda). He uses social network analysis specifically on Al Qaeda 
operatives since 1998. This analysis yields four large terrorist clusters.  The first cluster 
resides in the Pakistan-Afghan border and consists of the central staff of al Qaeda and 
the global Salafist jihad movement. The second cluster is a group of operatives located 
in core Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait. The third cluster is 
known as the Maghreb Arabs who, although they come from North African nations, 
currently reside in France and England. The final cluster is centered in Indonesia and 
Malaysia and is affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah.17   
Despite their many strengths, Krebs’ and Sageman’s works have a few key drawbacks. 
By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open 
sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do 
not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. If one 
cannot find an al Qaeda operative in the U.S. in publicly available sources, the 
researcher could assume there is no al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable 
this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing 
an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more 
descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers 
could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might 
be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional 
analytical framework. 
One promising activity is the development of a major terrorism web portal at the 
University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center. This website makes social network 
tools and data related to terrorism publicly available.18 One example is the Terrorism 
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Knowledge Portal, a database consisting of over 360,000 terrorism news articles and 
related Web pages coming from various high-quality terrorism Web sites, major search 
engines, and news portals. By providing publicly available network tools and data, the 
research opens itself to a number of new scholars. Academics can double-check the work 
of others to ensure quality. New scholars can enter the field without the lengthy time 
commitment and financial cost of developing basic tools and getting data. Such 
activities, combined with the federal government’s support, will help push the field of 
terrorism-related social network analysis to new heights in the future.   
 
Modelers 
Complex models have been created that offer insight on theoretical terrorist networks. 
Kathleen Carley heads one of the largest computational model organizations that 
models terrorist networks, Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational 
Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University. Carley, along with her team of faculty 
and graduate students, has a number of ongoing projects in the Networks and Terrorism 
division that have received funding from government sources ranging from the Office of 
Naval Research to the Department of Defense. In a series of projects, Carley and her 
collaborators deal with a variety of terrorism-related issues. They looked at how to 
model the shape of a covert network when little information is known, through 
predictive modeling techniques based on inherent network structures.19 Using a 
computational tool created at CASOS known as DyNet, they looked at ways to estimate 
vulnerabilities and destabilize terrorist networks.20 They also developed a city-level 
network model of chemical and biological attacks (BioWar) in an attempt to understand 
how people move in networks that affect what they know, what they do, how they 
respond, especially when they get diseases, how they get diseases, and how they react.21 
Finally, they use network text analysis, a method used to define and model the 
relationships between words in a text, to turn raw text related to Mideast covert 
networks into a pictorial network representation of the social and organizational 
structure of a covert network.22 Besides the aforementioned work, Carley and her team 
are beginning to look at a range of other related issues including work on the 
effectiveness of wiretapping programs in mapping the networks of rapidly evolving 
covert organizations.23 
There has been limited work in the field of complex modeling of terrorist networks 
outside the work of Kathleen Carley and her associates. One group using complex 
models to look at terrorism issues is the researchers at the University of Arizona Dark 
Web Terrorism Research Center. In a series of articles, researchers at this center 
published a number of articles in which they used social network tools to study 
extremist-group web forums.24 Through the analysis of web forum activities, they were 
able to construct social network maps and organization structures. In addition, in 2002, 
Tami Carpenter and others began to look at some of the practical issues and algorithms 
for analyzing terrorist networks by discussing a number of ways to construct various 
social network measures when dealing with covert networks.25 Besides the 
aforementioned works, a few of the major social network analysis scholars such as Steve 
Borgatti at Boston College and David Jensen at University of Massachusetts have 
discussed the general implications of social network analysis of terrorist networks in 
invited presentation and conference talks; but they have not undertaken the issue in 
detail with complex modeling.   
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A common problem for the modelers is the issue of data. Any academic work is only 
as good as the data, no matter the type of advanced methods used. Modelers often do 
not have the best data, as they have not collected individual biographies (like Sageman) 
and do not have access to classified data. Many of the models are created data-free or 
without complete data, yet do not fully consider human and data limitations. The 
implication of this is that the results can be potentially misleading, as they cannot take 
into account behavioral and contextual issues that might affect the network structure 
and activity. For example, it would be quite difficult to model the network structure and 
evolution of al Qaeda since many of the organizations that claim ties to al Qaeda are 
lying and do not actually have those ties. It can be quite difficult differentiating these 
groups from other, truly loosely affiliated groups.   
In addition, modelers often do not have a foundation in terrorist studies nor do they 
always work with top counter-terrorism experts. Without the help of counter-terrorism 
experts or a background in terrorism studies, it is difficult to turn the numbers and 
graphic models into interpretable results that make sense in the context of the vast 
literature on terrorism. The vast body of knowledge in terrorism studies created since 
the 1970s can provide a context for the network data created by the modelers, including 
the historical and political trends exhibited in terrorism, reasons people join terrorist 
groups, and the psychology of terrorist attack tactics, including suicide terrorism.26   
 
Government Activities 
Despite the seeming novelty of social network analysis, the federal government has used 
link analysis, a predecessor of SNA, for nearly fifty years. Karl Van Meter describes the 
two main types of link analysis: the village survey method and traffic analysis.27 The 
village survey method was created and used by Ralph McGehee of the CIA in Thailand in 
the 1960s to understand family and community relationships. He conducted a series of 
open-ended interviews and in a short time was able to map out the clandestine structure 
of local and regional Communist organizations and associated "sympathetic" groups. 
Traffic analysis (also known as communication link analysis) began during World War 
II and its importance continues to this day. This technique consists of the study of the 
external characteristics of communication in order to get information about the 
organization of the communication system. It is not concerned with the content of 
phone calls, but is interested in who calls whom and the network members, messengers, 
and gatekeepers. Traffic analysis was used by the British MI5 internal security service to 
combat the IRA in the 1980s and 1990s and continues to be used across the world by 
law-enforcement agencies including the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Office 
of National Drug Control Policy.28   
The Analyst Notebook is the primary software used for link analysis. Currently on its 
sixth version, this software is recognized as one of the world’s leading analytical tools 
and is employed in more than 1,500 organizations ("Contraband Enforcement"). Social 
network analysis improves upon link analysis by moving from single variable analysis to 
multivariate analysis, allowing the individual to control for many factors at once. The 
change from single variable to multivariate analysis is quite significant when 
researching terrorism: a number of factors affect terrorism, not one single factor. For 
example, the propensity for one to participate in a terrorist activity might not be 
strongly affected by the single variable of being related to a terrorist member. However, 
the combination of multiple variables such as poverty, type of government, combined 
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with the link to a terrorist member may cause a person to participate in a terrorist 
activity. Multivariate analysis allows us to take into account these multiple variables and 
their effects when controlling for another variable. 
From the outside, it is difficult to understand how social network analysis is being 
used in the federal government. Confidentiality prevents government social network 
analysts from discussing their work with professors and private companies without 
security clearances. Despite this lack of information, it is clear that the federal 
government is interested in using network techniques in fighting the war on terror.  
Many government agencies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), U.S. Army Research Labs, the U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR), the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have funded research related to social 
network analysis. Also in the past few years, government agencies such as the Navy 
Joint Warfare Committee have created openings for network analysts. DHS has 
instituted the Department of Homeland Security Graduate Fellowship program for 
graduate students interested in terrorist-related studies.  This program has funded 
research specifically in the field of network analysis.  However, aside from these 
activities, the number of government employees actually using network analysis is 
unclear. The best evidence in this regard is the admission, by the few known 
government social network analysts, that social network techniques are quite prevalent 
but they will not discuss the specifics of this approach’s use in government anti-terrorist 
activities.   
  
DISCUSSION 
The main limitation of social network analysis is the same that applies to any new and 
innovative technology: social network analysis is just one tool that can be used to 
understand terrorism, and is just one piece of the puzzle. Subject matter experts are 
needed to provide a context for the research. Furthermore, the basic assumption of 
network analysis regarding terrorism may not be completely valid. Despite their non-
hierarchical approach, terrorist organizations are not completely organized in a network 
structure. There are still central headquarters and training facilities for most terrorist 
organizations. Also, social network analysis must attempt to address the underlying root 
cause of terrorism. It is helpful to understand how a network evolves and how to 
destabilize a network. It is more helpful, however, to understand how networks recruit 
participants and why people wish to join terrorist networks.   
I would like to see an expansion of the research areas in which network analysis is 
being used with regard to terrorism. Only a limited amount of work has been completed, 
and there is much room for this tool to yield great insights into terrorism. I would be 
particularly interested to see this method used to analyze network recruitment.  
Network analysis could identify recruiters from peripheral participants, as well as the 
demographic and personal characteristics that repel – as well as draw – an individual to 
a terrorist organization. Are terrorist recruiters generally introduced to the organization 
through weak ties or strong ties? These characteristics may also affect the individual’s 
degree of participation in terrorist activity. Such research could potentially help 
intelligence analysts in creating strategies to counteract terrorist recruiting initiatives. 
  Network analysis can also be used to understand the psychological effect of 
terrorism. One of the main effects of terrorism is fear, which is spread through network 
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structures such as media, the Internet, and personal relationships. For example, the 
number of ties an individual has to victims of terrorism may impact the individual’s 
perception of the risk of terrorism. Finally, I would like to see further research on 
network structure evolution. It would be interesting to compare the structure of 
multiple terrorist networks to see how they evolve over time. The network structure may 
impact the ability of an organization to endure over the years and complete attacks. It is 
important for intelligence analysts to understand how to break up a network; they could 
potentially exploit the small world topology by eliminating weak ties in order to isolate 
the network and diminish its reach and power. The removal of individuals in key 
network locations may be even more important than attacking the traditional leaders of 
a group. 
Further, I hope to see an expanded use of social network analysis among homeland 
security educators and practitioners. Homeland security education is in a pre-paradigm 
phase as a professional discipline and is being conceptualized differently among 
educators. Christopher Bellavita and Ellen Gordon have identified over fifty topic areas 
related to homeland security education; I would like social network analysis to be taught 
as one of the tools available in a number of these areas, including risk management and 
analysis, intelligence, terrorism prevention, and the sociology of homeland security.29 
Further, I would like to see increased use of social network analysis by intelligence 
analysts. As Bellavita has pointed out, the U.S. suffers from the fear of imagination when 
it focuses on the idea of prevention and we need new tools.30 It is difficult for a 
hierarchical organization to cope with a widely dispersed, loosely integrated, 
disintermediated adversary; the U.S. government may want to consider changing some 
of its organizational structures to effectively fight such a foe. It may be worth 
experimenting with pilot programs in the intelligence community that consist of 
decentralized, loose networks of government employees, spanning the globe with 
various jobs and ideas, but focused on one goal: stopping terrorists.  
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Suggested Web Links 
http://www.insna.org (International Network for Social Network Analysis) 
http://www.orgnet.com (Valdis Krebs’ web page on social network analysis) 
http://ai.bpa.arizona.edu (University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center) 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu (Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational  
   Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University) 
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